Double Deterrence and International Mediation by Kocaman, Anil
  
 
 
 
 
 
        Double Deterrence and International Mediation 
 
   
                 Dissertation  
                                      zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
              der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät  
         der Georg-August-Universität  
 
                      vorgelegt von    
         ANIL KOCAMAN 
  geboren in Ankara, Türkei 
      
             
             Göttingen, 2018 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Erstbetreuer:          Prof. h.c. Dr. Peter W. Schulze 
Weitere Betreuer:  Prof. Dr. Walter Reese-Schäfer 
                               Prof. Dr. Anja Jetschke 
  
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 27.09.2017 
i 
 
       
 
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Defining the Problem ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 International Mediation ........................................................................................................ 4 
1.3 Nuclear Deterrence .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.3.1 Deterrence during the Cold War .................................................................................... 8 
1.3.2 Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War.................................................................... 11 
1.3.2.1 Pivotal Deterrence ................................................................................................ 13 
1.3.2.2 Multilateral Deterrence ......................................................................................... 15 
1.3.2.3 Collective Actor Deterrence ................................................................................. 16 
1.4 Hypothesis .......................................................................................................................... 18 
1.5 Variables ............................................................................................................................ 20 
1.6 Research Questions ............................................................................................................ 20 
1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................................... 21 
1.7.1 Case Selection .............................................................................................................. 21 
1.7.2 The Dyadic Crises as Other Possible Cases ................................................................. 21 
1.7.3 Evaluation of the Data.................................................................................................. 24 
1.7.4 Criteria in Analyzing the Data ..................................................................................... 24 
1.7.4.1 First Group of Cases: Nonnuclear Phase ............................................................. 24 
1.7.4.1.1 Expectation 1 .................................................................................................... 24 
1.7.4.1.2 Expectation 2 .................................................................................................... 25 
1.7.4.1.3 Expectation 3 .................................................................................................... 25 
1.7.4.2 Second Group of Cases: Nuclear Phase ............................................................... 25 
1.7.4.2.1 Expectation 4 .................................................................................................... 25 
1.7.4.2.2 Expectation 5 .................................................................................................... 26 
1.7.4.2.3 Expectation 6 .................................................................................................... 26 
2 METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................................... 28 
ii 
 
2.1 First Group of Cases: Non-nuclear Phase ......................................................................... 28 
2.1.1 India – Pakistan War of 1947 ....................................................................................... 28 
2.1.1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 28 
2.1.1.2 The US Mediation ................................................................................................. 32 
2.1.1.3 The Soviet Mediation ........................................................................................... 33 
2.1.1.4 The China’s Mediation ......................................................................................... 35 
2.1.2 The Rann of Kutch Crisis............................................................................................. 39 
2.1.2.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 39 
2.1.2.2 US Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis ........................................................... 40 
2.1.2.3 Soviet Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis ...................................................... 42 
2.1.2.4 Chinese Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis ................................................... 42 
2.1.3 The India-Pakistan War of 1965 .................................................................................. 44 
2.1.3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 44 
2.1.3.2 US Mediation of the India - Pakistan War of 1965 .............................................. 45 
2.1.3.3 The Soviet Mediation of India – Pakistan War of 1965 ....................................... 49 
2.1.3.4 The Chinese Mediation of Indian – Pakistan War of 1965 .................................. 53 
2.1.4 India – Pakistan War of 1971 ....................................................................................... 57 
2.1.4.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 57 
2.1.4.2 US Mediation of India – the Pakistan War of 1971 .............................................. 59 
2.1.4.3 The Soviet Mediation of India – Pakistan War of 1971 ....................................... 61 
2.1.4.4 Chinese Mediation of the India – Pakistan War of 1971 ...................................... 64 
2.2 The Second Group of Cases: Nuclear Phase ..................................................................... 67 
2.2.1 The Nuclearization of the Crisis .................................................................................. 67 
2.2.2 The Crises at the Beginning of 1980s and Kahuta Crisis ............................................ 73 
2.2.3 The Brasstacks Crisis ................................................................................................... 76 
2.2.4 The 1990 Kashmir Crisis ............................................................................................. 82 
2.2.4.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 82 
2.2.4.2 US Mediation of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis: .......................................................... 85 
iii 
 
2.2.4.3 The Soviet Mediation of 1990 Kashmir Crisis ..................................................... 88 
2.2.4.4 Chinese Mediation of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis .................................................... 91 
2.2.5 1999 Kargil War........................................................................................................... 92 
2.2.5.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 92 
2.2.5.2 US Mediation of the 1999 Kargil War ................................................................. 94 
2.2.5.3 Russian Mediation of 1999 Kargil War ................................................................ 97 
2.2.5.4 Chinese Mediation of the 1999 Kargil War .......................................................... 98 
2.2.6 Attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the Military Standoff ........................ 100 
2.2.6.1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 100 
2.2.6.2 US Mediation of the Crisis ................................................................................. 105 
2.2.6.3 Russian Mediation of the Crisis .......................................................................... 108 
2.2.6.4 Chinese Mediation of the Crisis ......................................................................... 114 
2.2.7 Mumbai Terrorists Attacks in November 2008 ......................................................... 117 
2.2.7.1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 117 
2.2.7.2 US Mediation of the 2008 Mumbai Crisis .......................................................... 119 
2.2.7.3 Russian Mediation of the 2008 Mumbai Crisis .................................................. 120 
2.2.7.4 The Chinese Mediation of 2008 Mumbai Crisis................................................. 121 
2.3 Complementary / Discussion Cases ................................................................................. 123 
2.3.1 The Crises between India and China .......................................................................... 123 
2.3.2 The Relations between the US, Russia, and China in the Post-Cold War Era ........... 129 
2.3.2.1 The Competition in Balkans ............................................................................... 129 
2.3.2.2 The Competition in Central Asia ........................................................................ 131 
2.3.2.3 The Competition in the South China Sea ........................................................... 133 
3 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 137 
4 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 142 
 
       
1 
 
  Double Deterrence and International Mediation 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Defining the Problem  
The body of literature on international mediation is large and comprehensive, with studies 
that analyze different facets of mediation ranging from the role of mediators, mediation tactics to 
the mediation success. The research on nuclear deterrence is also very advanced. There are ample 
studies which focus on nuclear deterrence mechanisms, types of deterrence, and which analyze the 
functioning principles of nuclear deterrence. Most of the research, however, neglects the possibility 
of a nexus between international mediation and nuclear deterrence theory. The research gap is 
twofold. First, there is a scarcity of research analyzing the relationship between various types of 
crises and international mediation, especially between nuclear crises and the pattern of international 
mediation. The second gap concerns the nuclear deterrence effect that may emerge through 
international mediation, and is conducted by more than one major state possessing nuclear 
capability. The purpose of this dissertation is to address these two gaps by analyzing the connection 
between nuclear deterrence and international mediation. 
More specifically, in this study, I explore the question of whether the nuclear dimension of 
the conflict can influence the way in which international mediation occurs. I will also examine 
whether international mediation creates deterrence effects on the conflicting parties other than the 
direct deterrence between them. This research will therefore identify whether there is a place in 
nuclear deterrence research to include the mechanism of international mediation into its analysis.   
The lack of research on the connection between international mediation and nuclear 
deterrence is puzzling, especially among nuclear deterrence studies because there is an increasing 
number of studies that approve the stability-instability paradox created by the stability at the nuclear 
level. The main argument of the stability-instability paradox is that the parties of the conflict rely on 
their nuclear capabilities to deter a massive attack from the adversary, which stabilizes relations at 
the nuclear level. Stability at the nuclear level caused an increasing number of crises at the 
conventional level. Snyder articulated the stability-instability paradox as “the greater the stability of 
the “strategic” balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at its lower levels of 
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violence.”1 Snyder analyzed this paradox in the context of US-Soviet relations. He asserted that the 
Soviet Union could get involved in “a range of minor ventures which they can undertake with 
impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.”2 In another study, 
Snyder and Diesing asserted that the crises became surrogates for war since war was no longer a 
possibility between the nuclear powers.
3
 Jervis defined the stability-instability paradox as, “To the 
extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable 
at lower levels of violence.”4 Geller asserted that even in the crises that only one side has nuclear 
capabilities, there is room for conflict escalation because the nonnuclear opponent does not always 
limit its escalatory behavior.
5
 Rachhaus also found supportive evidence for the stability-instability 
paradox, arguing that nuclear weapons lead to more risk-taking actions in lower intensity disputes. 
However, he argues that in symmetric conflicts, where both adversaries have nuclear weapons, the 
probability of war is smaller than asymmetric conflicts, where only one side of the conflict has 
nuclear weapons.
6
  
These studies demonstrate that the relations between adversaries are stabile at the nuclear 
level; nevertheless, there are recurrent crises at the conventional level. As such, there is a greater 
need for mediation at times of nuclear crises, as well as the consideration of the nexus between 
international mediation and nuclear deterrence. One can also observe this nexus in the context of 
India – Pakistan crises as well. The major powers, for example, presented a competitive behavior in 
their mediation attempts to the crises between India and Pakistan. However, they did not compete in 
the later periods of the crises between India and Pakistan. This represents a puzzling situation. Is it 
possible that the change in mediation behavior stems from the added nuclear dimension of the 
conflict? If so, did this new pattern of international mediation create a second deterrence effect on 
India and Pakistan other than the direct deterrence between them? Alternatively, I also analyze 
whether this new international mediation pattern provided opportunities for India and Pakistan to 
back down from the conflict. 
Although the Indo-Pakistani conflict has been a subject of numerous studies in the fields of 
international mediation and nuclear deterrence, these studies have not considered the node between 
                                                 
1 Snyder, G.H. (1965). The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror in Paul Seabury (ed.) The Balance of Power. 
Scranton: Chandler, pp. 198-199. 
2 Snyder, G.H. (1961). Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security. The US: Princeton University 
Press, p. 226. 
3 Snyder, G.H. and Diesing, P. (1977). Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in 
International Crises. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 455-456. 
4 Jervis, R. (1984). The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, p. 31. 
5 Geller, D.S. (1990). Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, 
No.2, Jun 1990, p. 307.  
6 Rauchhaus, R. (2009). Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, p. 258. 
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international mediation and nuclear deterrence. International mediation research analyzes the crises 
between India and Pakistan mainly under the conditions of conventional world, and does not 
analyze whether the nuclear dimension of the conflict changed the pattern of mediation. Nuclear 
deterrence research, on the other hand, examines the direct deterrence between India and Pakistan. 
They compare the deterrence between India and Pakistan with the deterrence between the US and 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Some studies found that the deterrence between India and 
Pakistan is sustainable as it was in the case between the US and the Soviet Union.
7
 Other studies, 
however, found that the deterrence between the two countries rather fragile.
8
 However, they 
neglected the possible deterrence effect from the international mediation led by major states, and its 
impact on the crisis between India and Pakistan.  
 The crisis situation is particularly more complex in crises in which parties of a conflict have 
opaque nuclear capabilities and do not know the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons of other side. 
There is also a great risk of miscalculation especially at the initial stages of the nuclearization of the 
conflict. If one party of the conflict has nuclear capabilities, and the other one is at the threshold of 
having one, then there may be a risk of preemptive attack by the former party with nuclear 
capabilities.
9
 This was also the situation in the Indo-Pakistani conflicts. India conducted a nuclear 
test in 1974, and Pakistan had opaque nuclear capabilities during the 1980s. There was a high 
likelihood of an Indian preemptive attack during the 1980s, but India refrained from it. For this 
reason, it is compelling to analyze the impact that international mediation had on the direct 
deterrence between India and Pakistan. 
This study addresses the nexus between international mediation and nuclear deterrence. It is 
therefore necessary to review the literature in both international mediation and nuclear deterrence 
fields. I will first start with international mediation. 
                                                 
7 Some of these studies are Singh, J. (1998). Against Nuclear Apartheid. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.5, Sept-October 
1998, pp. 41-52; Dixit, J.N. (2002). India – Pakistan in War & Peace. Routledge, London and New York: Taylor & 
Francis Group pp. 322-346; Sundarji, K. (1995). Proliferation of WMD and the Security Dimensions in South Asia: An 
Indian View in William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnson (eds.) Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, p. 55; Chengappa, R. (2000). Weapons of 
Peace: the secret story of India’s quest to be a nuclear power. New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers; Hagerty, D.T. 
(1998). The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
8 Some of these studies are Joeck, N.(1997). Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South. Asia Adelphi Paper 312, 
Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group: London and New York; Raghavan, V.R. (2001). Limited War and Nuclear 
Escalation in South Asia The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 8 Number 3 Fall/Winter 2001, Heisbourg, F. (1998). 
The Prospects for Nuclear Stability between India and Pakistan. Survival, Volume 40 Issue 4 pp.77-92; Tellis, J.A. 
(2002). The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India. Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 1, Winter 2002, pp. 13-45. 
9 For more information about US considerations of preventive and preemptive attacks in the Cold War see: Mueller, 
K.P. et.al. (2006). Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. The US: RAND 
Cooperation pp. 121- 182. [online] Available at:  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf [Accessed 23.03.2017]. 
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1.2 International Mediation 
The definitions of international mediation are diverse, ranging from one-party mediation to 
multi-party mediation. Generally, mediation is defined as a practice where an outside party 
undertakes to bring or preserve a peace.
10
 Zartman and Touval emphasized that mediation should 
facilitate ways of communication which parties of the conflict are unable to reach without the 
mediator.
11
 Bercovitch widened the definition of mediator by including individuals, groups, and 
organizations as mediators, in addition to states. Bercovitch highlighted that the parties of a conflict 
should request the help of these actors to mediate without resorting to physical force.
12
 The recent 
definition of mediation also included the mediation of multiple actors, manifesting itself as the 
simultaneous interventions of more than one state, or the interventions of regional organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations.
13
  
Several studies have analyzed the capabilities of mediators, claiming that a strong mediator 
is necessary for successful mediation. Mediators, whom adversaries perceive as highly skilled, 
could influence adversaries to accept the proposed solution.
14
 Skilled mediators are able to compel 
adversaries to make concessions, and can force them to adhere to agreements. Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille pointed out that those mediators, who possess resources and who employ 
active mediation strategies, are most successful in abetting a crisis.
15
  
 In contrast, some studies argue that adversaries actually prefer weak mediators because 
weak states do not have the power to issue threats. For the stronger party in the conflict, Slim 
argued that it is easier to meet the domestic political consequences of accepting the agreement terms 
provided by weak mediators. The weaker party in the conflict is also more likely to sympathize with 
the weaker mediator.
16
   
                                                 
10 Crocker, C., Hampson, F.O., and Aall, P. (1999). Multiparty Mediation: Concepts, Issues, Strategies, and Actors: 
Introduction in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in 
a Complex World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 7.  
11 Zartman, W.I. and Touval, S. (1996). International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, Pamela R. Aall (eds.) Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 446.  
12 Bercovitch, J. (2007). Mediation in International Conflicts: Theory, Practice and Developments in I. William Zartman 
(ed.) Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques. Revised Edition, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, pp. 167-168. 
13 Crocker, C., Hampson, F.O., and Aall, P. (1999) “Multiparty Mediation: Concepts, Issues, Strategies, and Actors: 
Introduction” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation 
in a Complex World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 9-10. 
14 Brookmire, D.A. and Sistrunk, F. (1980). The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time 
Pressure on Negotiation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No.2, June 1980, p. 323. 
15 Bercovitch, J., Anagnoson, J.T., and Wille, D.L. (1991). Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study 
of Successful Mediators in International Relations Journal of Peace Research, Vol.28, No.1 Special Issue on 
International Mediation February 1991, p. 16-17. 
16 Slim, R.M. (1992). Small-State Mediation in International Relations: The Algerian Mediation of the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to 
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Beardsly highlighted another problem associated with strong mediation. In his case studies, 
Beardly illustrated that strong mediation based on leverage can have negative consequences in the 
long term, when the mediators lose their interests in the conflict.
17
 Werner and Yuen also 
emphasized that agreements reached through strong mediator pressure would likely fail in the future 
if pressure from a mediator decreases because of a decreasing interest in the conflict.
18
  
There are also many debates surrounding the timing of mediation. Several studies argue that 
conflicts should reach a certain level of intensity in order for the mediation to be successful. For 
example, Zartman put forward the concept of ripeness. He asserted that only if a conflict reached to 
a certain level of intensity, the parties of the conflict would be more amenable for mediation 
because of the increasing costs of the conflict. In other words, the disputants should reach a point in 
which continuing the fight would not pay off. 
19
 
 On the other hand, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille have asserted that if the conflict lasts 
for a long time, it becomes less amenable to mediation. They pointed out that an increasing number 
of fatalities have a negative impact on mediation success.
20
 Greig and Regan claimed that increase 
in the duration of a conflict, rather than an increase in death toll, is the key factor for accepting a 
mediation offer.
21
  
There are several studies focusing on the intentions and the role of the mediator states for 
successful mediation. Young argued that a mediator could play a significant role if the adversaries 
believe that the mediator is impartial and has nothing to gain from the conflict by supporting either 
of the parties.
22
 Yet, there are also studies that argue that biased mediators are more successful than 
unbiased mediators are. Both biased and unbiased mediators inform the parties about the 
resoluteness of the other party. Kyadd argues that the conflicting parties would doubt the reliability 
of the information given by unbiased mediator because the unbiased mediator is only interested in 
easing the conflict. An unbiased mediator, therefore, can exaggerate the resoluteness of the other 
side just to end the crisis. On the other hand, if the mediator favors one party, then this party will 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Conflict Management. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 207.   
17 Beardsly, K. (2011). The Mediation Dilemma. The US: Cornell University Press. 
18 Werner, S., and Yuen, A. (2005). Making and Keeping Peace. International Organization Vol. 59, No.2, Spring, 2005 
p. 289. 
19 Zartman, I.W. (1985/1989) Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. Oxford University Press: New 
York. and Zartman, I.W. (2008) “ The Timing of Peace Initiatives: hurting stalemates and ripe moments” in Darby, J. 
and MacGinty, R. (eds.) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 22-36. 
20 Bercovitch, J., Anagnoson, J.T., and Wille, D.L. (1991). Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study 
of Successful Mediation in International Relations. Journal of Peace Research, Vol.28, No.1 Special Issue on 
International Mediation, February 1991, p.13. 
21 Greig, M.J., and Regan, P.M. (2008). When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept 
Mediation in Civil Wars. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No.4, December 2008, p. 776. 
22 Young, O.R. (1967). The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p. 81. 
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find the information given by the mediator more reliable. This increases the effectiveness of the 
biased mediator to convince the party, to which it favors, to make compromises.
23
 
Touval and Zartman argue that mediators are rarely unbiased. Mediators prefer an outcome, 
which concurs with their own interests
24
, and they use mediation as a tool in power politics to 
represent these interests.
25
 A recent study by Bercovitch and Jackson also confirmed this point. 
They argued that mediators have their own agenda about the conflict, and they bring their own 
knowledge, resources, and interests to the conflict.
26
 This finding is crucial for my research because 
the major powers mediating the crises between India and Pakistan were competitive. They brought 
their own agendas and interests to the conflict. In the crises after the 1980s, however, this 
competitive behavior is not visible, which poses a puzzling situation.   
The literature review on international mediation demonstrates that there exists sufficient 
research with respect to the role and the intentions of mediators, negotiation tactics, and the 
capability of the mediators. There are also several studies focusing on the necessary conditions for a 
successful international mediation. There is also sufficient research regarding the mediation of more 
than one state, called multi-party mediation. The research gap is then, literature that takes into 
account the nuclear aspect of the conflict and its influence on the international mediation. 
To illustrate the deterrence effect that may emerge from international mediation - the second 
gap in the literature - it is necessary to briefly summarize the research in the nuclear deterrence 
field. In the following paragraphs, I outline several definitions of nuclear deterrence, and will define 
the various types of nuclear deterrence. Subsequently, I will provide some historical information 
about the emergence and the development of the nuclear deterrence concept, in both the Cold War 
and the Post-Cold War periods. Providing a historical context of nuclear deterrence is necessary in 
order to demonstrate the place of this research in the literature, and to demonstrate how this 
research will contribute to the nuclear deterrence concept as well. 
1.3 Nuclear Deterrence 
Nuclear deterrence depicts a situation where the devastating effects of nuclear weapons deter 
both parties of the conflict from attacking. The gains are much smaller than losses even for the 
winner, which can only aspire a Pyrrhic victory. Therefore, the main assumption of the deterrence 
                                                 
23 Kydd, A. (2003). Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation. American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 47, No.4, October 2003 p. 597-598. 
24 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1989). “Mediation in International Conflicts” in Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt 
(eds.) Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 
118. 
25 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1989). “Mediation in International Conflicts, p. 129.  
26 Bercovitch, J and Jackson, R. (2009). Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and 
Approaches. Ann Arbor, the US: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 33-34. 
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logic is that there are no actual winners of a conflict, and actually, both sides are the losers. Snyder 
described deterrence as discouraging the enemy from taking military action by demonstrating that 
the costs and risks of attack outweigh the gains.
27
 Morgan defines deterrence as “the use of threats 
of harm to prevent someone from doing something you do not want him to.”28 
 Different types of nuclear deterrence emerged through geopolitical developments during the 
Cold War. This categorization is helpful not only for pursuing a clear scholarly discussion, but also 
in order for policymakers to provide rigorous policy recommendations. Below, I describe the most 
important types of nuclear deterrence. 
Direct Deterrence: Direct deterrence is deterrence between both parties of the conflict. For 
example, deterrence posed by the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. 
Extended Deterrence: Extended deterrence means that one actor deters another actor from 
attacking a third actor.
 29
 For example, the US security guarantees to Western Europe against Soviet 
Union were described as extended deterrence.  
Massive Retaliation: The Eisenhower administration declared a solid nuclear strategy, 
believing that a strong nuclear deterrence capability is cheaper than providing massive conventional 
forces for the protection of allies. The policy targeted the Soviet Union in order to protect US soil as 
well as US allies.
30
 The then US Secretary of State Dulles described massive retaliation as 
preserving the capacity to retaliate immediately to the places wherever the US chooses, and by 
using any means the US decides.
31
  
Mutual Assured Destruction:  Assured destruction capability is the capability to deter a 
nuclear attack by preserving the ability to cause unacceptable damage on aggressor, even after 
receiving the first surprise attack.
32
 The proposed idea was that deterring the Soviets would not 
necessarily requires keeping giant nuclear capabilities. Keeping the ability to destroy 33-20 percent 
of the Soviet population and 75-50 percent of industrial capacity would be enough to deter any 
                                                 
27 Snyder, G.H. (1961). Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security.  The US: Princeton University 
Press, p. 3. 
28 Morgan, P.M. (1977). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. The US: SAGE Publications, p. 17. 
29 Weede, E. (1983). Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No.2, 
June 1983, pp. 234-235. 
30 Pifer, S., Bush, R.C., Felbab-Brown, V. (et al.) (2010). U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and 
Challenges Brookings Arms Control Series, Paper No: 3, 2 May 2010, p. 4. [online] Available at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf [Accessed 15.02.2017]. 
31 US Department of State Bulletin The Evolution of Foreign Policy Address by Secretary Dulles US Department of 
State Bulletin Vol. XXX, No. 761 Publication 5349, 25 January 1954, pp. 107-110. cited in Freedman, L. (1981/1989). 
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
Printed in The People’s Republic of China, p. 85. 
32 Enthoven, A.C. and Smith, K. W. (1971/2005). How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 
RAND Cooperation: The US. p. 174. [online] Available at: 
 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/commercial_books/2010/RAND_CB403.pdf [Accessed 27.03.2017]. 
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Soviet attack.
33
 Assuming that the Soviets would also make similar calculations, and preserve the 
same capabilities, it would leads to a situation called “mutual assured destruction.”34  
1.3.1 Deterrence during the Cold War   
The theory of nuclear deterrence first gained prominence during the Cold War. The main 
goal of first deterrence theorists was to find strategies to deter Soviet attacks on US soil or on US 
allies. Brodie, one of the first theorists who wrote about the concept of nuclear deterrence in the 
Cold War, argued that the effects of nuclear weapons on war making are so enormous that the chief 
purpose of a military apparatus is not any more winning wars, but trying to find strategies to avert 
them.
35
 Synder agreed with Brodie that nuclear weapons have tremendous impact in war-fighting 
strategies. In the pre-nuclear era, Snyder asserts that the states used the same weapons for both 
offensive and defensive purposes. In the nuclear era, one uses mainly nuclear weapons to deter, 
however, it is not rational to provide defense with nuclear weapons if deterrence fails and the 
adversary state attacks. Therefore, Snyder asserts, in the nuclear era states must choose a policy 
between deterrence and defense.
36
 
Deterrence theorists in this period followed the rational model, basing their assumptions on 
deductive models and abstract logic. For example, Schelling applied game theory in nuclear 
deterrence.
37
 Wohlsteter also emphasized the rationality assumption; however, he also added that 
deterrence is not a situation that is automatically sustained. Deterrence requires the active 
involvement of states, and entails the development of new strategies which is relevant to the 
necessities of new weapons systems.
 38
  
After enthusiasm for the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, some scholars began to 
question the functioning principles of deterrence. These scholars were not necessarily the deterrence 
critics; however, they were concerned about the credibility of threats. The basic concern was that if 
a nuclear attack brings catastrophic consequences for both the attacker and the defender, then how 
would the attacker make a credible nuclear threat? This is especially notable in the deterrence of 
limited attacks. In this respect, Kahn asserted that the threat of general war to deter minor 
provocations would make allies uncomfortable, no matter how credible these threats were. If the 
threat of a general war to minor crises are credible, “the threat is too dangerous to be lived with. If it 
                                                 
33 Freedman, L. (1981/1989). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The International Institute of Peace Studies, London: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd., Printed in the People’s Republic of China, p. 246. 
34 Freedman, L. (1981/1989). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 246-248. 
35 Brodie, B. (1946). The Weapon: Implications for Military Policy in Bernard Brodie (ed.) The Absolute Weapon: 
Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, p. 76.  
36 Snyder, G.H. (1961). Deterrence and Defense, p. 8-9. 
37 Schelling, T.C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. The US: Harvard University Press. 
38 Wohlstetter, A. (1959). The Delicate Balance of Terror. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 January 1959. 
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is incredible, the lack of credibility itself will make the defense seem unreliable.”39 For this reason, 
Kahn argues that limited war forces are crucial instruments to tackle minor provocations.
40
  
Schelling also studied the credibility concept, making an analogy between threat of 
launching a nuclear attack and two men standing on the edge of a cliff roped to each other. 
Schelling maintains that one should envisage the cliff as a curved slope, but not as a sharp cliff. If 
one stays at the edge of a sharp cliff, then one does not have much room to threaten. One has the 
decision to jump off or not. If one stands on the edge of a curved slope, then one can gradually 
threaten. Each step towards the slope incrementally increases the danger of plunging. Therefore, 
one gives the impression that one does not have a complete control in the process. Even if one does 
not want to jump off, he can slip, and with every incremental step towards the slope, danger of 
slipping accidentally increases. Schelling argues that this gives greater credibility because if the 
rival knows that one does not have control of the whole process, then every provocative move 
presents the danger of accidental war. Therefore, the rival state would be more concerned and 
would think twice before acting. Schelling therefore argued that the threat that leaves something to 
chance is more credible than the threat where each side has full control of its actions and 
decisions.
41
  
The discussion about the functioning principles of nuclear deterrence, above, demonstrate 
that the realist thought was dominant among the scholars in the early period of the Cold War. 
Realism takes the unitary structures of states and this supports the usage of abstract logic. During 
the 1970s, some scholars criticized the unitary and rational behavior assumption of states in realist 
thought. In order to show that government leaders do not always act rationally, Jervis analyzed the 
perceptions of national leaders by applying cognitive psychology to historical cases.
42
 Lebow also 
analyzed the rationality of policy-makers and analyzed reasons that may cause policy-makers to 
miscalculate their decisions.
43
 Allison also questioned the unitary model of states assumed in realist 
theory. He instead argued that state actions are the consequences of negotiations between self-
interested sub-state actors such as organizations and bureaucratic elites.
44
 The sub-state actors are 
primarily parochial and mainly concentrate on their own interests during the decision-making 
process.
45
 
                                                 
39 Kahn, H. (1960). On Thermonuclear War. The US: Princeton University Press, p. 155. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Schelling, T.C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. The US: Harvard University Press, pp. 199-200. 
42 Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. The US: Princeton University Press, 
43 Lebow, R.N. (1981). Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. The US: John Hopkins University 
Press. 
44 Allison, G. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, 
No. 3, September 1969, p. 63. 
45
 Allison, G. (1971). Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 164-171. 
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Neorealist analyses of nuclear deterrence also brought the rationality concept to the 
forefront. Waltz claimed that wars are based on rational calculations. Since starting a war is not 
rational anymore, the probability of a major war among states possessing nuclear weapons is almost 
zero.
46
 Waltz maintained that the world has not witnessed a general war among major powers since 
the Second World War. Rather, the peace among major powers has been sustained, and wars only 
occurred in the peripheries. He asserts that states are rational actors trying to increase their security. 
In a nuclear war, gains are marginal, but losses are catastrophic. He even argued that the steady 
increase in the number of nuclear states is better than not increasing, or a sudden increase.
47
 
Therefore, it is not rational to conduct wars. For nuclear states, nuclear weapons are only for 
deterrence, not for actual use.
48
 Waltz emphasized the system level conditions. He argued that the 
international structure put some restraints on nuclear actor. In my argument, however, rather than 
the structure of the international system, the character of the conflict plays a predominant role. 
Regardless of whether the structure of the international system is bipolar, tri-polar or multipolar, the 
character of the conflict is decisive in forming the international mediation pattern. For this reason, I 
analyze the crises between India and Pakistan, from their independence until to present day. The 
conflict between them has survived the bipolar, tri-polar - China also emerged as a nuclear power 
during the Cold War - and emerging multi-polar structure.  
In analyzing the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, Waltz underestimates the impact of 
low-level crises on crisis stability. Waltz actually appreciates the stability-instability paradox. He 
also accepts that low scale wars can occur despite the existence of nuclear capabilities. He, 
however, argues that it is a fair price to pay, compared to the price of war which could occur at high 
levels.
49
 However, while one low level crisis may have a small price, if the frequency of low level 
crises increases, then it may burden the stability at the nuclear level. In this respect, the role of 
international mediation becomes critical for mitigating nuclear crisis, and conflict resolution should 
not be left only to the deterrence mechanism between the parties of the conflict. 
There are also some scholars who emphasized the role that the memories of historical 
experiences could play in mitigating the crisis. For example, Müller doubted the relationship 
between nuclear weapons and the nonexistence of major wars.  According to Müller, what prevents 
another great war from occurring are not nuclear weapons, but the memory of World War II and the 
                                                 
46 Waltz, K.N. (1990). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No.3, 
September 1990, p. 740. 
47
 Waltz, K.N. (1981). The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. The Adelphi Papers. Vol. 21 No.171, 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
48
 Waltz. K. (1990) “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review Vol. 84, No.3, 
September 1990, p. 734. 
49 Sagan, S. and Waltz, K.N. (2003). Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse? Chapter 3 in Scott D. 
Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Norton, p. 122. 
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contentment of both the Soviet Union and the US with the status quo that emerged after World War 
II.
50
 The second part of Müller’s argument, however, does not explain the absence of a great war 
between major powers after the Cold War. 
In short, during the Cold War, scholars analyzed the functioning principles of deterrence, 
mainly debating over how states should issue threats in order to sustain credibility. Other 
discussions emerged around the rationality concept. There were also discussions regarding the 
unitary notion of the state. Next, I will analyze the deterrence studies in the post-Cold War period. 
1.3.2 Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War 
Most studies published after the Cold War analyzed the differences between bipolar and 
unipolar or emerging multipolar world, and discussed which world order is better for the nuclear 
deterrence to function. They collectively sought to answer questions such as whether new world 
order after bipolarity was good or bad for nuclear deterrence. For example, Van Creveld was 
optimistic about nuclear deterrence after the Cold War. He claimed that in the places of the world 
where nuclear weapons have been introduced, large-scale warfare has disappeared.
51
 In contrast, 
Campbell drew a pessimistic picture. He argued that the world is approaching a situation in which 
there are more nuclear states and more war possibilities.
52
  
MccGwire notes that nuclear weapons sustained the stability in the Cold War. MccGwire, 
however, argues that this stability is no longer sustainable in the multipolar world because the 
restricted control and command systems of new nuclear states make nuclear war a greater 
possibility.
53
 Friedberg highlighted that especially in some parts of the world such as in Asia, 
complex situations can emerge. He claims that Asia seems similar to 19
th
 century Europe in the 
sense that small crises can lead to big crises. For this reason, possessing nuclear weapons pose a 
great danger.
54
 Wilson challenges the relevancy of deterrence in preventing wars and questions the 
role of nuclear weapons, even in context of the Cold War. He rejects the direct link between the 
existence of nuclear weapons and the absence of wars, stating that throughout history, there are 
simply periods without major wars. For example, after the Thirty Years’ War and the Napoleonic 
                                                 
50 Mueller, J. (1988). The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. International 
Security, Vol. 13, No. 2, Fall 1988, p. 56.  
51
 Van Creveld, M. (1993). Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. New York: Free Press, p. 124. 
52
 Campbell, K.M., Einhorn, R.J., Reiss M.B. (2004). Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. 
The US: Brookings Institution, p. 4. 
53
 MccGwire, M. (2000). The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in John Baylis and Robert O`Neill (eds.) Alternative 
Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 152. 
54 Friedberg, A.L. (1993/1994). Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar World. International Security, 
Volume 18, Number 3, Winter 1993/1994, p.31. 
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Wars, there was a time in Europe where peace was the dominant state of affairs.
55
 Wilson, 
therefore, maintains that it is not prudent to link peace directly to the existence of nuclear weapons. 
Both the pessimistic and optimistic arguments may have their own merits. However, they all 
analyze the deterrence concept under the constellation of two dyadic states, and do not consider the 
possibility that the nuclear aspect of the crisis can influence the pattern of international mediation.  
 In the post-Cold War era, one fundamental criticism of the unitary structure of states comes 
from Sagan. Sagan applied organizational theory to the nuclear proliferation context in order to 
demonstrate the unreliability of deterrence logic. Sagan emphasized the idea that subunits in 
organizations pursue their own interests and compete with one another. Therefore, in some cases, a 
final decision may not be rational, but it reflects the interests of self-interested groups and subunits 
in organizations.
56
 Sagan states that in the nuclear proliferation framework, the sub-state actors such 
as military organizations may be inclined to influence the decision-making apparatus to increase 
their own gains.
57
  
Another fundamental critique to realism and neorealism in the post-Cold War period came 
from Alexander Wendt. Wendt accepts the basic realist assumption of anarchy. However, he 
challenges the assumption that the anarchic structure leads automatically to a self-help institution. 
States do not perceive each other as hostile or friendly a priori. Wendt argues that states first 
interact with each other, and only after interaction does the image of friend or enemy emerge. 
Wendt considers this interaction as a process. He therefore argues that the process of interaction - 
not the anarchic structure of the international system - creates the self-help system.
58
 However, he 
should have considered that the conditions under which the interactions take place could also play 
an important role. In other words, the structure of the system may have an enormous influence on 
how the interactions between states occur in the first place. States may not have hostile attitudes 
against each other a priori. However, the structure of the system could still influence how the first 
interactions take place. It is hard to imagine an interaction of states independent of the structure of 
the international system. There are also several other constructivist studies held in the post-Cold 
War era. They analyze the influence of ideas and beliefs on policy-making, highlighting that 
changes in norms can affect how states view the role of nuclear weapons and their role in 
deterrence. For example, Tannenwald noted that some US generals considered using nuclear 
                                                 
55 Wilson, W. (2008). The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence. Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No.3, November 2008, p.  
433. 
56
 Sagan, S.D. (1994). The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 pp. 66-107 cited from p. 73, 74, 86, and 87. 
57 Sagan, S.D. (1994). The Perils of Proliferation. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 102-103. 
58 Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992 p. 394, 405, and 408. 
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weapons in the Korean War.
59
 General MacArthur wanted to apply an aggressive policy against 
China, one that even included the use of nuclear weapons.
60
 Rublee stresses that norms regarding 
the role of nuclear weapons have changed. Therefore, the kind of policy recommendations 
MacArthur gave at the height of the Korean crisis is no longer conceivable.
61
 However, I would 
argue that this change in norm could stem from changing security calculations. The US was no 
longer the sole superpower and had to include nuclear retaliation from the Soviet Union in its 
security calculations. This threat had tremendous impact on the US view of the role of nuclear 
weapons in crises.    
The theoretical debates discussed above, indicate that the theories of nuclear deterrence are 
couched in the context of dyadic conflicts; regardless of realist, neorealist or constructivist 
perspectives. In my dissertation, however, I analyze not only the deterrence between two rival 
states, but also examine international mediation between them. In the post-Cold War era, however, 
some scholars started to include third actors into deterrence calculations. The studies about pivotal 
deterrence, multilateral deterrence and collective actor deterrence also highlighted mediation efforts 
by third actors in conflicts with a nuclear dimension. I therefore analyze these concepts in detail to 
distinguish my argument from theirs. As such, I clearly demonstrate the contribution of my study to 
the literature. 
1.3.2.1 Pivotal Deterrence 
One can describe pivotal deterrence as a strong third party intervention in dyadic conflicts.
62
 
This strong state is called the pivot. Timothy W. Crawford first introduced pivotal deterrence as a 
concept to explain the third party role in dyadic conflicts. However, he applied pivotal deterrence 
not only to conflicts with a nuclear dimension, but also to conflicts with a conventional dimension. 
He proposes that in mediating crises, a pivotal state selects a combination of tactics to ease the 
situation. He gives examples from history and summarizes these strategies as listed below
63
: 
a-) Threatening the party who can initiate a conflict (Britain’s attitude against Franco-
German Conflict in 1870).  
                                                 
59 Tannenwald, N. (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. 
International Organization, Vol. 53, No.3, Summer 1999, p. 443. 
60 Ibid. p. 445. 
61 Rublee, M.R. (2009). Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraints. The US: University of Georgia 
Press, p. 37.  
62 For further reading about pivotal deterrence see:  
   Crawford, T.W. (2003). Pivotal Deterrence: Third Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs, the US: Cornell University Press. 
63 Ibid. pp. 6-9. 
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 b-) Threatening to stay neutral, if both side needs the help of a pivotal state to win the 
conflict   (Bismarck’s policy toward Austria – Hungary and Russia Conflict). 
            c-) Threatening the weakest side that you will stay neutral and threatening the strongest side 
you will go to war against it (Britain’s policy toward France and Germany in July, 1914). 
Depending on the power structure between conflicting states, a pivot state has to choose one 
of the above tactics. Crawford also adds that only a state that possesses the capability of following 
through on the threat can be a pivot state.
64
 
 Another vital condition needed in order for pivotal deterrence to function is that the 
conflicting states should not have any other reliable alignment options. Other alignment options 
weaken the pivotal state’s influence on the conflict’s actors.65 Crawford evaluated the 1965 
Kashmir crisis as an unsuccessful case in which pivotal deterrence did not function. He attributes 
this failure to the alignment options of India and Pakistan at that time. He argued that India 
collaborated with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan collaborated with China. This situation weakened 
the leverage of the US on India and Pakistan. Therefore, the US was not successful in preventing 
this crisis.
66
 
 After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of political camps, states developed 
more flexible alignment options. For example, If India and Pakistan receive harsh reactions from 
the US, they may align with China or Russia. One can therefore argue that one of the important 
conditions by Crawford is no longer valid in the strictest sense. However, in terms of conflicts with 
a nuclear dimension, major states share the same interest of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. This 
common interest prevents them from providing different alignment options to either party of the 
conflict due to the risk of escalating the conflict to a nuclear level. In other words, rival states do not 
have diverse alignment options during a nuclear crisis. One can therefore argue that the 
precondition of successful pivotal deterrence - no alignment option of rival states - is still valid in 
nuclear conflicts, but as already mentioned, pivotal deterrence concentrates on the mediation of 
only one pivot state. I consider the mediation of more than one state, and focus on the relations 
between them. I analyze whether they are competitive or collaborative, and whether the pattern of 
relationship between them can deter crises with a nuclear dimension. 
                                                 
64 Ibid. p. 30. 
65 Ibid. p. 38. 
66 Ibid. pp. 135-169. 
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1.3.2.2 Multilateral Deterrence 
In multilateral deterrence, one assumes that most of the competing interests of the states will 
eventually converge. Even if one could expect that they converged and actions were taken which 
resulted in the successful prevention of a nuclear war, the strategies considered by states to this end 
may differ. In other words, multilateral deterrence assumes a coalition, but even in coalitions it is 
challenging to reach an agreement within the members regarding the timing and nature of the 
measures and policies. Therefore, multilateral deterrence accepts that a prior harmony within the 
members is a necessary condition for the success of multilateral deterrence.
67
 In that respect, 
sustaining multilateral deterrence is relatively easier in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
than in the United Nations. (The UN)
68
 Moreover, in the unique unipolar phase of history, the US 
lost the opportunity to relinquish its duties partially to the UN. Therefore, in the context of an 
emerging multipolar world, the chance for multilateral deterrence seems dimmer. When one 
considers the US retreat from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
69
 or the increasing geopolitical 
concerns regarding the West and Russia, an institutionalized cooperation becomes harder to 
achieve. One may expect greater collaboration regarding the preclusion of conflicts with a nuclear 
dimension. However, there is a decreasing possibility that these collaborations could be 
institutionalized under the guidance of any international institution with legally binding 
international agreements. My argument thus pertains to the occasional collaboration of nuclear 
powers to mediate crises with nuclear elements. Therefore, my argument does not entail a strict co-
operation of nuclear states under international institutions as multilateral deterrence asserts. 
Moreover, multilateral deterrence is mainly discussed in the context of nonproliferation. Under the 
framework of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, states are bound by and entangled in 
multilateral arrangements in order to prevent further proliferation.
70
 A multilateral arrangement may 
help prevent nuclear proliferation in certain cases but it is very unlikely that nuclear powers would 
allow themselves to be bound in advance by multilateral arrangements when devising and 
implementing their strategic policies vis-à-vis parties in a conflict where interests need to be 
pursued in a rapidly changing security environment. 
 
                                                 
67 Goodpaster, A. J.et al. (1997). Post-Cold War Conflict Studies. Naval Studies Board National Research Council 
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68 Ibid. 
69 ABM was the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty. It was signed between the Soviet Union and the USA in 1972. It limited 
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1.3.2.3 Collective Actor Deterrence 
Morgan defines the collective actor as a group of states formed to protect general welfare, as 
opposed to pursuing only member interests. Morgan mentions that the states constituting collective 
actors can use deterrence to maintain peace and security for an international system.
71
   
Both my argument and collective actor deterrence theory concerns the interaction of more 
than one actor in deterring a crisis. My argument, however, mainly differs from collective actor 
deterrence in the level of interaction. In collective actor deterrence, the level of interaction is very 
high, which leads to a complete cooperation. Below, I will explain some basic differences of 
collective actor deterrence and my argument. For example, Morgan explains that: 
“Inside any collective actor is a smaller group that dominates the decision-making and any action taken. This 
shift in influence is not fully beneficial or acceptable to most states. It can increase the chances that something will be 
done but shrink their ability to determine what that “something” is. But it enhances the likelihood of coherent decisions 
and forceful threats, as well as their being upheld. Multilateralism is often made effective by a core “minilateralism” – 
a small group that acts and lets the others just tag long. This leaves far fewer members needed to get threats and 
actions mounted for the sake of deterrence.”72 
The features of collective actor deterrence mentioned above resemble the characteristics of 
multilateral deterrence. In my argument, states are not bound to following the leadership of one or 
two major states. States collaborate to ease the crisis, but the level of cooperation among them is not 
high. Most importantly, states maintain their complete sovereignty and the freedom of action as 
they collaborate. There is no submissiveness or a hierarchy between major states mediating to crisis. 
In other words, in collective actor deterrence, there are strong states, which form a nucleus. Other 
states circle around strong states. In my argument, major powers collaborate but do not need to 
follow or circle around one state. 
Morgan strongly emphasized the level of cooperation between the states constituting 
collective actor deterrence, to the extent that he even compared it with international law. He stated: 
“Collective actor’s deterrence these days is an extension of, and a tool in upholding, an emerging version of 
international law and order and the continuing development of norms – transnational, international and domestic- of 
proper behavior.”73  
The increasing geopolitical struggles among major powers nowadays show that the level of 
cooperation among them cannot be interpreted as international law or order, as collective actor 
deterrence does. I propose that the major states collaborate in a vital area in which they share the 
same interests, namely the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. In my model, the motivation to 
                                                 
71 Morgan, P.M. (2003). Deterrence Now. the UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 172.   
72 Ibid. p. 182. 
73 Morgan, P.M. (2012). The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 33, 
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collaborate is not an attempt at building norms at an international level or building international 
structure. Motivation to collaborate emerged from a necessity of preventing a catastrophe. Mediator 
states can be in competition with each other in other fields. When it comes to preventing a nuclear 
catastrophe, however, they collaborate.  
 In collective actor deterrence, the implementation of threats is based on wide consensus 
among the members. The lack of consensus causes the credibility problem.
74
 However, Morgan 
asserts that building this consensus is not an easy task: 
 “Compared with national actors, the collective actor has an additional level of political consensus to 
establish. Some members will want no action taken or no actions as potentially costly as fighting, or will want more 
evidence that such a drastic step is really required, or will fear that getting confrontational may exacerbate the 
situation.”75 
I argue that a mediator state does not have to act concomitantly with other states. If one 
mediator state acts, other major states have the option of collaborating with the mediator state or 
staying aside but not hindering the mediation attempt of the mediator state. They can actively 
collaborate or passively agree with the mediation effort of the mediator state. 
Moreover, Morgan assumes that ensuring credibility sometimes requires building a cohesive 
military force, which compels states constituting collective actor deterrence to give up some of their 
authority.
76
 In that context, he used NATO as an example to demonstrate the high level of 
institutionalization needed between the members of collective actor deterrence.
77
 In my argument, 
there is no combined armed forces of collaborative mediation. I am referring to the collaboration of 
states, which have their separate armed forces. It is not possible to gather these separate armed 
forces under one roof because collaboration occurs only ad hoc during only vital phases of a nuclear 
crisis. 
Morgan says that only liberal democratic states can organize themselves as collective actors, 
acting together for common welfare.
78
 However, in my model, it is not liberal democratic 
principles, but rather the danger of nuclear catastrophe, which compels states to collaborate 
regardless of whether the collaborating states share liberal democratic values or not.  My argument 
differs from Morgan in the sense that collaborating states do not have to share the same values. 
Collective actor deterrence would expect that the US, Russia, and China would not be able 
to cooperate because they do not necessarily share the same liberal values and they have competing 
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interests. In my argument, however, they would collaborate because of the fundamental common 
interest of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. 
In short, I argue that that a deterrence effect not only originates from conflicting parties. I 
argue that deterrence may occur at the international level, which limits conflicts with a nuclear 
dimension. I conceptualize this situation as double deterrence. I postulate that deterrence at the 
international level is a collaborative mediation of more than one state. This collaborative mediation 
is based on ad hoc arrangements; not on high-level cooperation, as collective actor deterrence 
asserts. Below is my hypothesis and the more detailed analysis of my argument.  
1.4 Hypothesis 
Crisis with a nuclear dimension transforms international mediation from competitive to 
collaborative. The collaborative international mediation then puts extra pressure on both sides of the 
conflict in addition to the direct deterrence between them. This helps keep the conflicts with a 
nuclear dimension stay in limited level.  
         Now I will explain the various parts of my hypothesis. 
I. A crisis with a nuclear dimension (at least one part of the conflict has nuclear 
capability) triggers the attention of the major powers (WHY?) 
 
A crisis with a nuclear dimension triggers the involvement of major powers because nuclear 
weapons have devastating effects not only for the countries which are in a crisis, but also for the 
entire world. For example, a nuclear crisis in South Asia between India and Pakistan does not carry 
grave consequences only for Russia or China (because of the geographic proximity), but also for the 
US. A triggered nuclear weapon would not only weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but 
also deteriorate the nuclear taboo regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons after the Second World 
War. All of these developments would carry serious consequences for the US, the main architect of 
the international security system which emerged after the Second World War. The world has not yet 
experienced a nuclear war between two nuclear states. Even moving to this unknown situation, 
therefore, can persuade states to take incentives to prevent a war with nuclear dimension. 
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II. The situation described above transforms international mediation from interest-based 
self-oriented competitive mediation to a collaborative mediation. (WHY?) 
 
Because of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons for the entire world, major powers 
share the same interest in preventing a nuclear catastrophe. For this reason, they collaborate to 
prevent conflicts that involve a nuclear dimension.  
By competitive mediation, I mean that in most mediation attempts the mediating states try to 
profit from the crisis and of the mediation process for themselves.
79
 Resolving the crisis is not a 
priority. Instead, the priority is to profit from the crisis or attempt to prevent other mediator states 
from seeking gains from the crisis. One can argue that there is a competition between mediator 
states in their mediation attempts. 
By collaborative mediation, I refer to the collaborative behavior of the mediator states, which 
even includes inactivity on the part of influential states. - since this, in certain contexts, could mean 
the omission of disruptive policies against mediation.- Mediator states do not calculate how they 
can profit from the crisis during the mediation process, and their priority is to end the crisis. 
III. Collaborative International Mediation reduces the alignment options of the Sides of the 
Conflict. (WHY?) 
 
In most mediation attempts, mediator states use a combination of threats and/or 
encouragements to settle the crisis. For example, major states may threaten both parties of the 
conflict to retreat from the conflict. Mediator states may also strategically collaborate with each 
other. This collaboration prevents parties of the conflict from aligning with one mediator state 
against the other mediators. In other words, the sides of the conflict cannot play the mediator states 
against each other due to the collaboration among the mediator states. This situation limits the 
maneuvering capability of the sides of the conflict. This situation then 
1.  puts extra pressure on parties of the conflict in addition to the direct deterrence between 
each other, limiting the scale of the conflict.  
OR 
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2. encourages the parties of the conflict to back down without losing face. Major powers 
collaborate and provide incentives to end the crisis. Parties of the conflict can then use 
these incentives to retreat without losing credibility.  
 
This also helps limit the scale of the conflict. (OUTCOME) 
 
Below, I depicted my hypothesis with a flow chart. 
Scope Condition: Nuclear Dimension of the Conflict 
At least one side of the conflict has nuclear capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5  Variables 
    Independent Variable: A crisis with nuclear dimension. 
    Dependent Variable: Conflicts with limited nature. 
    Intervening Variable: Transformed international mediation and its impacts on the sides of 
the conflict. 
     Scope Condition: At least one side of the conflict has a nuclear capability.  
1.6 Research Questions 
    - Does a crisis with nuclear dimension have impacts on the relationships between major 
nuclear states? 
    - Can a crisis with nuclear dimension cause changes in the mediating patterns of major 
nuclear states? 
Conflicts 
with  
limited 
nature 
Transforms 
international 
mediation from 
competitive to 
collaborative 
Reduces the 
alignment options of 
parties of the conflict 
 
Crisis 
Places extra 
pressures 
Back down of the 
conflict without 
Losing Face 
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   - Does this changed relationship pose pressure and form a second deterrence other than the 
threat that parties of the conflict pose to each other? 
  - Can this changed behavioral pattern help limit the scale of conflict? 
1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I use in-depth case study analysis as the main methodology for this research, using the crises 
between India and Pakistan from 1947 until present day. 
1.7.1 Case Selection 
I focus on the crises between India and Pakistan because they are both countries with 
nuclear weapons that have not signed the NPT. I therefore would like to test my hypothesis in a 
geographic region where both parties of the conflict are relatively flexible in their nuclear 
decisions. Furthermore, they have pursued conflicting foreign policies since independence. There is 
a high possibility that any dispute can escalate to a nuclear level in this region. It is therefore 
additional aim of this study to test the impact of collaborative international mediation in this 
conflicting context.  There are actually few possible cases in which I can apply my hypothesis, 
which are listed below. 
1.7.2 The Dyadic Crises as Other Possible Cases 
- North Korea – South Korea nuclear crises. (It is difficult to acquire data on North 
Korea.) 
- The US and Soviet Union/ Russia or China. (They are major powers. It is not 
conceivable that pressure appearing at the international level would ease the crises 
between them.) 
- Israel and Arab countries. (Israel neither accepts nor denies its nuclear capability.)  
- India and China crises. (This case is a complementary to my case study) 
 
The crises between India and Pakistan is the only case which received significant international 
mediation. Therefore, it is possible to observe international mediation throughout the years from 
independence until present day. Due to these reasons, the crises between India and Pakistan is 
arguably best suited for this analysis. 
Below are the major crises between India and Pakistan. 
    -  1947 India and Pakistan War, 
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    -  1965 Runn of Kutch Crisis 
    -  India – Pakistan War of 1965, 
    -  1971 India and Pakistan War and the Independence of Bangladesh, 
   -   1974 Indian Nuclear Tests 
    -  1984 Kahuta Crisis, 
    -  1987 Brasstacks Crisis, 
    -  1990 Kashmir Crisis, 
    -  1999 Kargil Crisis, 
    -  2001 India Parliament Attack, 
    -  2008 Mumbai Attacks. 
Each of the crises above are subcases of one case. I gathered these subcases into two main 
groups: the first is the nonnuclear phase from 1947 until the Indian nuclear testing incident in 1974. 
The second phase is the nuclear phase which started in 1974 and continues until present day. Using 
historical analysis as a method, I compared the nuclear and nonnuclear phases in order to 
understand whether there was a change in the pattern of international mediation. I then follow the 
process during the nuclear phase to identify the parts of the hypothesis that I proposed. By 
following the process, I sought to demonstrate whether/how the crisis transformed international 
mediation from a competitive to collaborative one in the nuclear phase. Subsequently, I show 
whether/how this transformed international mediation limited the scope of the wars.  
For each crisis, I begin the analysis with US mediation, using declassified documents from 
the US Department of State Office of the Historian. The declassified documents used for this 
analysis are: 
- Memorandums 
- Telegrams and messages from US embassies to the US Department of State and from 
the US Department of State to US embassies,  
- Minutes of the National Security Council meetings,  
- Letters from US presidents to the presidents of Pakistan and India,  
- Transcripts of telephone conversations. 
These documents were once classified as top secret documents. After a certain amount of 
time, they were released to public under the Freedom of Information Act. However, documents for 
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the crises occurring after 1990 are not yet available, as the US Department of State Office of the 
Historian has not declassified most of the relevant documents. Thus, for this period of time I have 
analyzed the hearings held in the US Senate and in the US House of Representatives as primary 
data. Hearings are important indicators in the US context because the Congress is a legislative 
body controlling – and in some circumstances limiting – the actions of the US administration. As 
such, discussions by the Congress are important indicators of US foreign policy. Using data from 
congressional hearings and secondary resources helped reveal US considerations when mediating 
crisis and conflict between India and Pakistan. In addition, I used memoires, diaries, and 
interviews done by journalists. These diaries and memoires are important indicators because they 
were written by officials who directly participated in the US mediation efforts in South Asia.  
In analyzing the Soviet Union’s mediation style, I collected primary data from an archival 
study by Rajendra Kumar Jain. Jain collected primary documents for the period 1947 – 1978 
pertaining to Soviet and South Asian relations. To analyze Russian mediation after 1990, I searched 
for speeches, transcripts, and documents released on the official websites of the President of Russia 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. I also searched the archives of the Wilson Center 
Digital Archive International History Declassified in order to find Russian attitudes regarding the 
crises in South Asia. Additionally, I analyzed secondary resources on the Soviet Union and then 
later, Russia’s role in South Asia.  
I used the articles released by the Peking Review in order to analyze Chinese mediation. 
Peking Review is the only official Chinese news magazine published in English, and most issues 
are made available online by Marxist Internet Archive. Peking Review was later renamed as the 
Beijing Review. I have also analyzed news from the Xinhua News Agency. It is the official press 
agency of the People’s Republic of China. The president is also a member of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, in identifying Chinese foreign policy, news released 
by Xinhua News Agency can be considered as important indicators. By using the database NEXIS, 
I systematically reached most of the articles released by Xinhua News Agency throughout the years. 
Additionally, I also analyzed secondary resources and working papers regarding China’s role in 
South Asia. I used the archives of Wilson Center Digital Archive International History Declassified 
as well. 
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1.7.3 Evaluation of the Data 
In evaluating the data, I used the same method of Rublee presented in her book 
Nonproliferation Norms. Rublee analyzed the reasons some states opt not to seek nuclear weapons, 
even if they have the technical capability.
80
 This provided a suitable framework for analyzing 
nuclear proliferation. In my study, I classified crises into two main groups: nonnuclear and nuclear. 
For both groups, I first identified expectations against which to compare and measure what really 
occurred. I named these occurrences as observations. By expectation, I mean what the relevant 
behavior of the mediator states should be, given that my hypothesis is correct. For each expectation, 
I also generated assumed policy actions of mediating states and policy discussions that might be 
held in the decision-making bodies of these states. I then analyzed the data and compared whether 
my expectations are fulfilled, and to which degree. When I analyzed a piece of evidence, I also 
considered the context. Accordingly, it increased or decreased the confidence that I have in each 
piece of evidence that I collected. Next, I briefly discussed other factors which have an influence on 
the interpretation of the evidence. Below is the criteria that I used in the evaluation of data. 
1.7.4 Criteria in Analyzing the Data 
1.7.4.1 First Group of Cases: Nonnuclear Phase 
In the first group, neither parties of the conflict have nuclear capabilities. Below are my 
expectations and associated actions and discussions. 
1.7.4.1.1 Expectation 1  
No nuclear dimension and the presence of competitive behavior. (Instead of collaborative 
behavior).  
        Expected Actions: The prime interest of mediating states is not to resolve the crisis. 
Instead, the countries compete with each other to seek gains from the crisis or they try to hinder 
potential gains of other mediator states. While they may want to settle the crisis, they do so in a way 
that best addresses their own interests. Mediator states may also frequently blame other mediator 
states for the instigation of the conflict. Therefore, there is a certain level of competition and 
conflictive language among the mediator states. 
        Expected Discussions: I expect that decision-making bodies of mediator states will 
focus on how their action or inaction to the crisis will impact other potential mediator states. The 
questions that follow are: If we do not actively mediate, will the inaction benefit other mediator 
                                                 
80 Rublee, M.R. (2009). Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. Athens, Georgia: The 
University of Georgia Press. pp. 21-28.  
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states? Alternatively, if we mediate, could it prevent other mediating states from gaining greater 
regional influence? 
1.7.4.1.2 Expectation 2 
Competitive mediation reduces the effectiveness of pressure for both parties of the conflict.  
        Expected Actions: Mediator states do not collaboratively place pressure on parties of 
the conflict to end the crisis. Each mediator state supports the state with which it has good relations. 
There is no coordination between mediator states, which will relieve parties of conflict from the 
pressures of international mediation.  
       Expected Discussion: I expect that the discussion will focus on the possible 
consequences of supporting or not supporting parties of the conflict with which the mediator state 
has a good relationship. These questions on the decision-making body may follow: If we do not 
mediate in support of the state with which we have a good relationship, will this state seek support 
from another mediating state? Alternatively, if we support the state that has a good relationship 
with another mediating state, will it cause a rift between this state and another mediating state? 
How could it profit our state? As noted below, these considerations relieve both parties of the 
conflict from pressures of international mediation. 
1.7.4.1.3 Expectation 3 
The sides of the conflict have more maneuver capability to choose different foreign policy 
(alignment) options.  
         Expected Actions: If the mediator state does not give enough support to the party of 
the conflict with which it has a better relationship, then this state may move between other mediator 
states in search for support. 
        Expected Discussion: High-level politicians of both sides of the conflict will express 
their changed position (or threat to change their position) if the support does not come from the 
mediator state with which it has good relations. 
1.7.4.2 Second Group of Cases: Nuclear Phase 
1.7.4.2.1 Expectation 4 
  The nuclear dimension of the conflict leads to collaborative behavior among mediator states. 
         Expected Actions: Mediator states try to settle the crisis as its first goal. Even if these 
states have alternative interests, these differences do not lead to competition because their main 
agenda is to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The priority is to resolve the crisis. Mediator states 
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collaborate with each other, or they at least welcome the mediation attempts of other mediator states 
and do not try to hinder them. 
        Expected Discussion: I expect that the discussion among the decision-making bodies 
of mediator states will focus on how to best hinder the conflict: The decision makers of the 
mediator states may ask the following questions: what threats or incentives should be made in order 
to hinder the conflict, and what kind of dialogue should be pursued with other mediator states for 
collaboration? 
1.7.4.2.2 Expectation 5 
Collaborative mediation places pressure on the sides of the conflict effective.  
       Expected Actions: There will be a certain level of coordination and communication 
between mediator states. If a mediator state rejects the alignment attempt of one side of the conflict, 
then other mediator states will also reject the alignment attempts of the parties to the conflict. 
Therefore, both parties cannot play the mediator states against each other. This will reduce the 
maneuvering capability of the parties of conflict and will strengthen the pressure from international 
mediation. 
      Expected Discussion: The mediator states would try to find ways to facilitate a direct 
dialogue between the parties of the conflict. If direct dialogue were not possible due to high tension 
between the parties of the conflict, the mediator states would then consider offering their services or 
emissaries to enable this dialogue. Discussions will focus on whether a mediator state should send a 
highly respected diplomat to the region, or whether a joint commission should be established with 
other mediator states to facilitate a direct dialogue between both sides of the conflict. 
1.7.4.2.3 Expectation 6 
Both parties of the conflict may use international mediation as a tool to withdraw from the 
conflict without losing face. 
 It would be difficult resist international mediation based on a large collaboration. 
Withdrawing from the conflict would therefore be tolerable and more understandable for the 
citizens of the rival countries. This perception can hinder the opposition forces in the respective 
countries from seeking political gains. It thus supports the government’s decisions of withdrawing 
from the conflict without serious domestic political risks.  
       Expected Actions: High-level politicians of sides of the conflict may publicly support 
international mediation. They can praise international mediation for its role in solving the crisis. 
They may overtly attribute the settlement of the crisis to international mediation. 
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       Expected Discussions: Mediator states will discuss how to proceed with mediation or 
emissaries. They may consider new ways to consolidate the dialogue between both sides of the 
conflict. They can also create more confidence building measures. 
Even if I can demonstrate that major powers collaborate with each other - once the crises 
between India and Pakistan took on a nuclear dimension - I must still consider the effect of the end 
of the Cold War. One can argue that major powers became collaborative because of the Cold War 
ended, not because of the nuclear dimension of the Indian – Pakistani conflict. I have two strategies 
to deal with this problem. 
   1- ) I will analyze the 1984 Kahuta Crisis and 1987 Brasstacks Crisis which occured 
between India and Pakistan. If I find a pattern of collaborative mediation in these crises, although 
these crises occurred during the Cold War, it would strengthen my argument. 
              2- ) I will also analyze the geopolitical rivalry between the US, Russia, and China in our 
contemporary world. I will focus briefly on the struggle between the US, and China in the South 
China Sea regarding the Spratly Islands. China demands complete sea navigation rights in the South 
China Sea which caused problems with the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. It also 
tried to hinder the navigation rights of the US navy in the South China Sea. I will also briefly 
mention the recent crises between Russia and the West. Subsequently, I will be able to demonstrate 
that even if the Cold War is over, it does not automatically translate into collaborative relationships. 
In other parts of the world, the US, Russia, and China continue to compete.  
I will touch on these topics in a small chapter, but not as a comprehensive case study. 
I analyzed the crises between India and China. My analysis of the crises between India and 
China complements the main case study of the present work. The aim is to identify and examine 
whether there is an identical mediation pattern in both India – China and India - Pakistan crises. I 
chose to analyze this case because India and China are two states, with territorial conflicts 
experienced since their independence. The crises between India and China also gained a nuclear 
dimension when China demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1964. This also carried significant 
implications beyond the region. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
In each subcase, I first present an overview of the crisis. Next, I proceed with the mediation 
strategy of the US. Afterwards, I continue with the Soviet and Russian mediation strategy, and 
analyze China last. Subsequently, I discuss the actions of mediator states in each crisis, and 
summarize the main characteristics of their mediation attempts in that particular crisis in one 
paragraph. For example, after explaining the US mediation strategy of the 1965 crisis, I wrote a 
paragraph at the end of the section defining the main characteristics of US mediation during the 
crisis. I approach the Soviet, Russian and Chinese mediation strategies in the same systematic way 
as I do for the US. Using this systematic approach makes the comparison easier. Finally, I compare 
their main characteristics in their mediation attempts in two phases. I compare whether these 
mediation patterns meet the expectations that I laid out in the introduction section. 
2.1 First Group of Cases: Non-nuclear Phase  
2.1.1 India – Pakistan War of 1947 
2.1.1.1 Overview 
The India and Pakistan conflict has its roots going back to the partition of British India. The 
All-India Muslim League and Indian National Congress were leading parties during the struggle 
against the British rule. These two parties had competing ideas regarding post- independence India. 
The National Congress Party, led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, were supporting the 
ideal of a secular India in which different cultures, religious, and ethnic groups live together. In 
contrast, the Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah was struggling for a separate Muslim 
state. This division was better for British interests than a united Indian nationalism during the 
period under British rule.
81
  
At the time of the British departure, there were 565 princely states which had privileges 
under the rule of British India. After the partition of British India, they had to decide whether they 
should join Pakistan or India. They also had the possibility of preserving their independence, which 
would however be difficult given that most princely states were not self-sufficient. At the time, they 
were geographically dependent on either India or Pakistan.
82
 These princely states became a subject 
of intense ideological competition between India and Pakistan.  
Out of the 565 princely states, Jammu and Kashmir had some unique characteristics which 
made the competition between joining India or Pakistan fierce. It had a Hindu ruler, the Maharaja, 
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but the majority of its population was Muslim. There were also Buddhists living in Ladakh. It was 
geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan.
83
 Joining Pakistan would make the Hindus of 
Jammu and the Buddhists of the Ladakh minority in Pakistan. Joining India would also put the 
Maharaja Hari Singh in a difficult position because the majority of the state was Muslim.
84
 
Moreover, Hari Singh was not keen on joining India because of Nehru’s close ties to Sheikh 
Abdullah, who was a major dissident figure in Jammu and Kashmir.
85
 The State of Jammu Kashmir 
was vital for both India and Pakistan. Joining India would prove the position of the National 
Congress that a predominantly Muslim state could live under the rule of a secular India. It would 
however be a direct challenge to the founding ideology of Pakistan, which claims to be a state for 
all Muslims in India. Therefore, Maharaja’s delay in reaching a decision caused frustrations in both 
India and Pakistan. The discontent among Muslim populations were also rising and it finally 
culminated on July 1947 in the district of Poonch, where Maharaja faced recurring problems with 
the local Muslim population.  
Most of the population in Poonch were experienced soldiers who fought in the Second 
World War in the Indian Army. Intense taxation and the dissatisfaction of soldiers with their lives 
were the main causes of the uprising.
86
 Rebels in Poonch sought to buy weapons from the arms 
bazaars in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.
87
 This is important because these 
purchases built the bases for further relations with the tribal forces living in NWFP, which later 
infiltrated into Jammu & Kashmir to fight against the Maharaja. By August 1947, the revolt reached 
its peak. Its leaders established the Azad (Free) Kashmir and became an autonomous region of 
Pakistan.
88
 Pakistan also helped the rebels in Poonch by creating an economic blockade. At the 
time, the state of Jammu& Kashmir was dependent on imports from Pakistan. As such, the 
economic blockade weakened the economy of the State and prevented it from launching a 
conclusive struggle against the uprising.
89
  
On 22 October 1947, the struggle against the Maharaja gained momentum. The Pathan 
tribesmen crossed the border to support the uprising in Poonch. They defeated the state forces of 
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Jammu & Kashmir and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel. Tribal forces also captured Uri and 
Baramula after a firm resistance. The way to the capital, Srinagar, was open.
90
  
On 31 October 1947, the Maharaja experienced another challenge to his rule, this time in Gilgit. 
The paramilitary forces in Gilgit, Gilgit Scouts, were mainly Muslim and they opted for joining with 
Pakistan. They rebelled against the representative of Maharaja, Brigadier Gansara Singh, and took over 
the control. They occupied Baltistan and declared their inclusion to Pakistan. This development gave 
Pakistan control in northern Kashmir.
91
 Gilgit Scouts was very effective. They invaded the district of 
Sakardu, and launched a military offensive from Sakardu to Leh, which is the capital of Ladakh. They 
also invaded Kargil.
92
  
Under these circumstances, the Maharaja Hari Singh made a plea to India for assistance. India 
accepted to help only on the condition that Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession to India. The 
situation seemed desperate to Hari Singh and he was therefore forced to accept India’s terms. He 
signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947; just four days after the tribal invasion had 
started. One day later, on 27 October, India immediately sent troops and equipment to Srinagar to 
help Maharaja.
93
 
After Jinnah heard of the Indian participation in the conflict, he immediately urged the acting 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army General Douglas Gracey to send in his own troops. The 
challenge for Jinnah was that India and Pakistan was under the same supreme command at that time. 
The Army Supreme Commander Auchinleck resisted a possible inter-Dominion war and threatened 
Jinnah by the resignation of all British officers in case of a Pakistani offensive. Jinnah could not have 
resisted at this point because the resignation of all British soldiers would have weakened the Pakistani 
army.
94
  
Indian forces were successful at the beginning of the conflict and managed to halt the advance of 
the Pakistani supported tribesmen. The defeated tribal forces were chased to Baramulla and Uri. Kargil, 
Baramulla, and Uri were recaptured in the end. In the Poonch Valley, however, tribal forces continued 
to besiege state forces.
95
 The subsequent attempts to recapture the whole of Poonch failed.
96
 Despite 
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early successes, the Indian army suffered a setback in December 1947 because of logistical 
problems.
97
 The tribal forces began an offensive attack again and pushed back Indian troops from 
the border areas. In the spring of 1948, India mounted another offensive. Pakistan also officially 
became involved in the conflict in May 1948. The fighting continued from the spring through 
December 1948. Pakistani forces also conducted operations in both the northern and the southern 
regions of the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
98
 The conflict eventually reached a dead end, and neither 
side was making promising progress. This deadlock paved way for mediation by the UN. India 
actually already appealed to the UN on 1 January 1948. The UN released the Resolution of 38 on 17 
January 1948.
99
 However, the resolution was nothing more than a suggestion to India and Pakistan 
to take all measures to improve the current situation. Then, on 20 January 1948, the UN released the 
Resolution of 39.
100
 The Resolution 39 formed a commission to observe the crisis. Despite these 
resolutions, the fight continued during the spring of 1948.  Only the deadlocks in the battlefield 
paved the way to further UN mediation. UN Resolution of 47 urged allowing the use of a plebiscite 
to allow the Kashmiri people to decide their future.
101
 On 20 January 1949, an agreement was 
reached on a Cease-fire Line along the positions held by the two armies at the end of the hostilities. 
The line is a de facto international border.
102
 However, the plebiscite was never held. Pakistan 
argued that Indian troops should be withdrawn before the plebiscite. India argues that it is 
impossible because of Pakistan’s support to tribesmen and the local Muslim population in the State 
of Jammu & Kashmir. At the end, one-third of the former princely state fell under Pakistani control, 
which is known as ‘Azad’ (Free) Jammu and Kashmir. India controls the two-thirds of the State, 
which is known as Jammu and Kashmir. Indian territory is composed of Ladakh, Jammu and the 
valley of Kashmir. Since 1949, the ceasefire line has been monitored by a small force of the United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).  
International reaction to the conflict was weak. The UN could have mediated the conflict 
because India had itself requested it. If India had not applied to the UN by its own decision, the 
conflict would not have been internationalized. Without the deadlock in the battlefield, it would 
have been difficult to imagine an effective UN mediation.  
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Britain showed an interest in the conflict because it might have partly felt responsible for the 
conflict because of the way of Britain divided India. Moreover, Britain wanted good relationships 
with both India and Pakistan after their complete independence. They were still dominions at the 
time of conflict. They also opted for staying in the Commonwealth. Therefore, the conflict between 
two Commonwealth states was of interest for Britain. Below, I analyze the position taken by the 
US, the Soviet Union and China during the conflict. 
2.1.1.2 The US Mediation 
The US interest in the 1947 crisis developed at the very onset of the conflict. On 28 October 
1947, Charles William Lewis Jr., the then chargé d'affaires in Pakistan, sent a telegram to the US 
Secretary of State, demonstrating that the US was observing the incidents and was concerned that 
the Pakistani government was pressuring Kashmir to join Pakistan by means of economic strangulation. 
The telegram also revealed that the US was aware that Pakistan was sending soldiers and tribesmen 
from the northwest frontier into Kashmir.
103
  
The US believed that the atrocities between India and Pakistan were difficult to mitigate 
without external mediation. Despite the close monitoring of events, the US lacked the necessary 
knowledge and experience regarding the region’s particularities to provide needed external mediation. 
The US, therefore, relied on the British network and knowledge in the region though it also had 
hesitations regarding the British ability to mediate. The telegram sent by the US Embassy in India to 
the US Secretary of State on 3 November 1947 expresses this concern. The US Ambassador Henry F. 
Grady reported that he met with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
External Affairs of India. Bajpai told Ambassador Grady that Nehru had sent a wire to British Prime 
Minister Clement Atlee, and urged him to demand that Pakistan use its influence on tribesmen to 
withdraw from the conflict. Atlee, however, only made a recommendation to both sides that peace 
should be preserved. Bajpai told US Ambassador Grady that the government of India felt that Atlee’s 
message was patronizing and failed to appreciate the Indian position. Bajpai reported to Grady that 
Nehru replied to Atlee, and complained that Britain took India’s friendship for granted.104 This was a 
serious setback for Britain, if the British wanted to be a broker between the conflicting parties.  
Another telegram sent by the then Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to the US 
Embassy in India on 2 December 1947 also revealed US doubt regarding the UK’s role in the crisis.  
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“It is increasingly apparent that this major difficulty between India and Pakistan probably cannot be removed 
without external assistance, or without resort to further armed conflict which may eventually involve some or all of the 
Afghan border tribes. Despite their vested interests in this area, because of the peculiarities of their position and the 
recentness of their withdrawal, the British are apparently not in a position to render this outside assistance.”105  
Despite this hesitation, the US continued to coordinate its efforts with the British. In the 
same telegram, Lovett said that although the US would prefer direct negotiations between India and 
Pakistan to settle the conflict, the US would support the UN resolution if the United Kingdom did 
so as well. After it had become clear that the conflict would be resolved by the UN resolution, 
Lovett sent another telegram to the US Embassy in India on 31 December 1947, ordering the 
conveyance of a message to Nehru. In this message, it was stated that: 
“The US as a firm friend of both India and Pakistan regrets that they have been unable by direct negotiation to 
solve the Kashmir problem. It now appears that the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) will soon be seized of this 
issue. US Government will respond fully to its obligations as a member of SC to assist in the attainment of an early and 
peaceful settlement.”106  
An analysis of primary documents revealed that the US interest in the conflict was pursued 
mostly by means of monitoring. US embassies in the region only reported the developments of the 
crisis, and did not proactively engage the region to end the conflict.
107
 Firm contact was established 
with the UK, although they were some concerns as to the capability of the British mediators. In the 
end, the US supported the UN resolution.   
This is a case where no belligerent language by the US can be observed regarding the 
mediation of the Soviet Union. 
2.1.1.3 The Soviet Mediation  
South Asia lies geographically close to the Soviet Union, thereby peaking interest by the 
Soviet Union in the region’s political developments. This interest translated to monitoring the crises 
in the 1940s, but never transformed into direct mediation. The Soviets were instead preoccupied 
with consolidating their European borders. Therefore, in this section, instead of analyzing the Soviet 
mediation to the 1947 war in particular, I will examine the general Soviet attitude to Kashmir crisis 
in 1950s. Although the Soviet Union was not directly involved in the region in the 1940s, India’s 
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perception was different. For example, Asaf Ali, the Indian ambassador to the US, once 
communicated the Soviet interest in the region to the US Acting Secretary of State Robert A. 
Lovett, and compared it with Japanese aggressions in 1941-42.
108
  
In the 1950s, strong ties between Pakistan and the US were a major problem for the Soviet 
Union. India, on the other hand, declared its position to pursue a foreign policy independent of both 
the West and the communist bloc. Indian Prime Minister Nehru did not want to be associated with 
neither of these two dominant powers. Tangible relations developed after Nikita Khrushchev 
became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On 8 August 1953 in 
a public statement, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgy Malenkow signaled a policy 
change towards India by recognizing India’s efforts in ending the war in Korea.109  
In February of 1955, large-scale economic assistance was given to India. The fundamental 
point was the visit of Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955. Nehru received a warm welcome, 
and the Soviet Union even agreed to construct what became the Bhilai steel plant.
110
 In the same 
year, Khrushchev and the premier of the Soviet Union Nikolai Bulganin visited India. On 10 
December 1955, Khrushchev stated in Srinagar that: 
“The people of Jammu and Kashmir want to work for the well-being of their beloved country-the Republic of 
India. The people of Kashmir do not want to become toys in the hands of the imperialistic Powers. But this is exactly 
what some Powers are trying to do under the pretext of supporting Pakistan with regard to the Kashmir Question…”111  
At a press conference in New Delhi on 14 December 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin 
reiterated their support for Kashmir as an integral part of India.
112
 Addressing the Supreme Soviet 
from 26 to 29 December 1955, Bulganin stated that “the Kashmir problem was the creation of 
powers pursuing military and political objectives in that area. The people of Kashmir have come out 
against this imperialistic policy.”113 
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 Starting in the 1950s, the Soviet Union briefly supported the Indian position concerning the 
Kashmir problem and discredited the US and British efforts to solve Kashmir problem as 
imperialistic behavior. 
2.1.1.4 The China’s Mediation 
China was not directly involved in the crises between India and Pakistan at this period. Only 
after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong in 1949 did China start to 
focus on the crises in South Asia. Therefore, I analyzed the statements of Chinese politicians during 
the 1950s in order to reveal the Chinese attitude towards the role of the Soviet Union and the US or 
the UN in the crises between India and Pakistan.  
 The main concern for China was that the crises between India and Pakistan was exposing 
the region to US influence. The Manila Pact and Baghdad Pact, the security organizations initiated 
by the US were particularly alarming to China. It considered the membership of Pakistan into these 
western-based security organizations as a direct threat to China’s security in the region. One can 
identify this concern in declassified Chinese documents. For example, on 4
 
January 1956, the then 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed China’s discomfort with the then Pakistani Ambassador to 
China, Sultanuddin Ahmad as:   
 “The Manila Pact is governed by the United States. The Baghdad Pact is governed by Britain, and of course 
the United States is behind Britain. Pakistan is in a very awkward position in Asia after joining these two pacts; it is 
very disadvantageous to be controlled and pinned down like this by Western nations.”114   
Zhou Enlai also made the Chinese position clear, conveying that China was in favor of direct 
talks between India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis in Kashmir. He emphasized that one should 
give priority to the will of the Kashmiris and that other states should not use the Kashmir issue as an 
opportunity to start a war in the region.
115
 
China was also concerned with the interventions of the UN. For example, in another meeting 
with the Pakistani ambassador on 16
 
February 1957, Zhou Enlai pointed out that there is a link 
between interventions by the UN and imperialist aspirations. He argued that the problems between 
India and Pakistan provide reason to the UN to intervene. This situation was argued to empower 
imperialist states. In the same meeting, he articulated that:  
     “…the two countries have put vast numbers of armed forces at the border. Imperialists will make use of the 
disagreements to instigate a conflict. Now the United Nations is once more getting involved; this is very dangerous. 
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Nothing good comes from United Nations involvement; thus, we are worried about the possibility of a local conflict. 
Imperialists want to make use of discord between Asian countries to instigate conflicts and profit from them; they are 
happy to see a conflict in Kashmir. Asian countries hope the situation can be stabilized, reducing military expenditure 
and engaging more in the work of construction. Our worries are not completely baseless, so we hope and call for the 
two friendly countries of India and Pakistan to become reconciled.”116   
At the same meeting, the Pakistani ambassador defended his country, reporting that it had 
tried to directly contact India eight times. However, India rejected all the contact attempts. For this 
reason, Pakistan considered it necessary to bring the issue to the UN. The ambassador’s defense did 
not convince Zhou Enlai, insisting that it was not a good idea. Zhou Enlai explained that:  
 “While in Pakistan, I already spoke to your president and premier about the negative consequences of going 
to the United Nations. The United States will make use of that, and the United States will want to colonize Kashmir. 
That result would be even worse than [what’s happening] now; neither India nor Pakistan could gain anything from 
it.”117 
In the same meeting, Zhou Enlai also asked the Pakistani Ambassador whether Pakistan 
would use armed forces, if all other options regarding Kashmir ran out. The Ambassador replied 
that Pakistan would not consider using force before the UN announced that there were no solutions 
to the Kashmir issue. Zhou Enlai again expressed his distrust in the UN as follows: 
“We do not approve of submitting issues to the United Nations. I once spoke to your foreign minister about this 
when I was in Peshawar. Do not speak to us of United Nations issues; as soon as the United Nations is mentioned, it 
provokes us. We have nothing to do with the United Nations; we are averse to the United Nations organization (not to 
its charter.) ”118  
On the 19
 
July 1961, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Geng Biao said to the then Indian 
Ambassador to China Parthasarathy that: 
“India and Pakistan were once one nation; after Partition they became two sovereign nations, like twins, two 
brothers. As for Kashmir, that is a dispute the British deliberately left for India and Pakistan at the time of Partition; 
that is no secret. My personal opinion is that if it had been decided at the time that Kashmir would go to India, or to 
Pakistan, or one half to each, there would never have been the Kashmir dispute there is today. Since Britain has created 
this problem, what should be done to resolve it? We have always believed that it should be resolved through friendly 
negotiations between India and Pakistan, and foreign countries should not interfere. Of course, there are now some 
who want to use this dispute to reach their goal of interfering.”119 
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In the statement above, the Chinese foreign minister argues that imperialist powers created 
the Kashmir problem and that these imperialist powers do not hesitate to profit from it. Therefore, 
one cannot detect a collaboration attempt to mediate the crisis. 
In another meeting on the 08
 
March 1962 between the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to China Ali Muhammad Rashidi, China reiterated that the problems 
between Pakistan and India should be resolved by direct talks, not by third party intervention. Third 
party intervention can only empower imperialist powers. Zhou Enlai highlighted that: 
“…in Pakistan’s dispute with India, resolving matters through direct negotiations is better than going through 
the United Nations, because the UN has many limitations. The UN is a tool of American imperialism, which could not 
possibly be impartial, and instead is used by the US whenever it needs to add pressure on this issue or that issue. 
Therefore, easing relations with India can lighten Pakistan’s burdens, saving money that can be used for economic 
development and reducing its likelihood of falling into imperialism’s trap.”120  
These statements from Chinese officials reveal China’s concern that the crises between India 
and Pakistan facilitate imperialist powers’ hegemony in South Asia. For this reason, China urges 
Pakistan and India to resolve the crises through direct talks.  
Expectation 1 is that major powers exhibit competitive behaviors in mediating conflicts 
without a nuclear dimension. The actions of the US, the Soviet Union, and China in the 1947 India-
Pakistan conflict seem contradictory to Expectation 1 because they did not compete with each other. 
They were hardly involved in the conflict. The US and the Soviet Union did not use belligerent or 
blaming language against each other. In evaluating the outcome, however, one should consider the 
historical context.  There are two main reasons why Expectation 1 was not realized. First, there 
were other political developments that distracted the mediators’ attention away from South Asia. 
Both the US and the Soviet Union were focusing on the political developments in Europe after the 
Second World War. South Asia was not a top priority of the US and the Soviet Union had not yet 
exhibited its position regarding South Asia at the time of the 1947 conflict. China was engaged in a 
civil war. There were therefore no aggressive policies or blaming and belligerent discourses from 
mediator states to each other in South Asia.  
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The importance of South Asia for the major powers increased in the 1950s, and the interest 
and the belligerent language of the major powers manifested itself as well. The analysis of the 
relationships between the US, the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s demonstrated that once the 
region became more important, the attention of mediator states also increased. This mediation 
attempts, however, were characterized by competitive behavior. Expectation 1 was therefore not 
realized specifically at the time of the 1947 conflict. However, political developments throughout 
the 1950s demonstrated competitive behavior between major powers and involved belligerent 
language, which met the criteria for Expectation 1.  
In the Stalinist years, in the 1950s, the Soviet Union saw both Pakistan and India as under 
the influence of Western powers and imperialism. In the Khrushchev years, one can observe that the 
Soviets attempted to align with India, although India was the leader of the Non-Aligned movement. 
In the years of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union overtly supported the Indian position in the Kashmir 
conflict. This fits to Expectation 2 that the major powers would side with one part of the conflict. 
Since the end of the Chinese civil war, China was overtly protesting against the US, the UK and the 
UN engagement in the region, and overtly discrediting their mediation efforts. This corresponds to 
Expectation 1: competition among major powers. For China, a major concern was mediation by 
western powers. Solving the crises between India and Pakistan was not a priority. Moreover, it 
discredits the mediation effort of the UN, arguing that the UN is under the control of the imperialist 
powers. However, one should consider here that the UN had not accepted the People’s Republic of 
China as the only representative of China. The Republic of China, Taiwan, was accepted as a 
representative of China. People’s Republic of China was accepted in 1971 as the sole representor of 
China. One should consider this background information before evaluating China’s position on UN 
actions as a strong evidence of its competitive behavior. 
Shortly, the India – Pakistan conflict in 1947 demonstrated that without a nuclear dimension 
to the conflict, and if the conflicted region is not a strategic priority of the major powers, there is a 
lack of attention by the major powers. From this sub-case, however, I do not intend to generalize the 
assumption that whenever the geopolitical significance of the region is low then the attention to the 
conflict is also low, as it lies outside the scope of my thesis. In this specific sub-case, however, I 
discuss these factors because they help me to explain why Expectation 1 was not fulfilled 
specifically in the context of the 1947 crisis. 
The crisis ended by the UN Resolutions. However, the UN Resolutions did not resolve the 
root of the problem. The plebiscite had not taken place and Kashmir continued to be a source of the 
frictions between India and Pakistan, leading to a second war between the two countries. The 
second conflict can be broken down into two parts. The first part is the Rann of Kutch Crisis, which 
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was a small-scale conflict, and the second part is the  subsequent large-scale war in 1965. In the 
following sections, I analyze these two wars.  
2.1.2 The Rann of Kutch Crisis 
2.1.2.1 Overview 
Rann of Kutch is a seasonal salt marsh area located in the Kutch district of Gujarat in India 
and in the Sindh province of Pakistan. The area is largely desert, and therefore, the border between 
India and Pakistan was not clearly demarcated at the time of India’s independence. On 14 July 
1948, Pakistan warned India that the Sind-Kutch boundary is a disputed area and must be settled.121 
Throughout the 1950s, several skirmishes occurred in the region. In January 1960, negotiations 
between India and Pakistan revealed stark their differences of opinion regarding the border. The 
talks failed to reach a conclusive agreement.122  
In early 1965, Pakistani elite troops engaged with Indian troops at Kanjarkon, on the north-
west edge of the Rann.123 In March 1965, India staged a military exercise in the Kutch region, 
named Arrow Head. In this exercise, India deployed its air, land, and sea forces.124 Indian Prime 
Minister Shastri made a speech in Hyderabad and stated that “should Pakistan seek to impose a 
military solution in Kutch, then we will have to act as the situation demands.”125  
On 9 April 1965, skirmishes started, and intensified between Indian and Pakistani troops in 
the northern part of Rann. On 24 April 1965, Pakistani forces launched Operation Desert Hawk, 
attacking the Indian military outpost at Sera Bet in the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan then attacked more 
bases on the Indian side, and occupied a territory claimed by India.126 As a response, India deployed 
its military units to the area and skirmishes at the brigade level occurred.127 
The then Indian defense minister, Y.B. Chavan stated in Lok Sabha that some service 
personnel on leave should be recalled. In the same manner, the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army Muhammad Musa ordered a general mobilization.128  
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The frictions between India and Pakistan did not last long. The UK Prime Minister Wilson’s 
attempts to mitigate the crisis succeeded, and the Rann of Kutch crisis ended. On 30 June 1965, an 
agreement was signed and both parties agreed to withdraw their forces. Below, I analyze the main 
responses to the Rann of Kutch Crisis by the US, the Soviet Union, and China.  
2.1.2.2 US Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis              
  In this crisis, the US did not employ an active mediation strategy. It mainly supported the 
British mediation effort initiated by the then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and incited both 
India and Pakistan to use the good offices of the Britain. For example, the Pakistani Foreign 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met with the US Ambassador to Pakistan, McCanoughy. Bhutto 
wanted to know whether the US would support Pakistan in the conflict. McCanoughy responded 
that the US would stand by its commitments, but did not specify which country it would support. 
Moreover, McCanoughy recommended that Bhutto accepts the requirements of the cease-fire 
proposed by the United Kingdom.129  
In 1954, the US and Pakistan had signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. 
However, most of the US commitments to Pakistan were valid under the condition that Pakistan 
was victim to an act of aggression.130 However, in the Rann of Kutch crisis, the US was hesitant to 
identify whether the aggressor was India or Pakistan. Therefore, it put US commitments in question 
and caused uncertainty to the minds of Pakistani decision-makers. For example, in his telegram on 
30 April 1965 to the US Department of State, Ambassador McCanoughy recommended that 
Pakistan be given an ambiguous message regarding Washington’s response against possible 
aggression by India. The recommendation of McCanoughy is below: 
 “I would not recommend immediate response to Bhutto reassuring government of Pakistan on effectiveness of 
past assurances against aggression, since a little uncertainty on their part for next few days could provide the 
additional leverage needed to achieve cease-fire. However, I do not think that we can postpone providing these 
reassurances very long without risking very serious damage to our position here. At same time, I strongly urge that 
government of India be reminded immediately of the standing explicit US assurances to Pakistan as a further deterrent 
against an Indian contemplation of retaliatory action against Pakistan in another area, such as East Pakistan.”131 
However, McCanoughy also highlighted that in the case of aggression, India should also be 
made aware of firm US assurances to Pakistan. McCanoughy’s recommendation that India should 
also be aware of US assurances to Pakistan reveals US support for Pakistan. 
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Financial means was also an important component of US mediation. US tactic was to soften 
up India and Pakistan through financial aid cuts, forcing them to adopt US terms. For example, 
Robert Kormer, a former staff member of the National Security Council, gave a briefing to US 
President Johnson explaining that the US financial cut would shock both India and Pakistan. The 
vital part of the recommendation is below: 
“You do not want to have Ayub and Shastri132 to here until we have worked out our new policy line, and have 
softened up to the point where they want to come for help rather than come tell you how to run Vietnam. Despite 
Pakistan’s fine economic performance, let’s get across quietly but clearly to Ayub that he cannot play China’s game 
while being banked by the US.”133 
Here, one can witness the close and complex relationship between financial aid and political 
aims. An important goal of the Johnson administration was not only to prevent the crisis, but also to 
punish Pakistan because of its friendly relations with Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai. The declassified 
document above reveals that Komer recommends tighter behavior concerning Pakistan and India. 
He emphasized that by tightening aid to Pakistan and India, Pakistan should understand that they do 
not have unlimited US backing. This means that they cannot approach China without jeopardizing 
their relationships with the US. By punishing India, Komer argues that it would prevent the Indian 
Prime Minister Shastri from commenting on the Vietnam war. From Komer’s memorandum, one 
see that the purpose of tightening aid was not only to force India and Pakistan to make compromises 
leading to peace, but also to manage the crisis that best fit US interests in the context of the Cold 
War. 
A memorandum prepared by the member of the National Security Council Staff Robert 
Komer to President Johnson also reveals the difference between merely ending the crisis and ending 
the crisis in a way that best serves the interest of the mediating actors.  
“Since there is a higher risk of a Pak/Indian flare up than any time since 1947, our stalling on MAP (military 
assistance programs) makes sense as a warning here too. A major risk, however, is that we're driving the Indian military 
to get more from the Soviets, which doesn't serve our longer term interest.”134 
This statement is indicative of the way of thinking among US policymakers. They appreciate 
the role of military assistance programs in easing the crisis in the South Asia. Nevertheless, they 
claim that it is not beneficial for US interests in the long run. Cuts in military assistance programs 
would at least force India to get additional military equipment from the Soviet Union, helping the 
Soviet-Indian relations further developing.  They use the military aid cuts as a valuable tool to ease 
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the crises; however, they do it in a way that does not jeopardize the US position in South Asia. 
Therefore, the policy makers in the US are not only considering easing the crisis but are also doing 
it in a way that can best serve US interests. 
Below is the Soviet attitude during the crisis. 
2.1.2.3 Soviet Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis  
Regarding the Rann of Kutch Crisis, the Soviet Union released one official statement by the 
Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS)
135
. A TASS statement released on 9 May 1965 
regarding the Rann of Kutch Conflict states that:  
“If the conflict is not extinguished, its continuing development will drain the forces of India and Pakistan and 
can lead to a great loss of life, endangering peace. Only the imperialist circles of the Western Powers are interested in 
such development of events…They strive to create a tense situation in various parts of the world so as to hinder the 
development of states that have recently won independence, to suppress the national-liberation movement of the 
peoples.”136 
 In this TASS statement, one clearly detects Cold War rhetoric. The Soviet Union blamed 
western powers and their imperialist intentions for instigating the crisis. Such rhetoric was abundant 
during the Cold War.  
2.1.2.4 Chinese Mediation of the Rann of Kutch Crisis 
In a statement released by Xinhua
137
 on 4
 
May 1965, China clearly chose align itself with 
Pakistan. It declared that India disregarded the Indo-Pakistan agreement. For this reason, China took 
the stance that India should bear the full responsibility for the conflict. This position is clearly laid 
out in the statement below: 
“India has recently provoked armed conflict in the Rann of Kutch on the Indo-Pakistan border in an attempt to 
forcibly occupy this disputed territory by armed attack…The Indo-Pakistan agreement on West Pakistan-India border 
disputes signed by the two sides in New Delhi on January 11, 1960, clearly stipulates that the Rann is one of the 
disputed territories on the Indo-Pakistan border and the two countries agree to study relevant material and hold 
discussions later with a view to arriving at the settlement. However, the Indian Government has gone back on the 
agreement and claimed that the area is Indian territory and there is no dispute over it. It has sent troops to occupy the 
area and carried out armed provocation against Pakistan. This is the crux of the present Indo-Pakistan border conflict. 
                                                 
135
 TASS is a Russian News Agency. It was established as The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. (Телеграфное 
агентство Советского Союза = TACC). It was a crucial institution at the Soviet time. It was the only institute which 
was responsible for disseminating official information. Therefore, analyzing statements released by TASS would be 
beneficial to identify some aspects of the Soviet foreign policy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has been 
overtaken by the Information Telegraph Agency of Russia. In Russian is Информационное агентство России 
"ТАСС” = ИTAP TACC).( Informatsionnoe agentstvo Rossii). 
136 Pravda TASS Statement, 9 May 1965 as translated in Daily Review (Moscow) comp. by Rajendra Kumar Jain. 
(1979) Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978. UK: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., p. 61. 
137 Xinhua is the official press agency of the People’s Republic of China. Its president is a member of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, statements made in Xinhua is an important indicator for the 
Chinese foreign policy. 
43 
 
Such action on the part of the Indian Government once again shows up India’s big nation chauvinism and 
expansionism. The position of the Indian Government on the border disputes with the neighbouring countries has 
always been truculent and unreasonable and one of rejecting peaceful negotiations. The logic of the Indian Government 
is ´ my territory is mine, yours is also mine, places I occupy are mine and those I want to occupy are also mine.”138 
 In the same statement, China attributed its own territorial problems to India as well. For this 
reason, China declared that it sympathized with Pakistan. 
 “In the prolonged Sino-Indian border disputes and repeated Sino-Indian border conflicts the Chinese 
Government has long had experience of the big nation chauvinist and expansionist logic of the Indian ruling circles. 
The Chinese Government and people fully sympathize with and support the solemn and just stand of Pakistan 
Government in opposing the Indian policy of military expansion and advocating settlement of the border disputes 
through peaceful negotiations.”139  
 In the statement below, one can also identify some elements of Cold War ideological 
competition. Just as the Soviet Union had done, China also placed blame on US imperialism in 
triggering the crisis in South Asia and more generally, in the developing world.  
 “The US imperialism and its followers, on their part, have energetically supported the Indian reactionaries, by 
giving them money and guns to encourage India’s arms expansion and war preparations. They have done so not only to 
make India a pawn in anti-China crusade but to back India in bullying its neighbouring countries so as to carry out 
their evil schemes of making Asians fight Asians and disrupting Afro-Asian solidarity.”140  
 At the end of the statement, China again condemned India and labeled Indian acts as 
chauvinist ambitions. It covertly threatened India that if the situation did not improve, things would 
worsen. 
 “The Chinese Government strongly condemns the big nation chauvinist and expansionist policy of the Indian 
Government. We would like to advise the Indian Government to give primary consideration to the interests of the Indian 
people and to the Afro-Asian solidarity and thereby settle its disputes with neighbouring countries, through peaceful 
negotiations. If instead, it insists on having its own way and playing with fire and widens armed conflict it will certainly 
come to no good end.”141  
 This statement made by the Xinhua News Agency clearly outlines China’s position in the 
Rann of Kutch conflict, supporting Pakistan and blaming imperialist forces for the escalation of the 
crisis. The Chinese statement also reflects the characteristics of the geopolitical and ideological 
competition of this era in that part of the world.  
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 During the Rann of Kutch crisis, the US, the Soviet Union and China blamed each other for 
the conflict between India and Pakistan. This partly meets the criteria under Expectation 1. China 
especially supported one party of the conflict, Pakistan, and heavily criticized the other party of the 
conflict, India. These actions meet the criteria of Expectation 1. The decision makers in the US 
contemplated whether India would be more pushed into the Soviet orbit if military aid was 
suspended. These considerations reflect the assumptions and discussions of Expectation 1. 
However, the Rann of Kutch was not a major conflict. It is therefore not possible to infer strong 
consequences from the Rann of Kutch crisis, even if it reflects the main assumptions of Expectation 
1. I, however, included an analysis of the Rann of Kutch crisis because it occurred immediately 
before the 1965 war, for which some background information is necessary. Moreover, the Rann of 
Kutch crisis exhibited how unresolved conflicts could expedite another war on a much bigger scale. 
Below I analyze this major war between India and Pakistan in 1965.  
2.1.3 The India-Pakistan War of 1965 
2.1.3.1 Overview 
After the Rann of Kutch crisis ended, Pakistan commenced Operation Gibraltar on 5 
August 1965. During Operation Gibraltar, Pakistani controlled guerillas infiltrated the Indian state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. While this incited clashes between Indian forces and the guerrillas, the 
regular armies of the two states first clashed on 14 August. On 15 August, India secured several 
important geographical mountain positions in the northern area. This development triggered a 
Pakistani counterattack – where Pakistan bombed Indian troops concentrated near Titwal, Uri, and 
Poonch. In return, this led to an Indian thrust into Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir. Indian forces 
eventually captured the Haji Pir pass, which is five miles within Pakistani territory.
142
  
These Indian gains caused a major Pakistani offensive called Operation Grand Slam on 1 
September. Pakistan was successful at the beginning and captured the village of Jaurian on 5 
September. This village was important because not only was it 14 miles inside of Indian territory, 
but Pakistan also wanted to use Jaurian as a base to proceed to the town of Akhnur. Capturing 
Akhnur would have isolated the state of Jammu & Kashmir from the rest of India.
143
 The Akhnur 
region was also not easy to defend. Therefore, India reciprocated by launching two offensives in 
Punjab, one directed to Lahore and another one to Sialkot, to enforce Pakistani withdrawal from 
Akhnur.
144
 These attacks led India to capture some villages on the way to Lahore, making the 
situation even more critical for Pakistan. With the aim of keeping India out of Lahore, Pakistan 
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attacked Khem Karan on the Indian side of Punjab. India had stopped Pakistani attacks in this 
region with mass causalities on the Pakistani side. In Sialkot, there was a battle with tanks, which 
became the main clash of the war. In the end, Indian forces were not be able to capture the city of 
Sialkot, with an ambiguous outcome as to which side won.
145
  
On 8 September, the US and the UK cut military aid in order to stop the conflict.
146
 The UN 
Security Council finally passed a unanimous resolution on 20 September 1965. In this resolution, 
the Council demanded a cease-fire on the morning of September 22 and a subsequent withdrawal of 
all armed personnel to their previous positions. Only after the meeting the conditions of the 
resolution, did the Council consider necessary steps for a final solution to the conflict. Indian and 
Pakistani governments accepted the resolution on 21 September and 22 September, respectively.
147
 
The war ended on 23 September 1965.
148
 This resolution was as below: 
     “A ceasefire should take effect on Wednesday, Sept 22, 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both 
Governments to issue orders for a ceasefire at that moment, and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personal back to 
positions held by them before Aug.5, 1965.”149  
The resolution first required the halting of all hostilities and then considered a discussion of 
how to resolve the problem. A settlement of the crisis was achieved with the Tashkent Agreement. 
On 17 September, Alexei Kosygin, the then Premier of the Soviet Union, proposed that Indian and 
Pakistani leaders should meet in Tashkent or in another Soviet city to discuss their differences 
under his chairmanship even before the UN Resolution on 20 September. Lal Bahadur Shastri 
announced on 22 September that he had accepted the Soviet offer. On 25 November, almost three 
months later, Pakistan accepted as well, after it realized that the UN was unable to offer a concrete 
solution. In the Soviet mediation part, I will analyze the Tashkent agreement in detail.
150
 Below, I 
outline US behavior in the Pakistan War of 1965. 
2.1.3.2 US Mediation of the India - Pakistan War of 1965 
The first clear mediation attempt by the US occurred on 1 September 1965. Chester Bowles, 
the US Ambassador to India, met with the Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh and the 
Foreign Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shekhar Chandra Jha. At the time of the 
meeting, Pakistan had already infiltrated Kashmir. The US was afraid of a reciprocal Indian 
movement from another part of the India-Pakistani border in which India had more of an advantage 
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than it did in the Kashmir region. Bowles urged Swaran Singh to take a reasonable position that 
could prevent an outbreak of war on the subcontinent. He did this by drawing Singh’s attention to 
the fact that a counter attack by India would trigger a war that would be difficult to control.151    
In terms of Pakistan, the US pursued a more discouraging strategy. As in the Rann of Kutch 
crisis, Pakistan reminded the US of its responsibilities as an ally to protect Pakistan. However, the 
US again refrained from identifying India as an aggressive actor. Moreover, it blamed Pakistan for 
its role in increasing the tension. This is illustrated in the below telegram sent by the US 
Department of State to the US ambassador in Pakistan. 
“It is clear from the United Nations Secretary General report that immediate crisis began with substantial 
infiltration of armed men from the Pakistan side.”152 
Another meeting between Zulfikar Bhutto and the US Ambassador to Pakistan, 
McConaughy was even harsher. Bhutto sought to involve the US in the crisis and reminded the US 
of their duty to support Pakistan as an ally. McConaughy, however, asserted that the US already 
concerted all of its resources behind the UN Security Council and the Secretary General. In 
response, Bhutto protested, and asserted that: 
“If only reason for bilateral agreement with US were to refer to UN then Pakistan might as well not have that 
agreement. US/Pak agreement is special arrangement and obligation US with respect Pakistan. To refer government of 
Pakistan now to UN is to say US not willing fulfill its obligations.”153  
There are several other examples that reveal the real concerns of the US in mediating the 
crisis. One example is the US fear of China from which can be elucidated from a telegram sent by 
the then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the US Embassy in India. This telegram demonstrates 
that while preventing the conflict was important for the US, a crucial motive was to hinder the 
spread of the conflict into East Pakistan. If the conflict had spread to East Pakistan, it could have 
invited China to the conflict. This would complicate the situation and was not in the best interest of 
US foreign policy, given the Cold War context. Below is the relevant part of this telegram.  
“As seen from here there are very urgent reasons why we should attempt to prevent Indo-Pak fighting from 
expanding into the Bengal-East Pakistan area. Quite apart from strong humanitarian reasons for not extending ground 
and air operations in area of massed populations, the military situation in the West still appears to be somewhat 
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tentative and possibilities of getting cease-fire and pullback still exist. Opening up of front in the Eastern subcontinent 
would be further major inflammation and would substantially increase risks of Chinese involvement.”154  
A declassified telephone conversation recorded between the then US President Johnson and 
the US Defense Minister McNamara also obviously demonstrates US calculations under the Cold 
War context. This document reveals that McNamara was concerned about contingencies that might 
develop and which contingency the US was not ready to cope with. For McNamara, the least 
desirable situation would be China intervening in a position against India, possibly leading to war in 
South Asia.155  
In fact, China concern played a predominant role in the US calculations. This is perhaps 
obvious, given an ultimatum sent by China to India. In this ultimatum, China threatened India, 
stating that India must withdraw its military units in the China-Sikkim boundary within three days, 
or else it would face grave consequences. The ultimatum by China was extremely disturbing for the 
US, because, as the above declassified documents indicate, a major concern of the US was to 
prevent China from intervening in the conflict and to contain communist influences in South Asia. 
For this reason, the US intensified its effort to convince Pakistan to distance itself from China. One 
of the concrete US diplomatic attempts regarding this topic came when the US Ambassador to 
Pakistan, McCanaughy met with Pakistani President Ayub. In his meeting, McConaughy did not 
overtly mention the commitments of the US and how the US would react in the face of Indian 
aggression, but instead, tried to secure firm assurances from Ayub that Pakistan would distance 
itself from Chinese commitments. McCanoughy made the distancing a condition for Pakistan if it 
wanted even a little support against Indian aggression. The real concern for the US was the 
expansion of communism and how to contain it. McConoughy reports from his meeting with Ayub 
to the US Department of State, as stated below: 
“I focused conversation on implications of ChiCom156 ultimatum and on inescapable and imperative 
requirement for unconditional cease-fire under United Nations Security Council resolutions. I said without arguing 
background, position at this moment is that ChiComs have it within their power to put Pakistan in impossible situation 
unless GOP157 moves before expiration of ChiCom ultimatum to reject threatened Chinese intervention and implement 
unconditional cease-fire with India. Anything short of this would put Pakistan in position of seemingly abetting or at 
least passively benefiting from ChiCom aggression against India. This would be posture which United States 
Government and people could not accept. It would be impossible for Pakistan or anyone else to prove ChiComs had not 
been influenced in their decision by Pak failure to disassociate themselves. Such Pakistani position could not be 
defended before American Government and people, and I did not know how we could get back on our traditional basis 
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after such a disaster….Even a semblance of Pakistani association with ChiComs in exertion of Communists military 
pressures on any free country would put Pakistan beyond reach of U.S. help.”158  
These conversations demonstrate how the US predicted the Soviet Union and China would 
behave, if faced with war between India and Pakistan. As such, the US first considered the 
positioning of others, and only later ending the crisis. 
A dialogue between the US Ambassador in India and India’s President Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan indicate that the US sought to influence India to turn against China. The ambassador 
advised the Indian President that India should make peace with Pakistan as soon as possible so that 
it can direct all of its resources against China. It is hence easy to see that US purpose was not only 
to prevent a war on the subcontinent, but also to mobilize countries against a Chinese communist 
threat.159  
The briefing below from the Secretary of State Rusk to US President Johnson also points out 
that the US considered its own interests before others in mediating the crisis. He informed the US 
President that:  
 “If Kashmir were the only issue, the US could reasonably hope to stand aside. However, the whole Western 
power transition in Asia may shortly be at stake.”160  
In this briefing, Rusk argued that if the US stood aside, the situation would raise doubt about 
US commitments among other allies such as Iran and Turkey. They would then begin to question 
US assurances in times of actual crises.  
One can detect geopolitical considerations in the US mediation of the 1965 crisis. The main 
concern of the US was the increase in Chinese influence among Asian nations. In this respect, the 
US and the Soviet Union shared the same concerns because the rift between the Soviet Union and 
China increased during this time period. The US, however, approached China during the presidency 
of Nixon to exploit the rift between the Soviet Union and China.  
This US attitude therefore meets Expectation 1 by not collaborating with other mediator 
states, where the US even tried to hinder the mediation attempts of China. On the other hand, the 
US was not opposed to the Soviet sponsored meeting in Tashkent that led to the Tashkent 
Agreement because it shared the same interest of preventing the increasing Chinese influence. One 
can argue that US behavior did not meet the actions mentioned in Expectation 2, which is that 
competitive mediation reduces the effectiveness of pressure for both parties because each mediator 
                                                 
158 FRUS Volume XXV, South Asia, Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State, 
Document 217, 20 September 1965 [online] Available at:  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d217 [Accessed 29.03.2017]. 
159 FRUS Volume XXV, South Asia, Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, 11 September 
1965 [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d201 [Accessed 29.03.2017]. 
160 FRUS Volume XXV, South Asia, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 9 September 
1965 [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d196 [Accessed 21.03.2017]. 
49 
 
state supports the state with which it has good relations. It was therefore to expect that the US 
should have supported Pakistan, but should not have criticized it. As explained above, however, the 
real US concern was that a prolonged war could have increased Chinese influence in the region. 
The US, therefore, harshly criticized Pakistan’s approach to China without giving second thought as 
to whether the Chinese involvement would be beneficial to end the crisis by pressuring India. The 
US worried that the alignment of a western ally, Pakistan, with communist China would jeopardize 
US interests in the region. An immediate ending of war was better for US interests. In this respect, 
the US criticized Pakistani actions. Expectation 3 is also met because Pakistan tried to play the 
China card in order to receive more US support. Only after understanding that the US stance against 
Chinese role is firm did Pakistan begin to reduce Chinese influence in its affairs. However, 
developing relations with China in this period did provide the basis of future strong relations with 
China. Pakistan later played a crucial role in the US-China rapprochement. 
2.1.3.3 The Soviet Mediation of India – Pakistan War of 1965 
The Soviet Union played an active role in the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan. The 
Soviet Premier Kosygin and other Soviet Representatives in the UN Security Council had many 
conversations with other states regarding the conflict. In the end, the conflict was resolved by a 
Soviet initiative called the Tashkent Agreement. Despite this active role, Soviet politicians 
generally used defamatory language against the US and the West in general regarding their alleged 
role in instigating the conflicts between India and Pakistan. Below are some examples of the Soviet 
position on the conflict. 
In his speech to the UN Security Council, Soviet representative Marozov asserted that the 
conflict between India and Pakistan was a legacy of colonialism. He also blamed western powers 
for trying to profit from the conflicts between India and Pakistan. Marozov aimed to highlight the 
superiority of the Soviet values and defended these values against the West. It also pointed out the 
relevancy of these values in solving the problems in Third World countries. In his statement, a sign 
of collaboration with the West to ease this crisis was not detected. Below is his speech:  
 “My delegation has repeatedly pointed out that the tension between these two important Asian States over 
Kashmir is one of the grim legacies of colonialism. The imperialists have always tried to use the Kashmir question to 
stir up quarrels between the peoples of India and Pakistan, to set them against each other now that they have freed 
themselves from colonial bondage, to undermine their solidarity, to aggravate international relations and exploit the 
situation this created for their own selfish purposes, and to create in Asia yet another hotbed of tension.”161  
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An example of a mediation effort was a message sent by the then Soviet Premier Kosygin to 
Indian Prime Minister Shastri on 4 September 1965. He stated that: 
“The tendency towards a further expansion of the armed conflict aggravates the already tense situation in 
South and South-East Asia created by the aggression of United States imperialism. Such developments, of course, serve 
the purposes only of those external forces that seek to divide the States which have liberated themselves from the 
colonial yoke and to set one against other, forces that are interested in weakening the unity of Afro-African 
countries.”162 
In the message by Kosygin to Shastri, a conflictive rhetoric can be detected. He believed that 
US imperialism was responsible for all negative events.  In the second part of the message, Kosygin 
offered to actively mediate the crisis: 
“Acting in the Spirit of the United Nations Charter and the Bandung principles, the parties should enter into 
negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the differences that have arisen between them. As for the Soviet Union, both 
sides could count on this willing co-operation or, to use the accepted expression, on its good offices in this matter. We 
are ready for this, if both sides consider it useful.”163  
In this statement, Kosygin explicitly offers assistance by the Soviet Union to solve the crisis. 
Nonetheless, his speech has confronting rather than collaborating discourse, and there is little 
evidence of willingness to cooperate with the West to mediate the conflict. 
 On 4
 
September 1965, Kosygin sent an identical letter to the Pakistani President Ayub Khan. 
In this letter, he blamed US imperialism and claimed that the roots of the crisis stems from 
imperialist agendas of western powers. He also offered assistance to mediate the crisis in this 
letter.
164
 Both President Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri rejected the offer.
165
  
In another official statement released by TASS on 7
 
September 1965, imperialism and the 
West were criticized again. It was likewise unconducive towards easing the crisis. 
 “There is no doubt that the armed conflict in the Kashmir region cannot benefit either of the sides. Present 
developments in that region play into the hands only those outside forces that seek to disunite and set at loogerheads 
the States that cast off the colonial yoke. In the past, too, these forces have more than once tried to exploit the Kashmir 
issue to prevent the establishment of good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan, seeking to set them at 
loggerheads. They are undoubtedly, now, too, instigating India and Pakistan to extend the bloodshed for the sake of 
their ends which run counter to the national interests of the Indian and Pakistani people who are vitally interested in 
the strengthening of peace.”166 
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 TASS statement on 13
 
September 1965, as seen below, also reveals that the Soviet Union 
held US imperialism responsible for all the unfortunate events in South Asia. This statement clearly 
demonstrates that the Soviet Union does not envisage the possibility of collaborating with the US in 
order to ease the conflict.  
“The incoming reports show that the Indo-Pakistani armed conflict is gaining ground…The growing military 
actions between India and Pakistan coupled with the continued aggression of American imperialism in Vietnam 
increase still more the danger to peace in South and South-East Asia and the rest of the world. Howsoever the causes 
behind the hostilities between India and Pakistan are appraised, one thing is clear: their further extension would 
benefit only the forces of imperialism, only those who would like to re-impose the yoke of colonialism and neo-
colonialism on the liberated peoples. Even now, American imperialism is trying to exploit the military clashes between 
India and Pakistan to divert the people’s attention from the US aggression in Vietnam.”167   
On 17 September 1965, Kosygin proposed again that Indian and Pakistani leaders should 
meet at Tashkent or some other Russian city to talk about their differences.
168
 
On 18
 
September 1965, Nikolai Fedorenko, the Soviet representative in the Security Council 
stated: 
“The spread of the armed conflict is aggravating the already tense situation in South and South-East Asia, 
created by the aggression of United States imperialism in Vietnam, and is still further increasing the threat to world 
peace… It is all evident that the armed conflict between India and Pakistan merely serves the purposes of the forces 
who are trying to disunite and set against each other the States that have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke. It 
is equally clear that the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces which are pursuing the criminal policy of 
dividing peoples so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims.”169 
Here, the Soviet Union stated in the UN Security Council that the conflict in South Asia had 
been inflated by imperialistic intentions. These charges were put before the UN Security Council 
and demonstrated that Soviet accusations of the US particularly, and of the West generally, were 
not merely for domestic political reasons. The statement brings these allegations to the international 
forefront. Therefore, this attitude further complicated the possibility of collaboration between the 
Soviet Union and the West. 
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On 22 September, Lal Bahadur Shastri positively responded to Kosygin’s offer from 17 
September to hold a peace conference in Tashkent. On 25 November, Pakistan also finally accepted 
Kosygin’s offer.170 
The Tashkent Conference started on 3 January 1966 and ended on 10 January 1966. It was 
not an easy conference to lead. Although Kosygin succeeded in stopping the war, the Kashmir 
problem was still not resolved. The Tashkent Conference applied the method of incremental 
improvement to India-Pakistan relations. The most fundamental problem, Kashmir, was first put 
aside in order to solve other more pressing issues: The immediate end of war, the redeployment of 
both armies behind the cease-fire line that was drawn in 1949, and the immediate reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations. Additionally, India and Pakistan agreed to pursue high-level contacts on 
matters of direct concern to both countries. In February 1966, both sides withdrew from behind the 
cease-fire line and on March 1966, the ministerial level meetings began to discuss the Kashmir 
problem.
171
 
On 10
 
January 1966, Kosygin also stated that: 
 “These were difficult talks but it could not be otherwise. For, the disputed problems were accumulated in the 
course of many years. More, it should be borne in mind that the enmity between Pakistan and India was a heritage of 
the long period of domination by the colonialists, who set the enslaved peoples at loggerheads with each other.”172 
The statements above demonstrated that in mediating the 1965 crisis, the Soviet Union 
prioritized geopolitical and ideological concerns. Apart from easing the crisis, it also strived to end 
the 1965 crisis by blaming the US for triggering the crisis. Therefore, on the one hand, the Soviet 
Union struggled to end the crisis, but on the other hand, it sought to impress both India and 
Pakistan, as well as achieving some political gains for communist ideology. Furthermore, ending 
the Indo-Pakistani conflict would endorse Russia’s role as an Asian power, one that could help 
solve problems among Asian nations without having colonialist motives.
173
 For these reason, the 
Soviet mediation of 1965 war fulfills Expectation 1: competition.  
During the crisis, the Soviet Union continued to send the military aids to India although the 
US and the UK decided to cut off these aids. This was also a competitive move and fits into 
Expectation 1, since one mediator state stopped providing military aid, and other mediator state 
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stepped in to fill the gap in military aid. In this context, the US cut off aid, which was then provided 
for by the Soviets.
174
  
2.1.3.4 The Chinese Mediation of Indian – Pakistan War of 1965 
In an article released by the Peking Review
175
 on 5
 
September 1965, one can detect that 
China blamed India for starting the conflict. It attributes the origin of the conflict to the brutal 
Indian rule in Kashmir. This statement clearly demonstrates the pro-Pakistani position of China. 
      “The people in the Indian-occupied sector of Kashmir started large-scale armed resistance early last month 
because they could no longer tolerate the brutal rule and communal prosecution of the Indian reactionaries…For more 
than a decade the Indian Government has defied the Kashmir people’s demand for self-determination and deprived 
them of their democratic rights.”
176
 
 It was also stated that India crossed the ceasefire line and therefore, Pakistan was only 
defending itself. This statement fully corresponds with the official Pakistani account of the crisis. 
 “While barbarously cracking down on the Kashmir people recently, India has at the same time openly violated 
the ceasefire line agreed upon between the two countries, sent its troops into the area controlled by Pakistan and 
launched armed provocations against that country.”177  
 In the same article China blamed both the imperialist powers and the Soviet Union. In this 
part, one can view the Chinese reaction as ideological competition with the West and geopolitical 
competition with the Soviet Union. 
 “The fact that the Indian reactionaries dare to carry on this unscrupulous expansionism cannot be separated 
from the backing and instigation of the United States and some other big powers. For many years, US imperialism has 
given India enormous sums of money and large quantities of arms. The Khrushchev revisionists, too, have vied with the 
United States in giving money and arms to India.”178 
 On 7
 
September 1965, the Chinese Government released an official statement regarding the 
Kashmir crisis. In this statement, China demonstrated its full support for Pakistan and condemned 
India. It again blamed western powers for pursuing their own interests in the region. 
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 “The Indian Government’s armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression. It is not only a crude 
violation of all principles guiding international relations, but also constitutes a grave threat to peace in this part of 
Asia. The Chinese Government sternly condemns India for its criminal aggression, expresses firm support for Pakistan 
in its just struggle against aggression and solemnly warns the Indian Government that it must bear responsibility for all 
the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression…On the Kashmir question, the United Nations has once 
again proved a tool of US imperialism and its partners in their attempt to control the whole world. ”179   
 In this official Chinese statement, it is evidence that international cooperation was difficult. 
China blamed the US and the Soviet Union for encouraging Indian belligerence. The same 
statement plainly reveals the Chinese threat to India as well.  
 “Since the Indian Government has taken the first step in committing aggression against Pakistan, it cannot 
evade responsibility for the chain of consequences arising therefrom.”180  
 On 9
 
September 1965, China threatened India one more time. While celebrating the 
Founding of the Tibetan autonomous region in Lhasa, Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih sent a strong 
signal to India. He stated that:  
 “The Indian reactionaries have always cherished expansionist and aggressive ambitions with regard to 
China’s territories of Tibet and Sinkiang. They have not yet learnt their lesson since their large-scale armed offensive 
against China was smashed in 1962…Should the Indian reactionaries continue to act arbitrarily and cherish their vain 
expansionist dreams, they will certainly repeat their previous mistake and suffer a still heavier defeat.”181 
      On 9
 
September 1965 Premier Zhou En-lai blamed again both the US and the Soviet Union 
for encouraging India to behave aggressive. At a public reception given by the Korean Charge 
Charge d´Affaires ad interim, he stated that: 
“The Indian reactionaries could not have engaged in such a serious military adventure without the consent 
and support of the US…In this context the modern revisionists (the Soviet Union) have also played a most unseemly 
role. They have repeatedly asserted that Kashmiri is an integral part of India. Is this not an open encouragement for the 
Indian reactionaries to embark on a military adventure? ”182 
 Here Premier Zhou En-lai overtly declared a pro-Pakistani policy. He stated that: 
 “The Indian reactionaries are the aggressors. They are outright aggressors both in the local conflict in 
Kashmir and in the general conflict between India and Pakistan…„The Chinese Government firmly supports Pakistan’s 
just struggle against aggression and the Kashmir people’s struggle for freedom and the right of national self-
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determination; it resolutely condemns India for its crimes of aggression and sternly warns the Indian Government that 
it must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from its extended aggression.”183 
 An editorial article in the People’s Daily also rejected allegations made by India that 
Pakistani forces infiltrated through the border and initiated the crisis. In this article, it was stated 
that: 
 “The Indian reactionaries describe their aggressive action in crossing the ceasefire line as aimed at coping 
with the so-called ´ Pakistan infiltrator´. This, too, is utterly absurd. It is common knowledge that India and Pakistan 
reached agreement in 1953 that the status of Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite… The Indian authorities have 
more than once openly claimed that ´ Kashmiri is an integral part of the Indian Union.´ This fully exposes their 
expansionist ambitions…The people in the Indian-occupied sector staged an armed uprising in early August to oppose 
Indian tyranny and demand self-determination of their own future. This is an entirely just action and no question of 
Pakistan „infiltration „is involved.”184 
 On 14 September 1965, in another editorial article, China’s reservations from easing the 
crisis through international cooperation can be identified. This article blamed not only the US and 
the Soviet Union, but the UN as well. It asserted that the UN had come under the influence of 
imperialist powers. It was stated in this article that:  
 “The United Nations is again playing a most unsavory role this time in India’s large-scale armed aggression 
against Pakistan. In the name of „mediation“ it is taking sides with the Indian aggressor and doing all it can to help the 
Indian reactionaries shored up by US imperialism and its partners…Under the manipulation of US imperialism, the 
United Nations, consistently reversing right and wrong and calling black white, has always served the interests of 
aggressors and branded the victims of aggression as the aggressors…Today, the United Nations is again siding with 
the aggressor on the Kashmir issue and the Indo-Pakistan conflict and bullying hic victim. It has become a sanctuary 
for the Indian aggressor. The United Nations is a tool of US imperialism. It has done much evil. It cannot do anything 
good…”185 
Apart from these statements above, China already aggressively began to meddle with the 
crisis in August 1965. Since 1963, China was protesting against the military structures erected by 
India on the Chinese side of the border between Sikkim and Tibet at the Nathu La and other passes 
leading into the Chumbi Valley, located within Chinese territory. As the Kashmir crisis intensified, 
China urged India to withdraw from Chinese territory
186 India declined China’s claims and proposed 
a neutral observer group to inspect the region. China refused the observers, and urged India to 
withdraw.
187
 India believed that China did bring the border issues in order to encourage Pakistan.
188
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On 16 September 1965, China delivered an ultimatum to India at the peak of the crisis. This 
ultimatum directed Indians to withdraw within three days from Sikkim-Tibet territory.  Otherwise, 
they would face grave consequences.
189
 The ultimatum would expire on 19 September. China 
extended the time for a further three days before the expiration date. On 22 September, China 
declared that India had already fulfilled the Chinese requirements and withdrew the ultimatum.
190
 
Chinese ultimatum was a source of great concern for India. India had to maintain substantial 
military troops in the Sikkim-Tibet territory, which had grave consequences on Indian war efforts 
with Pakistan. Even after the Indian decision to participate in the Tashkent Peace Conference, China 
continued to threaten India. Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi held a press conference for 
Chinese and foreign correspondents on 29
 
September 1965. A correspondent of the London Daily 
Express asked what assistance the Chinese Government would give Pakistan, if the conflict between 
India and Pakistan continued. Vice-Premier Chen Yi emphasized that: 
 “If the Indian troops resume the aggressive war against Pakistan, China will certainly give Pakistan moral 
and material support.”191 
 As the data revealed, in the 1965 crisis China firmly supported Pakistan. China also tried to 
discredit the Tashkent Agreement by claiming that it was “a product of joint US – Soviet 
planning.”192 These Chinese actions did not embody collaborative behavior. 
China’s attitude meets the criteria laid out in Expectation 1. China did not collaborate with 
neither the US nor the Soviet Union. In contrast, it competed with them to seek gains from the 
conflict. China blamed the actions of the US and the Soviet Union and kept them responsible for the 
crisis. This attitude fits into the likely actions of the Expectation 1. One can also interpret the 
Chinese threat to India, sending an ultimatum, as an attempt at solving its own territorial disputes 
with India by exploiting the crisis. This action by China could therefore be seen as an endeavor to 
make profit out of the crisis. Moreover, the Chinese attitude fits the actions elaborated in 
Expectation 2. Expectation 2 assumes that there is no coordination between mediator states and 
each mediator supports the state with which it has good relations. China overtly supported Pakistani 
actions and criticized India.  
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  The attitudes of India and Pakistan also fit Expectation 3 in that: The parties of the conflict 
have more maneuvering capability regarding foreign policy (alignment) options. Ayup Khan’s and 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s attempts to play the Chinese card show this capability. 
2.1.4 India – Pakistan War of 1971 
2.1.4.1 Overview 
After the demarcation of Pakistan and India, Pakistan was divided into two parts, East and 
West Pakistan. There were no shared borders between these two administrative units. West Pakistan 
was richer than East Pakistan. Military and industrial elites were located in West Pakistan. West 
Pakistan was not receptive to the demands coming from East Pakistan and was not interested in the 
widespread poverty there. All of these factors contributed to the public resentment in East Pakistan 
which led them to demand more autonomy. The Awami League, the major political party in East 
Pakistan, won 167 out of 169 seats in the December 1970 elections. West Pakistan invalidated the 
elections, causing uprisings in East Pakistan. However, the uprising was not united. Some non-
Bengali East Pakistanis (Biharis) sided with West Pakistan against Bengalis.
193
 This complicated 
the situation. Bengalis slaughtered Biharis during the uprisings in Chittagong because of their pro-
Pakistani position. Pakistan used this as an excuse to launch a massive operation against East 
Pakistan, called Operation Searchlight.
194
  
On the night of 25 March 1971, Pakistan attacked Dhaka. The Awami League was banished 
and political leaders were arrested. One of the aims of the operation was to disarm disloyal Bengali 
personnel in the police and army.
195
 Many members of the secession movement relocated to India. 
The leader of the Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and taken to West Pakistan. 
On 26 March 1971, Ziaur Rahman
196
 declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of 
Mujibur Rahman. In April 1971, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile.  
As a result of these developments, General Tikha, the commander of Pakistani Forces in 
East Pakistan, slaughtered the massive Bengali population in East Pakistan.
197
 Many Bengalis 
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started to flee East Pakistan, creating a large refugee problem in India. Nearly 10 million
198
 refugees 
were to be absorbed into the Indian economy.
199
 In addition, India was concerned about the strong 
ties between West and East Bengals on the ground that significant number of refugees could 
destabilize their own Bengali (West) region.
200
 After appealing to the international community 
without any success, India decided to develop massive military units near the border areas. On 23 
November, Pakistani President Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency and announced that a 
war with India was highly possible.
201
  
On the evening of 3 December, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike 
on airfields in north-western India, including Agra
.202
 This preemptive air strike was called 
Operation Cengiz Khan. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that air strikes were a declaration of war 
against India. This incident marks the official start of this conflict.  
Pakistan initiated attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan sector on the western 
front in order to keep India at bay from East Pakistan.
203
 The clashes in Chamb in the Jammu and 
Kashmir region were harsh and Pakistan had shown some success there. India had not launched a 
massive land aggression on the western front because its expectations in the western front were 
modest.  Nevertheless, the Indian navy initiated two successful attacks. On 4-5 December 1971, the 
Indian Navy attacked Karachi port in the Western theatre. This operation was called Operation 
Trident. Thereafter, Operation Python took place on 8-9 December 1971. In this operation, Indian 
missile boats attacked the Karachi port and caused heavy damages.
204
  
India also launched a massive land attack together with Mukti Bahini forces
205
 in the Eastern 
Sector. The Pakistani air force tried to retaliate, but the Indian air force quickly destroyed Pakistani 
air capabilities in East Pakistan.
206
 Consequently, Dhaka fell to Indian and Mukti Bahini forces on 
December 16. It ended the war. East Pakistan became an independent state and took the name 
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Bangladesh. This was a large defeat for Pakistan, which also lost its territorial integrity. Major 
powers also played a role in the crisis but were not successful in preventing the war. Below, I 
outline the mediation actions of the US, the Soviet Union, and China to the crisis. 
2.1.4.2 US Mediation of India – the Pakistan War of 1971 
In mediating the 1971 war, the US placed importance on its relations with Pakistan. The 
statement of the US Secretary of State William P. Rogers to US President Richard Nixon evidently 
demonstrated that when easing the crisis, the US should prioritize its own interests. Rogers 
highlighted that a war in South Asia poses a great danger to US interests in the region. He even 
recommended that for the sake of US relations with the Pakistani President Yahya, the US should 
not force Yahya to search for political concessions in East Pakistan. Below is a part of his 
statement: 
“The possibility of war introduces a new and greater threat to US interests in South Asia. The threat is likely to 
remain as long as the East Pakistan conflict remains unresolved. We agree that President Yahya is not likely to take 
steps to bring about a political accommodation until he realizes, himself, how essential it is. We cannot force him to this 
realization and therefore we are not imposing political conditions on our assistance. We believe, however, that we 
should avoid taking actions which might ease the internal pressures on him to take such steps on his own accord.”207  
The statement above shows how relations with Pakistan were important for the US, and 
while ending the crisis was also important, it was sought in a way that no damage was done to 
relations with Pakistan. The overt pro-Pakistani policy of the US and US President Nixon’s close 
relationship with Pakistani President Yahya is visible in the 1971 crisis. The US declared that the 
uprisings in East Pakistan were an internal problem of Pakistan. Therefore, it rejected the idea of 
external interference in this issue. On 5
 
April 1971, the spokesman of the Department of State 
stated: 
 “…We view what is going on in Pakistan as an internal matter...”208 
In a conversation between US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Nixon, the 
US objected to East Pakistani independence. Kissinger stated: 
           “…If East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It is going to be 100 million people, 
they have the lowest standard of living in Asia…No resources. They are going to become a ripe for Communist 
infiltration.”209 
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           This statement also illuminates one reason for which the US sided with Pakistan. Its 
unwillingness to support East Pakistani independence stemmed from geopolitical concerns and fear 
of the spread of communism. Although this conversation between Nixon and Kissinger 
demonstrates the obvious pro-Pakistani stance of the US, the staff of National Security Council 
tried to keep their options open. For example, they prepared a contingency plan based on different 
possible US reactions to the crisis. These scenarios varied from staying neutral to supporting either 
Pakistan or India. They evaluated the pros and cons of each scenario. They claimed that if they 
supported Pakistan openly, it would antagonize India and push India closer to the Soviet orbit. If 
they supported India, although they consider this to be less likely, it would antagonize Pakistan and 
make the country vulnerable to Chinese influence. They claimed that if the conflict is not 
prolonged, the best option would be to take a neutral position. If the conflict is prolonged, neutrality 
would not suit US interests. Below is one example, by the National Security Council, of the 
contingency plan relating to a scenario of US neutrality.  
“The U.S. would assume an essentially passive role toward the conflict indicating our basic neutrality. This 
would be most appropriate in circumstances where the responsibility for the outbreak of war was unclear or where we 
judged the likelihood of Chinese military involvement to be small. It would not do irreparable harm to our interests in 
either country. This posture would also allow us to adopt a mediating position encouraging a negotiated political 
settlement when circumstances made such a role possible. Such an approach would not be appropriate if there were a 
prolonged conflict.”210   
However, they added that this neutrality would be counterproductive to US interests in the 
long term, if the war was prolonged. In a protracted war, US neutrality would increase India’s 
dependence on the Soviet Union and Pakistan’s dependence on China. This contingency plan shows 
that the US tried to keep its options open. However, Nixon’s insistency to support Pakistan 
dominated national security discussions. For example, in one of the Washington Special Action 
Groups
211
 meetings, Kissinger stated: 
         “I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough on India. He has just called me 
again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we 
do comes out otherwise.”212 
          From Kissinger’s statement, one can detect that the US measures the possible impacts of its 
actions on its allies rather than merely easing the crisis. Kissinger further stated: 
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          “What may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India) equipped and supported by the Soviets may be 
turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries 
may be thinking of our action.”213 
           This statement reveals that the US considered how mediating the India – Pakistan crisis 
would affect the role of the US and the dynamics among allies. 
           The US mediation of 1971 crisis meets Expectation 1. The US competed with other mediated 
states. This fits into the likely actions of Expectation 1. The US sided with Pakistan because of its 
own foreign policy interests in the region. At the beginning of the crisis, US decision makers 
worked on different scenarios, but during the crisis US support for Pakistan became more solidified. 
In particular, US even sent the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal in order to 
demonstrate US support for Pakistan. Siding with one side of the conflict is more plausibly linked 
to actions of Expectation 2. Decision-makers in the US evaluated how their actions would affect the 
position of the Soviet Union. In the National Security Council, for example, they feared that 
supporting Pakistan could cause India to move towards closer relations with the Soviet Union, 
strengthening the Soviet position in South Asia. These considerations fit the discussions of Expectation 
1 and Expectation 2.   
2.1.4.3 The Soviet Mediation of India – Pakistan War of 1971 
             In mediating the 1971 crisis, the Soviet Union overtly pursued a pro-Indian policy. It 
prioritized its geopolitical interests in the region and accused Pakistan for the crisis. It also openly 
supported East Pakistani independence and claimed that the source of the problem was coming from 
West Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan. For example, then Soviet President Podgorny sent a 
message to the Pakistani President Yahya suggesting that the crisis in East Pakistan can only be 
solved by political means, and the use of force does not resolve the issue. However, Podgorny’s 
point is neither a simple wish nor suggestion. By urging Pakistan to stop the bloodshed and 
repressions of the population in East Pakistan, the Soviet Union actually implied that West Pakistan 
was the aggressive party in the conflict and responsible for the atrocities. This position can be 
evidenced below:  
             “We consider it our duty to address you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR, with an insistent appeal for the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repressions 
against the population in East Pakistan and for turning to methods of a peaceful political settlement.”214  
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          The Soviet Union was also critical of outside intervention. The Soviets suspected that outside 
powers would use the crisis as an opportunity to gain geopolitical and ideological gains in South 
Asia. For example, in a speech made at a dinner given in honor of the King of Afghanistan, 
Podgorny stated that: 
             “Lately, there has been an aggravation of the situation in the Hindustan subcontinent. The problem of 
refugees from East Pakistan arose in connection with the known events there. Tension has grown in relations between 
the two biggest states of the area-India and Pakistan. There are forces who would not mind using the obtaining tense 
situation for attaining their unseemly aims and for whipping up armed clashes in that area.”215  
        Most of the statements made in this period identify the pro-Indian stance of the Soviet Union. 
At a luncheon given in honor of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Kosygin stated that:  
           “We clearly comprehend the complexity of the questions that have emerged as a result of these events in the 
relations between India and Pakistan. It is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities which have 
compelled millions of people to leave their country, land, property, and to seek refuge in the neighbouring India…At 
this crucial moment we address an appeal to President Yahya Khan to take the most effective steps for the liquidation of 
the hotbed of tension that has emerged.”216  
         In this speech, Kosygin clearly condemns Pakistani actions and makes an appeal to stop the 
atrocities in East Pakistan. In the TASS statement below, the Soviet Union showed its solidarity 
with India as well.  
        “On encountering the growing resistance of the East Pakistan population to the mass repressions and persecutions, 
the Government of Pakistan tried to put the blame for this situation on India and embarked on a course of aggravating 
relations with it.”217  
          In the UN Security Council meetings, the Soviet Union continued to support India and accused 
the actions of Pakistan for instigating the crisis. For example, on 6
 
December 1971, the then Soviet 
Representative to the Security Council Yakov Malik said that: 
        “The main cause for the military conflict that has broken out on the territory of the Hindustan Peninsula is a 
certain series of actions of the Government of Pakistan which are directed at the suppression of the lawful demands and 
aspirations of the East Pakistan population…The military conflict in that region is the direct consequence of a series of 
acts of oppression, mass repression and violence conducted over a member of months with the use of the most modern 
forms of weapons and arms with a view to suppressing the clearly expressed will of 75 million East Pakistanis…We 
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appeal to the Government of Pakistan to take effective action towards a political settlement and immediately to 
recognize the will of the East Pakistan population.”218 
          One day later, Yakov Malik again declared in the UN General Assembly meeting on 7 
December 1971 that the party actually responsible for the crisis was Pakistan. He stated that: 
          “The crux of the matter is that the bloody repression by Pakistani authorities of the 75 million-strong 
population of East Pakistan has led to the deaths of many thousands of peaceful people and the flight of almost 10 
million refugees to the neighbouring country of India in order to save their lives.”219  
         In the same meeting, Malik also attributed the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council to 
resolve the crisis to the power struggle between great powers. He said that: 
        “Two great powers, because of their political orientation and ideological conceptions and military-political 
commitments, proved unable to rise above their narrow, selfish considerations and aspirations.”220 
          By “great powers” Malik refers to the US and China. Instead of mediating the crisis in a way 
that could immediately ease the conflict, he asserted that two great powers prioritized their own 
interests in the region. These competing interests in easing the crisis prevented the collaboration of 
the states.  
         In this period, there was also extreme tension between the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet 
Union criticized China’s position and accused it pandering to the imperialist agenda. For example, 
in one of the speeches made by Malik in the UN Security Council on 13
 
December 1971, Malik said 
that:  
“It is easy to see that the substance of the position of Peking lines in this: to inflame the Indo-Pakistan conflict, 
to pour oil on the fire and thus to strive to attain its expansionist, selfish, great-power chauvinist purposes…They view 
Pakistan simply as a spring-board and a puppet for their game that they are playing in this area of the world, as in the 
international arena as a whole.”221 
Malik also asserted that China played the same geopolitical game that the imperialist powers 
had once played. He said in the same meeting that: 
                                                 
218 UN Document S/PV 1608, 5-6 comp. Rajendra Kumar Jain Soviet-South Asian Relations 1947-1978 Volume 1 
Statement by the Soviet Representative Malik in the Security Council, 6 December 1971 (Extracts), p. 141. 
219 UN Document A/PV2003 comp. Rajendra Kumar Jain Soviet-South Asian Relations 1947-1978 Volume 1 Statement 
by the Soviet Representative Malik in the UN General Assembly, 7 December 1971 (Extracts) Document 62, pp. 145-
149. 
220 Ibid. 
221 UN Document S/PV 1613 comp. Rajendra Kumar Jain Soviet-South Asian Relations 1947-1978 Volume 1 Document. 64, 
pp. 149-155.  
64 
 
“In actual practice, by provoking an aggravation of the crisis in East Pakistan and by inflaming the Indo-
Pakistan conflict, the Maoists, in order to attain their great power purposes in South-East Asia, are, in fact, attempting 
to carry out a policy of setting Asians against Asians.”222 
On 15 December 1971, in another statement made by Malik in a UN Security Council 
meeting, Malik’s accusations of China that it was collaborating with the US became more clear. He 
asserted that: 
“Peking is following exactly the same course as Washington, and in this area, as has already been noted, there 
is a United States-Chinese duet going on. Peking is not interested in the fate of millions of people who are undergoing 
unheard of sufferings. Peking is interested in only one thing: to exploit the situation and to strengthen its position in 
East Asia and in the Indian subcontinent…”223 
         One week later on 21 December 1971, Malik made even more antagonistic statements against 
China in the UN Security Council. He asserted that: 
        “Only one permanent member of the Security Council, the Peking Government, has been blind and deaf to these 
tragedies and sufferings of so many millions of persons. It has given unreserved support to the tyranny, terrorism and 
violence and not condemned those who have perpetrated it, nor has there been any expression of regret about the 
victims on the part of Peking, on the part of the representative of China in the Security Council.”224 
         The Soviet mediation of the 1971 war meets the criteria of Expectation 1. One can detect a 
competitive tone in the released statements. The Soviet Union blamed especially China and then the 
US for the atrocities in the region. The Soviet Union also discernibly demonstrated its position by 
articulating its firm support for India. Siding with one side of the conflict fits into the likely actions 
of Expectations 2 which is that each mediator state would support the state with which it has good 
relations. 
2.1.4.4 Chinese Mediation of the India – Pakistan War of 1971 
In this conflict, China pursued a pro-Pakistani policy. It criticized both superpowers. 
However, its frictions with the Soviet Union became more evident in this crisis. For example, an 
article released by the People’s Daily stated that: 
  “It is worth noting that the two superpowers, working in close co-ordination with the Indian reactionaries, 
crudely interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The US State Department issued a statement in an effort to poke its 
nose into Pakistan’s internal affairs, while the Soviet Government acted more blatantly…The Chinese Government and 
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people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle for safeguarding 
national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and inference.”225  
In this statement, China criticized the position of the other superpowers. There were no 
incentive to engage in collaboration to ease the conflict. Each actor pursued its own interests in the 
region.  
On 12
 
April 1971, the then Premier of China Zhou En-lai sent a message to the Pakistani 
President Yahya. He criticized the activities of the US and the Soviet Union. He added that China 
would help Pakistan in the case of a serious threat. 
“We have noted that of late the Indian Government has been carrying out gross interference in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan by exploiting the internal problems of your country. And the Soviet Union and the United States are 
doing the same one after the other…Your Excellency may rest assured that should the Indian expansionists dare to 
launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan 
Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence.”226 
 The above statements exhibited an overt pro-Pakistani position of China. 
 At his speech at the banquet given in honour of the Pakistani delegation, the then Foreign 
Minister of China Chi Peng-fei also supported the Pakistani position. He pointed out that Pakistan 
had struggled hard to defend its territorial integrity and tried to protect its independence from 
foreign aggression. He stated that: 
 “In order to defend their state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence, they (the Pakistani 
people) have waged unremitting struggles against foreign aggressors, interventionists and domestic secessionists. The 
Pakistan Government has adhered to its foreign policy of independence and contributed to the defense of peace in Asia 
and the promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity”227 
 Fu Hao, the representative of the Chinese delegation to the UN, also highlighted that the 
uprisings in East Pakistan were part of the internal affairs of Pakistan and that other countries 
should not interfere. 
 “The Chinese Government and people have always held that the internal affairs of any country should be 
settled by the people of the country themselves. The question that has arisen in East Pakistan is purely Pakistan’s 
internal affair which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves, and no country has the right to interfere in 
it under any pretext.”228  
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 Huang Hua, the Chinese representative to the UN Security Council, also accused the Soviet 
Union for supporting Indian atrocities. On 5
 
December 1971 in the UN Security Council meeting, 
he stated that: 
“Over a long period the Soviet Government has energetically supported India’s expansion and has provided 
the Indian expansionists with large quantities of arms and other war material. It has encouraged India in its scheming 
activities to subvert and dismember Pakistan, and has at the same time openly exerted all kinds of pressure on the 
Pakistan Government…In supporting India in its provoking of an armed conflict with Pakistan, the purpose of the 
Soviet Government is to take advantage of India’s inevitable dependence on the Soviet Union in the war and to control 
the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and expand its spheres of influence so as to compete with another 
Super Power for world hegemony…”229 
Chia Kuan-hua, the Chinese representative in the UN General Assembly, also declared that 
the tension in South Asia was a legacy of the colonial past.  
 “The dispute between India and Pakistan is a legacy of the British imperialist rule in the Indian subcontinent. 
The Chinese Government has consistently held that the new independent Afro-Asian countries should resolve their 
disputes in a friendly way through consultation on an equal basis. They must not be taken in by the imperialists.”230 
           On 9
 
December 1971, the Chinese Foreign Minister declared that:   
“The Chinese Government and people sternly condemn the Indian Government for its criminal acts of 
expansionism and armed aggression and firmly oppose the power-politics and despotism practiced social-
imperialism.” 231 
In this statement, he did not only condemn India, but also harshly criticized the Soviet 
Union. In another statement by Huang Hua, the clear pro-Pakistani stance of China can also be 
detected. 
 “No matter what happens in the India – Pakistan subcontinent, the Chinese Government and people will firmly 
support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and defense of national 
independence and unity.”232 
 These statements above indicate that China pursued a pro-Pakistani policy based on power 
politics and prioritized geopolitical concerns in mediating the 1971 crisis. The elements of a 
collaborative behavior pattern with other mediating actors cannot be found. Chinese mediation of 
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the 1971 meets the criteria of Expectation 1. China blamed the actions of the US and the Soviet 
Union, discredited their mediation attempts, and warned that nothing good can come from their 
sides. It therefore competed with other major powers. In that respect, it fits to the likely actions of 
Expectation 1. China also strongly showed its pro-Pakistani position. Siding with the one party of 
the conflict fulfills the likely actions of Expectation 2.  
 Shortly, the US, the Soviet Union and China pursued competitive policies in the 1971 war, 
and each of them prioritized their own interests over efforts to end the war between India and 
Pakistan. Therefore, the behavior of the major powers fits Expectation 1. The US and China supported 
Pakistan, whereas the Soviet Union sided with India. This accords with actions mentioned in 
Expectation 2, which is that the mediator state supports the state with which it has good relations.  
The important context to consider is the US-China rapprochement. During the crisis, tensions between 
the Soviet Union and China bifurcated. The statements above clearly reflect this Soviet-Chinese rift, 
paving way for the further US-China rapprochement. This rapprochement clearly delineated which 
countries supported which side of the conflict, where Pakistan was supported by both the US and 
China, and India was supported by the Soviet Union. Due to the clear delineation, there was no need 
to move between different mediator states in the search for support. Therefore, Expectation 3 was 
not realized, which assumed that if the party of the conflict did not receive enough support from a 
mediator state, the party of the conflict might move between other mediator states. It was the case in 
the 1965 conflict which Pakistani President Ayup Khan tried to use relations with China in order to 
secure greater support from the US. In the 1971 war however, Pakistan facilitated communication 
between China and the US.  
2.2 The Second Group of Cases: Nuclear Phase 
2.2.1 The Nuclearization of the Crisis 
The Indian nuclear program started with the endeavors of Homi Bhabba, who was known as 
the father of the Indian nuclear program. Bhabba had written a letter on 12 March 1944 to Sir Dorab 
of Tata Trust, a large philanthropic organization in India belonging to the Tata Group. He complained 
about the poor research conditions of applied research in India and requested an establishment of a 
research center. The Tata group supported Bhabba and established the Tata Institute of Fundamental 
Research, and Bhabba became its director.
233
 In short, the Indian nuclear program had started as a 
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research program without military aspect. However, it gained a military dimension after India lost 
the war against China in 1962.
234
 The trauma caused by losing the war in conjunction with the 
Chinese nuclear test in 1964 incited India to develop its own nuclear bomb.
235
  
 India tested its first nuclear bomb in 1974, which was called Smiling Buddha. Although 
Indira Gandhi explained that it was a peaceful nuclear test, the international community was afraid 
that an Indian bomb would cause Pakistan to develop its own nuclear bomb. A movement towards 
this direction had however actually started even before the Indian nuclear tests. Bhutto had already 
disclosed his intention of building nuclear weapons in an interview to Manchester Guardian in 
1965. Bhutto stated that “If India becomes a nuclear state then Pakistan must build a nuclear 
weapon even if we have to eat grass.”236  
 Pakistan’s loss of the 1971 war and the subsequent independence of Bangladesh accelerated 
the Pakistani endeavors to have nuclear weapons. President Bhutto invited renowned Pakistani nuclear 
scientists to a conference in Multan and declared his support for the nuclear program.
237
 The conference 
in Multan was a vital step leading to Pakistan’s nuclear capability.238 
 Serious concerns in the US regarding Pakistani nuclear capability had already begun to develop 
by the end of the 1970s. A declassified Special National Intelligence Estimate report revealed that the 
US estimated already in 1975 that Pakistan could develop a nuclear device by 1978.
239
 France was 
planning to build a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan at that time, but the project was cancelled. 
The cancellation of this agreement deferred the estimations of the acquisition of Pakistani nuclear 
capability. In 1979, however, estimations became pessimistic again. A declassified document of the 
National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation revealed that the US predicted that Pakistan 
might have succeeded in acquiring the main components for a gas centrifuge. The same report 
claimed that this development would enable Pakistan to produce enriched uranium in 1982.
240
 An 
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interagency working group paper on South Asian nuclear and security problems also estimated that 
sufficient highly enriched uranium for a weapon could be available by 1983. A nuclear test was 
then more likely to occur in 1984.
241
  
The US feared that a nuclear Pakistan would cause India to develop its nuclear program 
further. This concern paved way for international collaboration to stop the nuclearization of 
Pakistan. The then US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Harold H. Saunders and 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 
Thomas R. Pickering gave a briefing to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. 
Newsom on 20 January 1979. In this briefing, Saunders and Pickering recommended that there 
should be a common understanding between the West and China concerning nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia. It was pointed out that China had influence on Pakistan. For this reason, an approach to 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was offered. It was also highlighted that the Soviet Union shared the 
same non-proliferation concerns with the US and did not want to witness a nuclear arms race in 
South Asia. Thus, contact with Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the US, was also recommended 
for the transmittal of the message that a Russian demarche to Pakistan is welcome by the US.
242
 
Although the option of contacting Dobrynin was abandoned at the Policy Review Committee held 
on 22 January 1970
243
, a comprehensive diplomatic campaign including China, Saudi Arabia, and 
some European states was recommended.
244
 This is a crucial recommendation which shows that crises 
with a nuclear dimension brings diverse actors to the negotiation table. The Special Representative 
of the President for Non-Proliferation Matters Gerard C. Smith also highlighted the importance of 
an international approach. He claimed that a nuclear Pakistan was the biggest challenge to the 
international structure since 1945. He argued that Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union would also 
join the international effort because they share the same interest in limiting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Smith claimed that efforts at the UN level would be required.
245
 This recommendation 
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exhibits the burgeoning emphasis on collaboration at the international level concerning the crises in 
South Asia.  
The US further highlighted the importance of international mediation, while recognizing the 
limits of collaboration. It offered that the mediation option should not be limited only to a group of 
states or to an international organization. One should also consider the possibility of a diplomatic 
mission by highly respected individuals who hold international recognition.
246
 
The US concern steadily increased. In a telegram from the US Embassy in India to the US 
Department of State, Ambassador Goheen reported that India considered the nuclearization of 
Pakistan as very serious, and even the moderate Indian Prime Minister Dessai declared that if India 
detect a nuclear test, they would then destroy the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.
247
  
Although India was not receptive to an international solution or Chinese involvement, the 
US was convinced that an international solution was necessary to stop the further nuclearization of 
South Asia. In this respect, the US considered communicating with China in order to secure formal 
assurances that China would not deploy its nuclear forces against India.
248
 The US Department of 
State instructed the US Ambassador to China Leonard Woodcock to contact Chinese officials and to 
convey to them US concerns regarding the nuclearization of South Asia. Further instructions were 
to hear Chinese suggestions to this problem and convey that nuclearization of Pakistan would not 
only be a problem to the US, but would create major problems to other nations as well. The State 
Department also informed the US ambassador Woodcock that there was already a meeting between 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the Chinese ambassador to the US Chai Zemin 
as an effort to reach a regional solution to the nuclearization of Pakistan.
249
  
Another example of increasing collaboration is the briefing given during the Policy Review 
Committee meeting to the then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on 10 November 1979. It was 
recommended in this meeting that the US should have continued to consult with Europeans and 
should have enlarged its diplomatic efforts to include Japan. This broad coalition should have been 
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used to place pressure on Pakistan in nuclear issues.
250
 The developments above exhibit the first 
signs of collaboration attempts between international actors brought about by concerns of Pakistani 
nuclearization.  
The danger emanating from a Pakistani nuclear test and its subsequent consequences for 
South Asian security made the nuclearization of the crisis more poignant in the 1980s. For example, 
the US Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research released a report on 25 June 1981, 
highlighting the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear test and the risk of the aftermath of nuclear 
weaponization. India’s possible reactions to a Pakistani nuclear test were also discussed. 
“India fears that Pakistan might launch an attack against it with the expectation that the international 
community will call for a ceasefire and thus force the contentious issue of Kashmir into the international arena. Indian 
counterattack would almost certainly involve efforts to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. India would undoubtedly 
ignore any international resolution concerning Kashmir. India under such circumstances might even decide to 
eliminate the threat of a nuclear-armed Pakistan once and for all by a counterattack aimed at the destruction of 
Pakistan.”251  
These intelligence estimates reflect the serious concerns of the US Department of State 
stemming from potential nuclear tests of Pakistan. The US Department of State emphasized that 
after Pakistan conducts nuclear tests, it would pursue belligerent policies against India regarding 
Kashmir on the expectation that the international community would intervene. The report also 
highlights that India would likely respond harshly to these Pakistani activities. 
For example, another report on 09
 
April 1981 to the Reagan Administration by the National 
Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) and the CIA asserted that: 
“The heightened tension resulting from the presence of Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosives could spur a 
greater conventional arms buildup, and perhaps a race for weaponization. There would be a risk that a future Indo-
Pakistani conflict could result in the use of nuclear weapons.”252  
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This report shows that already in 1981, the US had concerns about Pakistani nuclear tests 
that could trigger a wider conflict with a nuclear dimension. 
The concern increased in the 1990s when India showed signs of testing its nuclear capability 
a second time. It was believed that if India tests its nuclear weapons again, it would lead to an overt 
demonstration of Pakistani nuclear capability through a number of nuclear explosions. Another 
telegram in 1995 sent by the US Department of State to the US Embassy in China also demonstrates 
US collaboration with China regarding the nuclear tests in South Asia.
253
 In this telegram, the US 
mentioned an article written by Tim Weiner in New York Times.
254
 In this article, Weiner claimed 
that spy satellites detected some activity at the Pokaran test site in India and American officials 
believed that India was preparing to test its nuclear capability for the first time since 1974. The US 
was concerned that the claims in this article would trigger Pakistan to follow the same path leading 
to nuclear explosion. This telegram articulated this danger to Chinese authorities and required them 
to warn Pakistani authorities not to follow suit even if India conducted nuclear tests.  
Despite these fears, Pakistan did not detonate a nuclear explosion until 1998. However, 
India decided to conduct a nuclear test in 1998, 24 years after its first tests in 1974. This Indian 
decision compelled the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to conduct nuclear tests as well. The 
US intervened and tried to stop Pakistan. US President Bill Clinton telephoned Sharif and urged 
him not to follow the same suit with India. The US also tried to persuade Pakistan through some 
incentives such as the cancellation of the Pressler amendment
255
, resuming economic assistance, 
and reviving of military relationships.
256
 These incentives did not stop Pakistan because the pressure 
coming from Indian nuclear tests were bigger than the US incentives. For this reason, Pakistan also 
detonated five nuclear explosions on 28 May 1998, their first tests. These tests completed the phase 
of overt nuclearization in South Asia. 
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2.2.2 The Crises at the Beginning of 1980s and Kahuta Crisis 
As described in the Introduction, a crisis has a nuclear dimension if one part of the conflict 
has nuclear capabilities. Although Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, the international 
community believed that Pakistan already acquired nuclear capability in the mid 1980s, while India 
conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. For my analysis, I use 1974 as the year in which the crises 
between India and Pakistan gained a nuclear dimension. Therefore, the crises that occurred in the 
beginning of the 1980s also had a nuclear dimension, albeit not at the same level as in the 1990s. I 
use the crises in the 1980s as one analytical unit and analyzed the mediation of major powers to 
these crises not separately, but jointly. 
Despite the concerns at the international level, Indo-Pakistani relations were strong in the 
beginning of the 1980s. In early 1982, there were even discussions on a no-war pact. Pakistan 
submitted a draft agreement on nonaggression in June 1982. In return, India proposed to create an 
Indo-Pakistan joint commission.
257
 Consequently, the Pakistani President Zia and the Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi met at a bilateral summit in New Delhi on 1 November 1982. They decided 
to create a joint commission to solve the problems of two countries through dialogue.
258
 However, 
an article released by the Washington Post on 20 December 1982 abruptly interrupted these positive 
developments. This article reported leaked US intelligence sources which claimed that India was 
considering launching a preemptive air strike on nuclear facilities in Pakistan. The report 
highlighted India’s concerns about the construction of the new nuclear laboratory next to the 
Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology in Nilore. According to the same report, the 
US and India feared that the spent fuel in the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) could be 
diverted to this new laboratory for reprocessing. Moreover, the report stated that KANUPP could 
have produced 10 to 20 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium which equals one to three 
Hiroshima-sized weapons.
259
 These developments caused India to consider contingency plans. If the 
claims in the report were true, the planning phase of the preemptive attack would have occurred at 
the same time that India and Pakistan were meeting to establish the above-mentioned joint 
commission. Upon learning this, Pakistan was astonished. 
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India rejected the allegations and labelled the report as an attempt to impair the recent 
reconciliation between India and Pakistan.
260
 The report also stated that K.R. Narayanan, India’s 
ambassador to Washington, rejected all claims by US intelligence sources and asserted that there 
was no Indian contingency plan to attack the Pakistani nuclear facilities.
261
 Regardless of the 
authenticity of India’s contingency plans, US intelligence sources as to the existence of contingency 
plans exhibited that the US was paying attention to the conflict and its nuclear dimension.  
In the end, the preemptive attack was not carried out. Nevertheless, some studies claimed 
that India might have at least evaluated the preemptive attack as an option. W.P.S. Sidhu 
interviewed a former Indian air force director of operations. This interview revealed India’s position 
that a preemptive attack could have destroyed the Kahuta nuclear facility. The real concern, 
according to the interview, was not the success of the operation itself. It was rather a possible all-
out war between India and Pakistan following the preemptive attack.
262
 However, this explanation 
is not sufficient to elucidate the Indian inaction. If fear of all-out war was the only reason hindering 
the preemptive attack, then why India did not hesitate to launch an all-out war in the preceding 
crises. To address this, Perkovich attempted clarify the matter with an interview with a former 
defense analyst. According to Perkovich’s statement, the former defense analyst claimed that India 
did not launch preemptive attacks because it would lose 50 percent of the Jaguar fighting planes 
recently acquired at that time.
263
 This evidence is also not persuasive. If Pakistan were at the 
threshold of becoming a nuclear power, then India would have to live with a nuclear Pakistan 
forever. Therefore, losing the 50 percent of the Jaguar fighter jets would not be a reasonably 
decisive factor to avoid a preemptive strike.  
Other interviews conducted by Perkovich with three former high ranking air force and 
Ministry of Defense officials further explain the situation. Based on these interviews, Perkovich 
claimed that Pakistan would have started a major war and attacked India’s nuclear reactors and 
reprocessing plants, if India had launched a preemptive attack.
264
 This was a specific threat against 
India and a more persuasive argument. Perkovich also supports his claim by citing the meeting 
between Munir A. Khan, the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and Raja 
Rammana, the Chairman of Bhabha Atomic Research Center, in Vienna in 1983. Munir A. Khan 
recounted Perkovich that Munir A. Khan transmitted the message to Indian side in Vienna meeting 
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that “if Kahuta were attacked, the uranium fallout would be less toxic because Pakistan had only a 
small enrichment plant for plutonium. However, after such an attack, Pakistan would assume that 
the attack came from India and would respond accordingly.”265 This meeting allowed India to see 
the dangerous consequences of a preemptive attack, perhaps encouraging a decisive end to the 
crisis.  
The crisis in 1982 ended without escalation. However, the allegations of common Indian and 
Israeli operation on Pakistani nuclear facilities started again in 1984. The New York Times reported 
that CIA officials briefed members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in September 
1984. CIA officials told the Committee members that aides of Indira Gandhi recommended 
attacking the Kahuta enrichment facility in Pakistan.
266
 Another declassified document, a 
memorandum prepared for the then Director and Deputy Director of the CIA, also revealed US 
concerns about this matter. The US believed that a preemptive attack by India in the near term was 
a real possibility. The report also predicted that an Indian attack on nuclear facilities in Pakistan 
would prompt retaliatory attacks against Indian nuclear facilities and would lead to full-scale war.
267
 
This reveals the US belief that deterrence between India and Pakistan based on the threat of 
attacking each other’s nuclear facilities was not sustainable and that the crisis could easily escalate 
to a nuclear level. These US concerns also caused a concern in Pakistan which led Pakistan to 
solicit additional security guarantees from the US. On 5 October 1984, a Pakistani newspaper 
Nawa-e-Waqt published an article which claimed that Reagan offered Pakistan a NATO nuclear 
umbrella in exchange for Pakistan’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.268 On 10 
October, moreover, the US Ambassador to Pakistan Deane Hinton stated in Lahore that the US 
would react in case of an attack by India.
269
 US support led Indira Gandhi to terminate any kind of 
operation against the Kahuta nuclear facility in Pakistan, and the crisis ended.
270
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2.2.3 The Brasstacks Crisis 
  The Brasstacks crisis started because of a military exercise conducted by India. The 
Brasstacks exercise had four phases. The Phases I, II, and III were conducted from July until 
December 1986. They were exercises on the map and the telecommunications network was also 
tested.
271
 These first three phases did not receive attention from either the Indian or Pakistani 
public. The problems began with Phase IV. It started after India deployed its military units near the 
India - Pakistan border. It was a large military exercise relative to NATO exercises. Both the scope 
and the place of the exercise (in the Rajasthan desert) were alarming for Pakistan. A large military 
exercise in the Rajasthan region would give India an opportunity to cut Pakistan in half, if India 
decided to make a surprise attack.
272
  
 The Pakistani media reaction to the exercise was one of alarm. The Urdu daily Jang 
reported that the Brasstacks exercise was the biggest exercise that India has ever held. It thought 
that the exercise was intended to convey a message to Pakistan that India was aware of Pakistani 
covert support to Sikh separatist groups in the Punjab region of India and would not tolerate 
Pakistani actions.
273
 The Sikh insurgency was a vital national security issue for India.
274
 The 
exercise received even more coverage in the Indian media after the cancellation of mail and 
passenger trains between Srinagar and Punjab and Haryana regions.
275
 
Political leaders also started to express their concerns about the military exercises. Pakistani 
Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmed advised that Indian actions in the Rajasthan region should be 
carefully observed.
276
 Pakistani Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar expressed Pakistan’s apprehension 
over the Brasstacks exercisis at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
meeting in mid-November. Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo also raised the issue 
with his Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi, and Gandhi assured Junejo that it was only a routine 
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exercise.
277
 On 2 December 1986, Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo expressed Pakistan’s willingness 
to settle the crisis, albeit in a covertly threatening way. Junejo said that he could meet with Rajiv 
Gandhi to settle the crisis, but added that, Pakistan would react if India kept large amounts of its 
troops near to border.
278
  
The anxiety spread by the scale of the Brasstacks exercise led Pakistan to extend its own 
military exercises. Pakistan was conducting its own military exercises at that time: Saf-e-Shikan and 
Flying Horse. The Saf-e-Shikan military exercise included the southern strike force reserve of the 
Pakistani army and was located in the Bahwalpur-Marot area. This region is located opposite the 
Rajasthan region in India.
279
 The exercise was supposed to end at first week of November 1986, but 
was extended due to Indian military deployments near the border. The exercise Flying Horse was 
being conducted in the Ravi – Chenab sector and was supposed to end the first week of December 
1986. Pakistan extended this military exercise as well and redeployed its troops to the Shakargarh 
bulge area. This was a critical decision because the Shakargarh bulge area is closer to the Indian-
Pakistani border than the Ravi - Chenab sector. This development was disconcerting to India 
because it revealed Pakistan’s plans to block the roads and isolate Kashmir and Punjab from the rest 
of India in case of a military conflict.
280
  
 India was also alarmed by the observation that Pakistan placed mines along the border, gave 
its troops advance supplies of ammunition and kept its air force and satellite base at full working 
condition.
281
 Moreover, the Pakistani troops in the southern reserve did not stay in Bahwalpur. They 
crossed the Lodhran Bridge over the Sutlej River and took up positions at the opposite side of the 
Indian cities of Bhatinda and Ferozepur.
282
 These moves demonstrated Pakistani responses to a 
potential Indian aggression near to border in the Rajasthan region. The crisis intensified on 23 
January 1987 when the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that Indian troops also moved 
forward to the Punjab state as a response to the frontline positions of Pakistan.
283
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 The military hotline facilitating the direct communication between the Director-General of 
Military Operations (DGMO) of both India and Pakistan was not used from 8 December 1986 until 
23 January 1987. The military hotline was considered as an important element of confidence 
building measures. Not using it was a disappointment.
284
 Instead of using the military hotline, 
politicians chose to communicate through interviews and press conferences, which in return 
increased the tension. For example, Rajiv Gandhi asserted in a press conference that India could 
deal with all difficulties caused by the redeployments of Pakistani military units near the border. He 
declared that “India will not be pushed around.”285  
Along the official channel, India’s High Commissioner to Islamabad SK Singh was 
summoned to the Pakistani foreign office and was allegedly told by Pakistan’s Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani that if India took any action not conducive to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Pakistan, Islamabad will consider inflicting “unacceptable damage on India.” 
Noorani further warned that Pakistan’s actions would not be restricted to northern India, but would 
include targets in other regions. In response to Singh’s query as to whether the message implied a 
threat to Bombay
286, Noorani replied, “it might be so.”287  
President Zia suggested meeting with Rajiv Gandhi for a summit over a cricket game in 
order to decrease the tension.
288
 However, the crisis was still far away from defusing. Indian and 
Pakistani troops exchanged fire in Kashmir on 28 January 1987.
289
 Despite these negative 
developments, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Abdul Sattar arrived in New Delhi to hold talks 
with his Indian counterpart A.S. Gonsalves on 30 January 1987.
290
 The first day of talks were 
disturbed by developments along the border. It was reported that Pakistani troops were seen in the 
Chamb-Chicken’s Neck in the Jauiran sector at night.291 It was also reported that there were an 
exchange of fire in the Mendhar and Poonch areas of Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. 
Some villages were evacuated on both sides of the border in the Chamb sector. This claim was later 
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denied by Pakistan.
292
 On the fifth day of the talks, both countries finally reached an agreement. 
They agreed not to attack each other and agreed on the phased withdrawal of troops along the 
border.
293
  
From 5 February to 19 February 1987, India and Pakistan withdrew their forces from the 
border between Ravi and Chanab rivers. The withdrawal of troops took place in the northern half of 
Punjab province near the states of Jammu and Kashmir. The Brasstacks exercise, however, 
continued.
294
 On 2 March 1987 India and Pakistan signed an agreement to move nearly 70 percent 
of their troops away from the borders, but this time in the southern region of the Rajasthan sector. 
They were to begin on 6 March 1987, a day after the Brasstacks exercise concluded.
295
 
  These withdrawals of troops at the southern border officially ended the crisis. Western 
diplomats observed that the actual threat of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in Brasstacks laid in an 
accidental start of the hostilities.
296
 What, however, caused the peaceful settlement of the Brasstacks 
crisis? One may attribute it to the direct dialogue between India and Pakistan and to the Zia’s visit 
to India in order to watch a cricket match which was later labelled as “cricket diplomacy.” 
However, the direct dialogue between India and Pakistan at the beginning of the crisis was limited. 
The hotline was not used. The role of Zia’s visit was also dubious. Although Zia declared the 
“cricket summit” as a success and announced that border tension between India and Pakistan was 
over
297
, his cricket diplomacy was late and was the last step in the crisis.   
If direct dialogue between India and Pakistan and Zia’s cricket diplomacy had a limited role 
in settling the crisis, then the role of both US and Soviet mediation is worth mentioning. US 
engagement first manifested itself as a struggle to limit the nuclear dimension of the crisis. An overt 
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nuclear Pakistan was a fundamental problem for the US executive because the US government had 
to annually guarantee the US Congress that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. Only through 
these assurances, was the Congress permitted to provide military and financial aid to Pakistan. 
Reducing this aid would have had negative consequences for the US because Pakistan was playing 
a key role against the Soviet Union in the Afghan war. The most important development indicating 
the overt nuclearization of Pakistan was the statement of the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, 
A.Q. Khan. In his interview with an Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar, Khan admitted that Pakistan 
was enriching uranium at the Kahuta plant and already had developed a nuclear bomb. He added 
that Pakistan would use the bomb if its existence was threatened
298
 Reuters also reported that Khan 
told Nayar that ground tests were not necessary and a lab simulator would be enough for a test.
299
 
Khan later denied this, and claimed that his sentences were taken out of context.
300
 One should 
mention here that although the interview was conducted on 28 January 1987, it was first published 
on 1 March 1987 after the crisis ceased.
301
 One can therefore argue that the interview did not have 
any role in ending the crisis. Considering the status of the interviewee, as the father of the Pakistani 
nuclear bomb, it is inconceivable to expect that the interview could have been conducted without 
informing both Pakistani and Indian officials. It is therefore plausible to claim that Khan’s message 
was conveyed to India at the peak of the crisis. Nevertheless, it is not known how seriously India 
took the message.
302
  
The US meddled with the Brasstacks crisis by directly communicating with both sides. US 
President Reagan telephoned both Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia-ul-Haq. He urged them to end the 
crisis. However, the exact day of his call is not clear and the role it played is disputable.
303
 What is 
important to note is that the direct communication between India and Pakistan failed. Therefore, one 
should still not underestimate the role of US mediation.
304
 On the one hand, the US threatened to 
cut off military and financial aid to Pakistan, if Pakistan did not give up its nuclear activities. For 
example, the US ambassador to Pakistan Deane R. Hinton gave a speech at the Pakistan Institute of 
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Strategic Studies. He stated that if Pakistan acquired a nuclear capability, then Congress might have 
rejected financial and military assistance to Pakistan.
305
 On the other hand, the US advised India to 
immediately end the Brasstacks exercises because the scope of the Brasstacks was inciting fear in 
Pakistan and justifying Pakistani actions. For example, in January 1987 US officials told the 
visiting Indian Foreign Secretary A.P. Venkateswaran that  
“The Brasstacks Exercise made it easier for Pakistan to obtain advanced weapons; while Brasstacks might 
improve the operational readiness of the Indian military, it had the ironic effect of strengthening Pakistan’s case in 
Washington.”306  
At the peak of the crisis on 23 January 1987, the Pakistani ambassador to India Humayun 
Khan was summoned to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs by the Minister of State for External 
Affairs Natwar Singh. Khan was asked to convey to his government a deadline for pulling back 
Pakistani troops deployed near the border.
307
 More importantly, the discussions between N.D. 
Tiwari (Indian Minister of External Affairs), Vasily Rykov (Russian Ambassador to India), Arun 
Singh (Indian Minister of State for Defense) and John Gunther Dean (US Ambassador to India) 
were also held on the same day in order to defuse the crisis.
308
 Arun Singh complained to US 
Ambassador Gunther Dean that the movement of Pakistan’s Army Reserve South (ARS) from 
Bahwalpur to Sahiwal was threatening and required more information. In turn, American officials 
told the Pakistanis of this request.
309
 This was an important realization of US’s intermediary role. 
Furthermore, the Indian Foreign Minister Narain Dutt Tiwari discussed the situation with Soviet 
Ambassador V. N. Rykov.
310
 On 23 January 1987, both Soviet and US diplomats became involved 
in a crisis prevention mechanism for the same country. This marks initial signs of collaboration, and 
illustrates how the US and the Soviet Union worked together in mediating a crisis with a nuclear 
dimension. It was an interesting point because although the Brasstacks crisis took place in the Cold 
War era, neither the US nor the Soviet Union pursued clientelistic policies. The US prioritized 
ending the crisis. Throughout the crisis, TASS and Izvestia, the Soviet Union’s official barometers, 
maintained a neutral position.
311
 A military clash between Pakistan and India would have benefited 
                                                 
305 Weisman, S.R. (1987). Pakistan’s Nuclear Aims Worrying U.S. The New York Times 20 February 1987 [online] 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/20/world/pakistan-s-nuclear-aims-worrying-us.html [Accessed  
27.03.2017]. 
306 Bajpai K.P. et al. (1997). Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 91. 
307 Bobb, D. and Badhwar, I. (1987) Game of Brinkmanship. India Today, February 15, 1987 [online] Available at: 
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19870215-game-of-brinkmanship-756869-1987-02-15 [Accessed 
28.03.2017]. 
308 Reuters North European Service. 23 January 1987, cited in Bajpai K.P. et al. (1997). Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 167. 
309 Bajpai K.P. et al. (1997). Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 82. 
310 Barnetson, D. (1987). India forces on red alert at Pakistan border. United Press International, 23 January 1987 
[online] Available at:        
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/01/23/India-forces-on-red-alert-at-Pakistan-border/1986538376400/ [Accessed 
28.03.2017]. 
311 Bobb, D. and Badhwar, I. (1987). Back from the Edge. India, Pakistan hold marathon talks in New Delhi to defuse 
82 
 
the Soviet Union since this would have weakened Pakistan’s war efforts in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union
 312
. However, the Soviet Union did not provoke the crisis to increase its own gain. 
This shows that although there was harsh competition between the US and the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, they displayed collaborative behavior in a crisis which had a nuclear dimension.  
 Although the Brasstacks crisis ended, the political turmoil in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir led another crisis to occur in South Asia, where the nuclear dimension of the conflict 
became more evident by the day. Below is the next crisis between India and Pakistan. 
2.2.4 The 1990 Kashmir Crisis 
2.2.4.1 Overview 
Kashmir had again become the focal point of political struggles between India and Pakistan 
at the end of eighties. Widespread protests took place in the State of Jammu and Kashmir against 
Indian rule in 1989. The combination of diverse factors played a role in leading to these uprisings. 
An important factor was the elections in 1987 in Kashmir, which was widely believed as rigged by 
the Indian government.
313
 Another vital development was the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. Some Islamist groups fighting against the Soviet Union became independent and 
infiltrated South Asia to fight against Indian rule, inflaming the already tense situation in 
Kashmir.
314
 Another important factor was the harsh Indian rule in Kashmir. This caused resentment 
among the young Kashmiri population and culminated into uprisings.
315
 In January 1990, the 
situation became critical when police forces fired on demonstrators.
316
 The uprisings increased the 
tension in India- Pakistan relations. India accused Pakistan of destabilizing the Kashmiri region by 
supporting Kashmiri “terrorists”. Pakistan claimed that it gave only moral support to “freedom 
fighters”.317  
Military exercises also increased the tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan started a 
massive military exercise, Zarb-i-Momin, on 9 December 1989. The exercise was built on a 
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scenario aiming at a preemptive attack in north Punjab. This caused significant concern in the 
decision-making circles of India. B.G. Deshmukh, the principal secretary to the then Indian Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh, pointed out that a possible Pakistani attack on north Punjab would impede 
India to supply additional troops to the region in a real war situation. Deshmukh also promoted the 
Indian position that Pakistan would attack after monsoon broke and in the meantime, terrorists 
supported by Pakistan would declare their independence in Srinagar and invite Pakistan to protect 
them, causing a fait accompli in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
318
 
India responded to these exercises by sending troops to the States of Jammu and Kashmir 
and Punjab. In February 1990, India sent two new tank units to Mahajan in Rajasthan, which was 
disconcerting for Pakistan. The US ambassador to India William Clark argued that this action was 
unsettling because Pakistan was not sure whether these movements were only an exercise or were 
actually designed to launch a big offensive.
319
 As a result of these worrisome developments, US 
military attaches in New Delhi and Islamabad took reconnaissance trips in February to check the 
situation and determine whether Indian and Pakistani forces were preparing for offensive.
320
  
The nuclear dimension of the conflict was also becoming visible. For example, Indian Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh met with Air Chief Marshal Mehra to determine whether India had the 
capability to respond to a Pakistani first strike. The Air Force said there was no such a guarantee 
and that India should develop nuclear deterrence.
321
 V.P. Singh later stated that “India would have 
to review its peaceful nuclear policy, if Pakistan would employ its nuclear power for military 
purposes."
322
 V.P. Singh was also asked in an interview whether India deploy nuclear weapons 
during the conflict. He replied that:  
“We want to avoid conflict, but if it comes we have nothing to fear. If Pakistan were to go nuclear, we will 
have to take stock of the situation and act accordingly.”323   
         Benazir Bhutto also increased the tension by stating that Kashmiri militancy was indigenous 
and intrinsic. She even openly proclaimed the Kashmiri’s right to self-determination.324 In 
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Muzaffarabad, she promised a thousand years of war if necessary to support Kashmir.
325
 Through 
these statements, Bhutto declared Pakistan’s open support of Kashmiri uprisings and of the fighting 
groups in Kashmir. These hawkish statements of Bhutto led V.P. Singh to respond with identical 
statements. V.P. Singh quickly stated India would react decisively against a Pakistani intervention 
in Kashmir. He stated in the Lok Sabha
326
 that a misstep from the Pakistani side would not be 
without costs.327 V.P. Singh also responded to Bhutto’s thousand-years war threat with these words: 
“I warn them that those who talk about 1000 years of war should examine whether they will last 1000 hours of 
war.” 328   
           Another pugnacious statement came from Baharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
329
 in India. The BJP 
party announced that training camps and transit routes for terrorists should be destroyed.  BJP 
further argued that the doctrine of hot pursuit is a recognized defensive measure.
330
 Rajiv Gandhi, 
the former Prime Minister of India, also made a hawkish statement and covertly indicated the 
nuclear capability of India. He stated that: 
            “I know what steps are possible. I also know what is in the pipeline and what the capabilities are. The question 
is: does the government have the guts to take strong steps?”331 
             One could also observe how the situation was deteriorating in the parliamentary speeches. 
On 10
 
April 1990, V.P. Singh made a series of speeches in Lok Sabha. He warned that “Indians 
should be psychologically prepared for war”. He also added that “Pakistan could not get away with 
taking Kashmir without a war.”332 Sayeed, the Home Minister of India, also warned that: 
 “War with Pakistan would be fully justified if the objective of freeing Kashmir from the stranglehold of the 
secessionists was achieved.”333 
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The BJP leader, L.K. Advani threatened that “Pakistan would cease to exist if it attacked 
India”334 
 The exchange of statements above indicate that despite nuclear capability, both countries did 
not necessarily engage in peaceful discourse. Instead, they continued with threatening statements as 
in the conventional period. This gives some insights into the role of international mediation in 
easing crises. Below I began with the US mediation. 
2.2.4.2 US Mediation of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis: 
Because of increasing threats posed by Indian and Pakistani politicians, the US was deeply 
concerned with the situation. However, during this time, South Asia was not considered a strategic 
region for the US. The Soviet Union had retreated from Afghanistan and thus, Pakistan was no 
longer a valuable ally. Furthermore, the US was busy with estimating the new emerging international 
structure and global issues in case of a possible dissolution of the Soviet Union.
335
 Nonetheless, the 
US viewed the crisis between India and Pakistan as a serious issue due to the nuclear dimension of 
the conflict. The US believed that Pakistan possessed not only nuclear capabilities, but also built a 
nuclear weapon. For example, the US Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, reported that 
the US knew that Pakistan had a nuclear weapon.336  
On 16
 
February 1994, four years after the 1990 crisis, an on-the-record discussion meeting 
was held by the Henry L. Stimson Center.
337
 In this meeting, the US Ambassador to India William 
Clark stressed that the US was highly concerned about the Kashmir crisis. He said that US officials 
were taking the crisis so seriously that they were in a more panicked state than the Indian and 
Pakistani officials. US Ambassador Clark said that:  
 “… The concern in Washington went up quicker than concern in Delhi did.”338  
The US ambassador’s statement demonstrates the interest of the US in the crisis. Clark also 
added that: 
             “We felt that there was a need, at least in Delhi, for some overtures on the part of the US. Exactly, what that 
overture would be, perhaps a visit by someone of significant stature to come out and see if there wasn’t something that 
the US could do was one option.”339  
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The intelligence community of the US was more alarmed than the embassies in the region. 
Intelligence agencies reported that Pakistan was preparing for the delivery of nuclear weapons.
340
 
These concerns led to the organization of the Gates Mission. The Bush administration sent a 
diplomatic mission led by Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to Islamabad and New 
Delhi to defuse the situation. The other members of the mission were John Kelly and Richard Haas. 
Gates visited both Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, he talked with the President of Pakistan Ghulam 
Ishaq Khan and the chief of the army staff Mirza Aslam Beg. He told them that “Washington had 
war-gamed the Indo-Pakistani confrontation, and there is no a single way Pakistan can win.” Gates 
also urged Pakistani leaders to tone down their public statements, in order to avoid new military 
deployments. Additionally, he pointed out that some political parties in the Pakistani held Kashmir 
region provide arms to secessionist groups in the Indian held Kashmir and warned Pakistani leaders 
to stop these activities. Gates also added that if war breaks out the US would not help.
341
  
 Afterwards Gates visited India. He held talks with Prime Minister V.P. Singh and Chief of 
Army Staff General Sharma. He warned that India should avoid provocation that could spiral out of 
control. Gates mainly communicated the message that winning the war would be so costly that in 
practice there would be no winner at all.
342
  
 Within two weeks of Gates’ mission, India and Pakistan withdrew their military forces and 
the crisis subsided. 
 The Gates mission was generally considered a successful mediation attempt. The US 
Ambassador to India William Clark reported: 
 “At the end of the day, I think you could say that both Delhi and Islamabad used Gates and his mission as an 
excuse, if you will, to back off of positions they had been taking. We were rather pleased to have been the excuse, and 
for the first time in a long time, the United States was seen as not favoring one or the other.”343 
This statement from Ambassador Clark demonstrated that the US considered the crisis as 
serious, and did not pursue clientelistic policies. Its main objective was to ease the crisis, not to 
support one party. Both actors also recognized this. It prevented one party of the conflict from 
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siding with the US to place pressure on the other side. It meets the conditions of into the 
Expectation 5. 
The statements coming from India and Pakistan also supported this assumption. For 
example, Pakistani Ambassador Abdul Sattar stated that he viewed the mission positively. He stated 
that: 
 “I think that what is important is not what was happening in the months of January and February, but the 
projection of what might happen if the trends in motion were not arrested. And I think it is here that the American 
diplomacy deserves credit. … What happened in the spring of 1990 is an illustration of good, useful preventive 
diplomacy.” 344  
Ambassador Clark reported that Indian officials also appreciated the chance to ease the 
tension: 
 “I did have several senior people, including the prime minister, tell me afterwards that it had been a useful 
visit, it had allowed a way to back off for both sides, without one having back down to the other.”345  
Here, it can be noted that there was praise from both parties of the conflict about the 
mediation effort. It meets the criteria of the Expectation 6. 
 On the other hand, there are also some officials attributing the easing of the crisis not to US 
mediation and the Gates mission, but mainly to deterrence between India and Pakistan. For 
example, a renowned Indian expert in the field of international security, Krishnaswamy 
Subrahmanyam, stated in an interview made by Saira Khan that: 
         “The chances of war occurring between India and Pakistan are low…compared to what happened in 1965 and 
1971. This is because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. It is quite obvious that there is not likely to be any war 
between Indi and Pakistan now, unless one or the other is going to cross the line of control at the frontier.”346  
 General Sundarji also added that it was not conceivable that in 1990 there would have been 
a total war between India and Pakistan. He believes that the Brasstacks crisis was the last all-
conventional crisis in which India could have used its conventional superiority to destroy Pakistan’s 
conventional and nuclear weapons capability.
347
 General Sundarji even added that: 
          “If you could go back to 1947 as a method of replaying events once again, but with the added change of a 
nuclear capability of this nature as a backdrop, I rather suspect that many of those three wars would not have 
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happened…Because of nuclear deterrence, the menu of Indian responses to Pakistani provocation in Indian held 
Kashmir no longer includes launching a bold offensive thrust across the Punjab border.”348 
These statements, however, focus only on the possibility of breaking out of a sudden major 
war. Experts emphasizing only direct deterrence do not consider the low threshold that could be 
exceeded in the threats of preemptive or limited attacks. It is important especially in the Indo-
Pakistani context in which the nuclear capabilities were still nascent. In these phases, international 
mediation deserve credit as a having served as a complementary force to direct deterrence.  
The US mediation of the 1990 war meets the criteria of Expectation 4: collaboration. One 
likely action of Expectation 4 holds that mediator states do not blame each other. The US blamed 
neither Russia nor China for the conflict. Another likely action of Expectation 4 is that mediator 
states would consider offering their services or emissaries to enable a dialogue between the sides of 
the conflict. The Gates mission, for example, fulfills this assumption. The Gates mission was not a 
joint diplomatic effort; nevertheless, China and Russia did not object or prevent the Gates mission 
and its activities.
349
 It is also important to note here that Gates went to South Asia right after his 
visit to Moscow, bringing the same message from Moscow to both India and Pakistan. It 
demonstrates an expectation of collaboration.
350
 
The US was not pro-Pakistani or pro-Indian. This fits to the likely actions of Expectation 5. 
Expectation 5 requires that mediator states do not align with one party of the conflict, helping 
international mediation being more effective. 
2.2.4.3 The Soviet Mediation of 1990 Kashmir Crisis 
During the 1990 Kashmir Crisis, the Soviet Union’s mediation behavior was not consistent 
with its mediation pattern concerning the crises before 1980s. The Soviet Union had been blatantly 
pursuing a pro-Indian policy before the 1980s. However, during the 1990 crisis, the Soviet Union 
took a neutral role. Both the US and the Soviet Union were against the war and discouraged India 
and Pakistan from fighting in the 1990 Kashmir Crisis.
351
 Ambassador Robert Oakley, for example, 
indicated in the Stimson Center Meeting that both Moscow and Beijing also sent identical messages 
to India and Pakistan asking them to back off.
352
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One can also attribute this neutrality to changing geopolitical conditions. The Soviet Union 
had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Cold War was approaching its end. Therefore, rather than 
a nuclear dimension, shrinking Soviet power was what compelled the Soviet Union to stay neutral. 
However, Soviet behavior also demonstrates similarities with the Soviet behavior in the 1987 
Brasstacks Crisis and with other small crises at the beginning of the 1980s. One can potentially 
argue that by 1990, the Soviet Union had very limited power and did not show any interest in the 
conflict. However, the Soviet Union demonstrated the same behavioral pattern in the 1980s, and did 
not provoke the conflict between India and Pakistan in the 1980s. However, one may argue that the 
Soviet Union did not spark a conflict in South Asia even in the 1980s because the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was a process that had already begun in the early 1980s. Even if it were true, 
however, overtly supporting India and provoking the India-Pakistan conflict could have provided 
certain advantages to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. A war between India and Pakistan could have 
enforced Pakistan to invest extensively in the war with India. Pakistan would have focused more on 
the Indian dispute, thus allocating relatively less resources against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 
This would have partly relieved the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In other words, while it is 
reasonable to argue that the Soviet Union was not actively involved in the crises of the 1980s due to 
lack of resources, it would have been in the Soviet interest to pursue any policy which contributed 
to a war between India and Pakistan in order to provide a certain amount of relief for the Soviet 
Union in its difficult and costly war in Afghanistan. One should further consider that India also did 
not entirely support Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
353
 A more pro-Indian stance in the conflicts of 
the 1980s, at least rhetorically, would have helped the Soviet Union receive more support from 
India in the international arena. However, the Soviet Union did not pursue such a policy.  
The evaluation of the Soviet Union’s mediation efforts in the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
however, requires that one should still consider the severe economic problems faced by the Soviet 
Union. Before analyzing the Chinese mediation of the 1990 Kashmir crisis, therefore, it is necessary 
here to elaborate on the impact of the shrinking Soviet power and the approaching end of the Cold 
War on Soviet behavior towards the crises in South Asia. Below, I shortly discussed the 
particularities of the Soviet domestic situation in the 1980s and the early 1990s.  
The poor economic conditions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s were already perceivable in 
the era of Leonid Brezhnev.
354
 Moreover, the end of the détente between the US and the Soviet 
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Union due to the war in Afghanistan rendered unmaintainable the already stagnated Soviet 
economy. Brezhnev, an ardent supporter of détente, died in 1982. After Brezhnev, the Soviet Union 
experienced two short-term leaderships. Yuri Andropov was elected as the successor of Brezhnev in 
1982 and died in 1984. Later, Konstantin Chernenko became the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1984 and died in 1985. During these two terms, called as 
the interregnum, there were no notable reforms in Soviet domestic politics, apart from the 
anticorruption campaign initiated by Andropov. After these two-short terms, Michael Gorbachev 
took power on 10 March 1985. Gorbachev was very young and reform-oriented. He later called the 
Brezhnev era as an era of stagnation.
355
 In the Gorbachev era, however, economic problems 
intensified. The deteriorating economic situation compelled reforms and this was more obvious by 
the mid 1980s. The Soviet Union was spending more hard currency than it earned at the beginning 
of 1985.
356
 Gorbachev thus initiated his ambitious reforms: perestroika and glasnost, which means 
restructuring and openness, respectively. These reforms aimed at reforming Soviet political and 
economic life. Nevertheless, economic problems worsened. On 30 October 1986, Gorbachev 
complained in a Politburo session that the Soviet state “started to borrow from the population and 
rely on emissions of paper money. Salaries became unlinked from the productivity of labor.”357 
Gorbachev summarized the economic crisis in the Soviet Union as “the situation holds us by our 
throat.”358 Gorbachev also objected to the rise in prices in the same meeting. He believed that the 
rise in prices would carry unforeseeable political consequences and would endanger the 
perestroika.
359
 Despite the ambitious character of the reforms, the economic situation in the Soviet 
Union deteriorated. In the end, the political structure of the Soviet Union was impaired and ended 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1999. 
 The significant domestic problems experienced by the Soviet Union in the 1980s 
demonstrated that the Soviet Union did not have enough resources to invoke another conflict in 
South Asia. The same reason also compelled the Soviet Union to remain neutral during the 1990 
Kashmir conflict. This line of approach does not explain, however, the Soviet incentive to actively 
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support the US initiative of the Gates Mission. Taking a neutral and passive position did not 
necessarily require the active support to the US endeavors.  
Soviet lack of activity during the crises of the 1980s in particular was less understandable, 
considering Pakistan’s role in the war in Afghanistan as immediately above explained. These Soviet 
behaviors during the crises of the 1980s and in the case of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis are critical and 
deserve particular consideration even if one accepted that the declining economic state of the 
Soviets was a vital factor that affected Soviet behavior during these decades. One should also 
compare Soviet behavior at the start of the 1990s with the end of 1990s before determining the 
extent to which diminished Soviet power affected its behaviors towards the crises in South Asia. It 
should be noted that Russian foreign policy started to change in 1993, which continued to evolve 
throughout the decade. The situation becomes clear when one further analyzes the domestic 
situation in Russia in the 1990s, which I will do in the section of addressing Russian mediation of 
the 2001-02 military standoff between India and Pakistan. 
2.2.4.4 Chinese Mediation of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis 
Before the crises in 1980s, China had resolutely taken a pro-Pakistani stance on the crisis 
between India and Pakistan. In a previous part of this study, I demonstrated that highly ranked 
Chinese officials and politicians had not refrained from publicly disclosing their pro-Pakistani 
policies.  However, China’s response to the 1990 crisis departed dramatically from its previous 
stance in the crises early on. In the 1990 crisis, China was more passive than it had been in the crisis 
before. Without supporting any part of the crisis, it encouraged both UN and US initiatives. For 
example, on 16
 
February 1990 the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said to Iqbal Akhund, 
Pakistan’s Prime Minister’s foreign advisor that:  
“China hopes that they will solve their dispute peacefully through friendly negotiations and in accordance with 
the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the Simla Agreement reached by the two countries. Only through the 
maintenance of stability in South Asia can the countries in the area develop their economies and improve the lives of 
their peoples.”360  
By stressing the Simla Agreement, China clearly indicated that it is not pro-Pakistan. 
Pakistan lost East Pakistan after the Simla Agreement and this agreement continues to invoke bad 
memories to present day. This was a serious blow for Pakistani officials hoping to gain China’s 
support.  
 On February 20, only four days after the meeting between Qian Qichen and Igbal Akhund, a 
military mission led by the Chinese Defense Minister General Qin Jiwei visited Pakistan. They met 
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with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Although Bhutto marked the importance of a Pakistani 
Chinese friendship during the visit, it was not enough to impress the Chinese delegation. Quin Jiwei 
emphasized that: 
          “China hopes that India and Pakistan will solve the Kashmir issue in accordance with the relevant United 
Nations resolutions and agreements between the two countries, and through friendly consultations on the basis of five 
principles of peaceful coexistence.”361  
 This tone set above, was very different from China’s position during the 1965 and 1971 
crisis. Supporting the UN Resolutions demonstrates that China did not want to play an active role in 
the conflict. Instead, China encouraged Pakistan to search for international solutions.  
 To summarize, the behaviors of Russia and China mainly supported the assumptions of 
Expectation 4: collaboration. Russia and China did not support their traditional allies, India and 
Pakistan respectively. They did not try to sabotage the mediation efforts of the US, rendering 
mediation more effective and making India and Pakistan more amenable to mediation. It was also 
notable in the case of China that Bhutto tried to garner Chinese support, which China rejected 
multiple times. It fits Expectation 5 that mediators rejected the alignment demands of the parties of 
the conflict, rendering the mediation of the Gates mission more effective. The statements of both 
Indian and Pakistani politicians praising the Gates mission fits Expectation 6 that leaders of the 
conflicting parties could use mediation as a tool to withdraw, and thereby overwhelm domestic 
pressures. 
2.2.5 1999 Kargil War  
2.2.5.1 Overview 
Kargil is a highly mountainous area located in the Ladakh region in the State of Jammu & 
Kashmir. The geographical conditions are stiff in the region, making it difficult for the military to 
maneuver. There was an informal understanding between India and Pakistan to refrain from having 
a military presence in the region from 15 September to 15 April each year.
362
 However, Pakistani 
troops together with Kashmiri militants crossed the Line of Control (LOC) and violated this 
informal agreement in the spring of 1999. Pakistan assumed that the Indian response would not be 
immense and Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants could have taken the upper hand in the Kargil 
sector before Indian troops realized the intrusions. However, the Indian reaction was massive as the 
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infiltrations came as a complete surprise.
363
 Pakistan’s military strategy posed a great danger to 
India because the intrusions also targeted National Highway 1A, the road connecting Srinagar and 
Leh and the only major supply route to Indian forces in the area.
364
 As a reaction to the intrusions, 
India launched a counter operation to ward off infiltrators from Kargil.
365
  
 Indian operations had three components. The land component was named Operation Vijay. 
It was fought in a mountainous area. Indian troops managed to capture the Tololing complex in 
Drass, Tiger Hill, and the Mashkoh Valley. There were also air operations, named Operation Safed 
Sagar.  The fighter jets have low maneuver capability at high attitudes. The air operations were 
therefore difficult due to the high attitude in the region. The Indian Navy also sent warships to the 
Arabian Sea to block the Pakistani Navy in Karachi.
366
 This was a significant act, because Karachi 
was a vital port and most of the oil imported by Pakistan came through this port. The situation was 
exceedingly tense. The then Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmed even stated that  
“Pakistan is willing to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.”367 
Ahmed was referring to the Pakistani nuclear capability and to the determination to deploy 
nuclear weapons in a serious situation. 
  In the end, Pakistani forces withdrew from the Kargil sector, and the crisis ended. The extent 
of Indian operations and the blocking of Karachi, one of the important ports of Pakistan, shows that 
even in the nuclear dyads the intensity of the crisis can be very high. This demonstrated the need for 
international mediation, even in the context where direct communication channels between India 
and Pakistan were open. During the Kargil conflict, Indian and Pakistani prime ministers spoke with 
each other on the phone. On 24 May 1999, for instance, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee called 
Shariff, and warned him that all possible steps would be taken to clear the territory from intruders. 
As a response, on 28 May 1999 Shariff called Vajpayee, and offered to send Pakistani Foreign 
Minister Sartaj Ali for talks.
368
 There were also a backchannel of communication between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan nominated former Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik, and India 
nominated an Indian journalist R.K. Mishra for the meetings.
369
 There were therefore no lack of 
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communication between the parties of the conflict during the crisis. One of the duties of mediation, 
facilitating the communication between parties of the conflict, more or less occurred during the 
Kargil conflict even before international mediation. Therefore, mediation here played the role of not 
only facilitating communication but also deterring the crisis. Next, I will explain the role of 
mediation in detail.   
2.2.5.2 US Mediation of the 1999 Kargil War 
In analyzing US mediation of the Kargil conflict, I started with congressional hearings. 
From these hearings, I detected that the nuclear component of the crisis put the Clinton 
administration at unease. Immediately following the nuclear tests, serious debates were held in the 
US Congress concerning a possible crisis in South Asia with a nuclear dimension. Even a year 
before the Kargil crisis, US attention to the region had begun to increase. In the US House of 
Representatives, they had even discussed an article written by the RAND Cooperation
370
 on the 
crisis. It was about the possibility of war in South Asia involving a nuclear dimension. Under the 
guidance of this article, Dan Burton, a representative of Indiana in the US House of 
Representatives, warned on 23 April 1998 that: 
“The prospect of a nuclear war in South Asia must be distressing to anyone. This event could pose a major 
threat to the entire world. We should all commit ourselves to making pressure that even if war does break out, it is 
fought without the use of nuclear weapons.”371  
In his statement, Burton stressed that the crisis between India and Pakistan was not only a 
matter between two actors, but had wider implications on the entire world. Another hearing held in 
the Congress also notes the danger posed on the world from a nuclear South Asia. Robert 
Underwood, representative from Guam in the US House of Representatives, stated on 3 June 1998 
that:  
“…Through the irresponsible actions of both India and Pakistan, two more nations of the world have declared 
themselves nuclear weapons states. In the course of these critical two weeks, our planet has returned towards the days 
of nuclear peril, the likes of which have not been seen since the most tense days of the Cold War… I ask all my 
colleagues to join me in sending India and Pakistan a strong message of disapproval and to support the President in his 
use of economic and military sanctions.”372 
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In this hearing, the combined elements of a sense of nuclear danger posed to the world and 
call to implement economic and military sanctions against the nuclearization of South Asia can be 
detected. On 24 June 1999, during the Kargil war, US Senator from Nebraska Bob Kerrey gave the 
testimony below:  
“There is a danger in not watching and paying attention to what is going on between India and Pakistan, and 
there is a danger that our lack of attention to this particular problem could produce a confrontation that not only would 
be deadly but would draw in the rest of the world as well…unlike the United States and the Soviet Union that over the 
last 50 years developed protocols to deal with nuclear weapons—and we have fairly substantial impressive margins for 
error—there have been no such discussions between India and Pakistan. Both of them are nuclear powers. Both of them 
could detonate nuclear weapons and use nuclear weapons in a confrontation of this kind.”373 
Here, Senator Kerrey pointed out that the threat stemming from an Indo-Pakistani conflict 
poses a danger not only to the region, but also to rest of the world. Moreover, he underlined that the 
danger of a nuclear catastrophe was more acute in the Indo - Pakistani context than for the US and 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. There was no institutionalization of the nuclear relationship 
between India and Pakistan, as had been the case during the Cold War between the US and the 
Soviet Union.  
 These hearings reveal the anxiety felt in the US Congress regarding the nuclear dimension 
of the crisis in South Asia. The uneasiness in the Congress might have also influenced Clinton 
administration’s active mediation efforts during the conflict. In late May, for example, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Frederick Inderfurth and the Undersecretary of State 
for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering met with Indian and Pakistani ambassadors in Washington, 
and conveyed the message that Pakistan should withdraw from the Indian side of the Line of 
Control. US Secretary of State Albright then called Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif and US General 
Tony Zinni called Pakistani General Musharraf, who he had a good relationship.
374
   
 Clinton sent letters to Sharif and Vajpayee, and clarified that Pakistani withdrawal is a 
precondition if Pakistan expected the US mediation. Clinton then called two leaders in mid-June to 
highlight this point.
375
 In late June, Clinton called Sharif again and rejected the Pakistani claim that 
the fighters were separatist guerrillas. Clinton also pointed out that the US believes that Pakistan is 
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the aggressor.
376
 Clinton then sent the Commander in Chief of the US Central Command General 
Anthony Zinni to the region. Zinni visited Pakistan and met with the Prime Minister Sharif and General 
Musharraf on 24 and 25 June 1999. He sent a stark message to Pakistan that “if you do not pull 
back, you are going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be 
very bad news for everybody.”377 After that, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Gibson 
Lanpher, visited New Delhi. He shared the same message conveyed by Zinni to Pakistan, that both 
parties should consider mitigating the crisis. Lanpher emphasized that India should not have 
reservations because Zinni had also asked Pakistan to withdraw troops from Kargil, and treat the 
crisis and the Kashmir problem as separate issues.
378
 
Sharif was extremely concerned about the situation. He flew to the US to talk with Clinton. 
On 4 July 1999, Clinton met with Sharif. During the meeting, Clinton made pressure on Sharif to 
withdraw Pakistani troops from the Indian side of the Line of Control, and stated that only after that 
the US could mediate the conflict. Sharif accepted the US condition, in return Clinton promised to 
take a personal interest in the conflict and encourage bilateral talks between India and Pakistan.
379
 
After these mediations, Sharif offered a peace agreement to India. India first rejected, but 
then accepted, and the crisis ceased. The Kargil crisis continued to be discussed in the US Congress 
even after the crisis ended. Bill McCollum, a Representative from Florida in the House of 
Representative, asserted on 29 July 1999 that not punishing Pakistan could encourage other states to 
acquire nuclear weapons. He also criticized Clinton by saying that:  
“By stressing the imperative for a “face saving” exit for Nawaz Shariff, the Clinton Administration in effect 
went along with Islamabad’s lies – thus covering up Islamabad’s rouge-state actions. The Clinton administration in 
essence rewarded Pakistan for its aggression and nuclear blackmail, as well as blatant violation of previously signed 
international agreements.”380 
This statement is pro-Indian and blames Pakistan for the Kargil conflict. It came from a 
Republican Representative to the House of Representatives, and could therefore be political and 
denunciatory of Clinton’s efforts in easing the crisis. However, he still call attention to the 
seriousness of the crisis and its possible consequences on the world altogether.   
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 Director for South Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
381
 
Teresita Schaffer also made a testimony on 20 October 1999 in the US House of Representatives. 
She stated that: 
“To me, the Kargil episode demonstrated two things: one, that India and Pakistan really do not want a nuclear 
confrontation; and two, that it would be easy to slip into one by accident. This makes a compelling case for increasing 
the margin of safety through risk reduction measures between those two.”382  
 This testimony from Shaffer demonstrates the need to build risk reduction measures. It also 
indicates that without outside mediation, India and Pakistan are inclined to make mistakes with 
catastrophic consequences.  
David Edward Bonior, a Representative in the US House of Representatives from Michigan 
and Democratic Whip, gave testimony on 12 July 2000 in the US House of Representatives, almost 
one year after the Kargil conflict. It highlighted that a continual involvement by the US in the 
region is needed because of the danger of nuclear conflict and terrorism. He stated that:  
“Now we have an obligation to do our part to help establish stability in South Asia, and it is in our interest to 
do so. The threat of nuclear conflict and terrorism in South Asia is very real. We must reduce this threat and halt the 
arms race in South Asia, but I believe that unless Kashmir is addressed, Mr. Chairman, no real progress can be made. 
If we turn our attention away from the region as we did after the war in Afghanistan, we risk further erosion, violence, 
and disillusionment. We are uniquely positioned as a longstanding ally of Pakistan and as an emerging friend of India 
to bring the parties together. Given the stake in South Asia, punitive economic sanctions are clearly 
counterproductive.”383  
These Congressional Hearings demonstrated that the US Congress took the crises between 
India and Pakistan seriously. 
2.2.5.3 Russian Mediation of 1999 Kargil War 
In the Kargil crisis, Pakistan actively sought to open a dialogue with Russia. It was obvious 
that Pakistan would not receive any active Russian support. Nonetheless, it aspired to at least hinder 
the overtly Russian support of India. For this reason, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a 
diplomatic envoy led by H.M. Kasuri to Moscow. Kasuri explained the Pakistani position, was not 
able to secure Russian support. Quite the contrary, he found that Russia supported India. Russia 
declared that groups backed by Pakistan triggered the crisis by infiltrating the Line of Control. 
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Learning this was backlash for Pakistan as Russia’s position was indeed consistent with what India 
had claimed. Pakistan also pled for an active Russian mediation of the crisis. However, Russia 
responded that it could only intervene under the condition that the mediation request comes from 
both sides of the conflict. Russia added that a realistic solution could only be achieved through a 
direct dialogue between India and Pakistan.
384
 
Moreover, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigory Karasin requested that Pakistan draw 
the infiltrators back out of the LOC. It was clearly support for Indian claims.
385
 Russia also tried to 
influence Pakistan through its embassy in Islamabad and warned Pakistan that it should 
immediately withhold.
386
  
 Russia was pro-India in the Kargil conflict. However, this position was consistent with both 
the US and even with the Chinese responses to the conflict. They both supported India to a degree 
that even surprised India itself.
387
 Therefore, the Russian reaction to the Kargil crisis was not 
divergent from the global community.  For example, the G-8 also expressed its concern and stated 
that infiltration of armed intruders violating the Line of Control was the main reason of the Kargil 
Conflict.
388
 This statement from the G-8 also supported India’s stance to the conflict.  
2.2.5.4 Chinese Mediation of the 1999 Kargil War 
In the 1999 Kargil crisis, China did not play an active role. It stayed neutral and encouraged 
both sides to engage in dialogue. This Chinese attitude in the 1999 Kargil crisis overlaps with the 
China’s response to the 1990 Kashmir crisis. This finding strengths the assumption that after the 
Cold War, China pursued a passive role in the crises in South Asia. For example, on 10
 
June 1999, 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that China hoped that the crisis would be solved through 
negotiations between India and Pakistan.
389
 It did not specify any particular role that China could 
play. Pakistan was not satisfied with this statement by China. What Pakistan needed was not the 
China’s neutrality, but China’s support. Hence, Pakistan wanted to influence China and on 11 June 
1999, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sartaj Ali met with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. 
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However, Jiaxuan gave exactly the same message that was released one-day before by the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry. He told to Ali that only India and Pakistan could solve their problems through 
peaceful means.
390
 He refrained from making any commitments to support Pakistan or taking up a 
mediator role in the conflict. 
    Then Chairman of the Committee of the Chinese People’s Congress Le Peng also met with 
Ali. During the meeting Peng told Ali that both Pakistan and India are important countries in South 
Asia, and China sincerely hopes that they would prevent the Kashmir situation from getting out of 
the control.
391
 This statement from Peng also did not satisfy Pakistan’s expectations from how they 
could engage China. 
 A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao, also stated that: 
 “China hopes India and Pakistan will exercise restraint and peacefully resolve their differences and problems 
through patient and sincere dialogue.”392 
     This statement above exhibited that China was not willing to mediate, which was 
representative of Chinese foreign policy pattern at that period. China’s position during the 1999 
Kargil crisis was very different from its attitudes in the crises before the 1980s. China’s 
unwillingness to support Pakistan was also declared to the Pakistani General Musharrraf in his state 
visit to China. China warned Musharraf that engaging an open conflict with India was not a wise 
decision. He also informed Musharraf that China ultimately predicted that Pakistan would have to 
back down.
393
  
These messages sent by China demonstrated failed Pakistani attempts to obtain Chinese 
support. This Chinese attitude meets the criteria of Expectation 4 because China did not try to 
prevent the mediation attempts of the US. Moreover, it refrained from singling out a party to blame, 
contrary to the crises before 1980s where China had persistently blamed India for initiating the 
crises. These Chinese actions also meet the criteria of Expectation 5 that Pakistan tried to align 
itself with China, but China rejected Pakistan. 
Analysis of the Kargil War demonstrated that the nuclear dimension of the conflict was 
important for the major powers. The mediation carried out by US President Bill Clinton demonstrates 
the importance that the US gave to the crisis. The crucial factor was Russia and China’s rejection of 
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the demand of Pakistani foreign minister Sartaj Ali and Pakistani General Musharraf for support. 
The joint stance by Russia and China to support neither of the conflicting parties facilitated 
Clinton’s mediation efforts. This shows the role of the collaborative mediation by the US, Russia, 
and China to ease the crisis. The analysis based on only pivotal deterrence would only indicate US 
mediation and left the reactions from Russia and China to US mediation unexplored. Here, I 
identified the Pakistani attempts to secure support from both Russia and China at the height of the 
crisis. I have demonstrated that Russia and China’s rejections of Pakistani demands during the crisis 
isolated Pakistan and made it more amenable to US mediation.  Therefore, it is necessary to analyze 
the interaction of Russia and China in relation to the mediation efforts of the US. Identifying the 
collaboration between the US, Russia, and China is especially interesting because the US was busy 
with the NATO air campaign in Kosovo at the same time. Russia and China had positions differing 
from the US regarding Kosovo. One would expect that China and Russia would prolong the conflict 
by supporting either India or Pakistan; thereby preoccupying the US and weakening its position in 
Kosovo. However, the nuclear dimension of the conflict in South Asia did not allow the play of 
power politics. These actions of the mediator states in the 1990 Kashmir and the 1999 Kargil Crisis 
met Expectation 4: collaboration and Expectation 5: collaborative mediation places pressure on the 
sides of the conflict. 
The case also demonstrated that the interaction between Russia, China and the US is not 
institutionalized based on high-level cooperation, as collective actor deterrence would argue. Rather 
is loosely organized and mainly involves not hindering the mediation attempt of each other. It has, 
however, an influence on the success of mediation, which makes it necessary to analyze.  
The President of Pakistan Shariff also used international mediation as a tool to withdraw 
from the conflict. Sharif was in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Pakistani military. A failure in a 
national security issue would seriously harm Sharif and cause him to lose his position.
394
 Sharif 
therefore used the mediation of Clinton, and highlighted that Clinton would continue to show 
interest in the conflict. Sharif thought highlighting the success of the Clinton mediation could 
reduce the domestic pressure. Therefore, the move of Sharif fits Expectation 6. 
2.2.6 Attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the Military Standoff 
2.2.6.1 Overview 
After the Kargil War ended, relations between India and Pakistan did not immediately 
normalize. The military coup by Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 worsened the already tense 
relations. Despite these tense relations, there were no major incidents until the fall of 2001. On 1 
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October 2001, the Legislative Assembly in the Indian-controlled State of Jammu and Kashmir were 
attacked by a group of insurgents masquerading as police officers by using a hijacked official 
vehicle loaded with explosives. A Pakistan-based insurgent group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, claimed 
responsibility for the attack.
395
 Although this incident put India under pressure to show its strength 
in the Kashmir region, the real shock came when the Parliament of India in New Delhi was attacked 
on 13 December 2001. The Indian government blamed the Pakistani based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
(LeT) for being responsible for the attack, noting Pakistani involvement as well.
396
 An attack on a 
symbol of Indian democracy was a huge test for the relations between India and Pakistan under a 
nuclear context. The plan was to attack in the morning session of the Parliament, which was 
attended by the Prime Minister and other senior government leaders. Two lucky incidents prevented 
the attack from taking place. First, the attackers’ car crashed into an official car. They had to 
therefore continue on foot. Second, the parliamentary session was on a break at the time of the 
attack. The militant who was responsible for notifying the attackers by mobile phone about the time 
of the sessions of the Parliament was unaware of the break because there was a power outage in 
New Delhi preventing the broadcasting of the parliamentary sessions.
397
 If the attack had been 
successful, there was a possibility that most of the important decision makers in the Indian 
government would have been killed, including the Prime Minister. An attack on Indian Parliament 
was therefore against the assumptions of incremental escalation. Nuclear deterrence theories would 
not expect a huge provocation on this scale in the first stages of the conflict, which can seriously 
damage the stability at the nuclear level. In the absence of international mediation, devastating 
consequences would follow, because the crisis had already started at a very high level, providing 
limited room for India and Pakistan for further escalation.  
India claimed that the Pakistani secret service I.S.I. (Inter-Services-Intelligence) was 
funding violent Islamic groups on the Indian side of Kashmir since the 1980s. This belief led the 
Cabinet Committee of India to give a serious warning to Pakistan. The then Indian Prime Minister 
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Atal Bihari Vajpayee ordered the country’s armed forces to mobilize for war. 398 India sent 800,000 
troops to its western border. It also activated its air force units and satellite airfields, and 
additionally moved its Easter fleet from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea to block Pakistan. 
Pakistan also deployed its troops along the border, bringing the danger of escalating the conflict to a 
nuclear level conflict that may have been triggered by just a single incident or misunderstanding.
399
 
Indian military deployments at the border compelled Pakistan to freeze the accounts of 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and to arrest fifty Islamic militants toward the end of December 2001.
400
 India, 
however, was not satisfied with this Pakistani measure. New York Times reporters Burns and 
Dugger reported that the spokeswoman for India’s Ministry of External Affairs Nirupama Rao 
demanded more information about the arrests made by Pakistan. Based on the observations of 
Pakistani officials, Burns and Dugger also reported that India brought seven divisions into attack 
positions near the Pakistani border.
401
 The most concerning development was that there were some 
reports claiming that Indian military opted for enlarging the scope of the deployment, and 
considered launching limited offensives against training camps on Pakistan’s side of Kashmir.402 
This caused a great concern at the international level because India and Pakistan did not cross the 
LOC after the nuclearization of the conflict, even in the 1999 Kargil war. Nuclear deterrence theory 
would assume that there was no need for international mediation because India and Pakistan would 
limit the conflict anyways, and India would not cross the LOC. However, the increasing threatening 
tone of Indian and Pakistani politicians put the main assumption of nuclear deterrence under 
pressure, and brought international mediation to deescalate the conflict. On 2 January 2002, for 
example, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that “no weapon would be spared in self-defense. 
Whatever weapon was available would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy.”403 Here, one 
can detect the underlying threat of using even nuclear weapons. On 11 January 2002, Indian Army 
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Chief General S. Padmanabhan announced that the Indian armed forces completed their 
mobilization and waited for a positive signal from political leadership.
404
   
Increasing tensions compelled Pakistani President Musharraf to make some concessions. On 
12 January 2002, on national television, Musharraf denounced religious extremism and banned 
jihadi groups from Pakistan, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Although 
Musharraf highlighted Pakistan’s continuing moral support for Kashmir’s liberation, he described 
the attack on the Indian Parliament as a terrorist act.
405
 He also declared that “no organization will 
be allowed to perpetuate terrorism behind the garb of the Kashmiri cause.”406 Although the television 
speech of Musharraf helped reduce the tension, India had some doubts about Musharraf’s 
intentions. India also highlighted that there was heavy snow during the winter in the region, not 
letting the insurgent activities take place anyways. It was therefore better to wait until April and 
May to see whether terrorist activities would reoccur and increase.
407
 Moreover, Musharraf had 
detained 2.000 people as Islamic radicals. He later set approximately 70 percent of them free again, 
only contributing to the doubts by India about the real intention of Pakistan.
408
 Therefore, India 
maintained its military units along the LOC. Additionally, India tested a ballistic missile
409
, causing 
Pakistani President Musharraf to issue a nuclear threat. Musharraf even declared that the use of 
nuclear weapons was a possibility if the pressure on Pakistan became too great.
410
  
The second most dramatic point of the crisis began with the massacre of families of Indian 
soldiers on 14 May 2002 in a military base in Kaluchak, Jammu.
411
 This led some Indian decision-
makers to reconsider crossing the Line of Control, and initiate an offensive against the Pakistan-
held parts of Kashmir.
412
 Even if the offensive was considered to be a conventional attack, the 
objectives were no longer limited, which posed the danger of escalating the conflict to a nuclear 
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level. The situation deteriorated when Pakistan tested surface-to-surface ballistic missiles on the 
dates of 25, 26 and 28 May 2002.
413
 The nuclear dimension of the tests became clearer when 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, discussed the use of nuclear weapons in a news 
conference, and declared that Pakistan could not accept “no first use” policy.414 
The nuclear threats issued by Pakistani and Indian politicians combined with the 
considerations of enlarging the military operations along and beyond the LOC show the importance 
of international mediation as a complementary measure to support the direct deterrence between 
India and Pakistan. For this reason, the US sent a special envoy to ease the increased tension.
415
 
After the arrival of the US envoy, the tension started to decline, but India still kept its troops on the 
front line until October 2002. It then announced that it would withdraw its troops from the border 
even though cross-border terrorism was continuing and Pakistan did not extradite the criminals 
India wanted. Nevertheless, the Indian government claimed that it had reached its goals, because 
President Musharraf confessed Pakistan’s support of separatist groups in Kashmir and promised to 
confine the activities of radical Islamic groups within Pakistan.
416
 
Although the crisis had ended, some post-conflict statements of high-level politicians raised 
doubt as to India and Pakistan were really affected by the nuclear aspect of the conflict. The severity 
of these statements endorse the importance of international mediation in overcoming 
misunderstandings. For example, on 30 December 2002 after the crisis ended, President Musharraf 
said that he would have unleashed an “unconventional war” on India had a single Indian soldier 
crossed the border.” In response, George Fernandes assured him that “there will be no Pakistan left” 
if India used its nuclear weapons. Pakistan followed by warning India of “an unforgettable reply” 
besides accusing it of “sick war hysteria.”417 Below, I analyze the mediation of major powers in 
detail. 
 
 
                                                 
413 Subramanian, T.S. (2002). Missile Maneuvers. Frontline, Cover Story, Volume 19, Issue 2, 8-21 June 2002 [online] 
Available at: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1912/19120200.htm [Accessed 24.03.2017].   
414 Haider, M. (2002). Islamabad refuses to accept `no first strike` doctrine. Dawn [online] Available at: 
 https://www.dawn.com/news/38860/islamabad-refuses-to-accept-no-first-strike-doctrine [Accessed 24.03.2017]. 
415 This is a special envoy led by the then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. I will explain the function of 
this envoy later in the US Mediation part. 
416 Chari, P.R. (2003). Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia, p. 22. 
417
 Bidwai, P. (2003). Nuclear South Asia: Still on the Edge. Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 02, 18 January 2003 [online] 
Available at: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2002/stories/20030131007211600.htm [Accessed 13.08.2016], and BBC News 
(2003). India Warning over Nuclear War, 7 January 2003 [online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2636157.stm 
[Accessed 28.03.2017]. 
105 
 
2.2.6.2 US Mediation of the Crisis 
In 2001, the US was essentially occupied with its campaign against terrorism in 
Afghanistan. However, the attack on Indian Parliament drew US attention. On 14 December 2001, 
US President Bush called Pakistani President Musharraf and India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee and 
urged them to stay calm.
418
 Threatening statements from Indian and Pakistani leaders was concerning 
for the US Congress, where the nuclear dimension of the crisis was salient. For example, Samuel R. 
Berger, the former National Security Advisor, testified in the US Senate stating that:  
“…Our objective must not be only to destroy the terrorist networks that have attacked and threatened us; we 
must do so in a way that makes the world more stable, not less, that isolates the extremists, not us…It means supporting 
the administration’s active role in diffusing the crisis between Pakistan and India, where confrontation can lead to 
miscalculation and with nuclear weapons on both sides, miscalculation can lead to disaster.”419 
 In his testimony, Berger linked the crisis in South Asia with the US’s own campaign against 
terrorism. He added that instability strengthens the terrorism. The conflicts between India and 
Pakistan also destabilized the region and contributed to the growth of terrorism. Additionally, the 
conflict between India and Pakistan also has a nuclear dimension with devastating effects. 
Therefore, Berger advocated the active US involvement in mediating the crisis. 
 George Tenet, the then director of the CIA, also underlined the danger of nuclear escalation 
in the region. He stated that:   
 “With regard to India and Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, we have been very concerned subsequent to the attack 
on the Indian Parliament in December about the instability that has been created. The chance of war between these two 
nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971. If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations 
into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would 
limit the scope of an Indian counterattack. Both India and Pakistan are publicly downplaying the risks of nuclear 
conflict in the current crisis. We are deeply concerned however, that a conventional war once begun could escalate into 
nuclear confrontation.”420 
          Tenet clearly states that CIA took the conflict between India and Pakistan very seriously. This 
statement exhibits Tenet’s belief that a conventional crisis could easily escalate to a nuclear level, 
despite the nuclear deterrence between parties of the conflict. 
           The nuclear dimension of the crisis became clear in the US Department of State as well when 
India tested its new generation ballistic missiles in the beginning of February 2002. The range of 
ballistic missiles was 700 km, which could have been directed against Pakistan as the only possible 
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target.
421
 New Yorker columnist Steve Coll wrote in his article that Richard Armitage, the US 
Deputy Secretary of State, told him that he was absolutely convinced that Pakistan’s generals would 
use nuclear weapons if the Indian army continued to use force against Pakistan.
422
 This statement 
shows that senior executives in the Bush administration took the crisis seriously, and did not rely on 
nuclear stability between India and Pakistan.  
These ominous developments caused US Secretary of State Colin Powell to telephone 
General Musharraf. Powell warned Musharraf to end Pakistan’s military support for jihadi groups in 
Kashmir,
423
 likely paving way for Musharraf’s speech on national television on 12 January 2002, 
which slightly reduced the tension. The crisis became stable until the Kaluchak Massacre in May 
2002. After this massacre, the rhetoric of Indian and Pakistani politicians resumed a belligerent 
tone. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee even declared that military personnel should be ready for 
a decisive battle.
424
 Pervez Musharraf answered this threat by stating that:  
    “Any incursion by the Indian forces across the Line of Control, even by an inch, will unleash a storm that will 
sweep the enemy.”425 
On 30 May 2002, George W. Bush declared that Pakistan must stop the infiltration of 
terrorists into India, and said that he would sent US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the 
region to defuse the tension between India and Pakistan.
426
 Additionally, in an effort to ease the 
crisis, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also met with India’s defense minister, 
George Fernandes, in Singapore. Wolfowitz told Fernandes that the war would carry grave 
consequences and must be avoided.
427
  
The tension between India and Pakistan was still high. Therefore, the US tasked Richard 
Armitage to go the region and mediate the crisis. Armitage arrived in Pakistan on 6 June and met 
with President Musharraf. By his own account to the New Yorker columnist Steve Coll
428
 Armitage 
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warned Musharraf that even if radical Islamist groups may be instrumental for Pakistan to exercise 
pressure on India now, these groups would be very dangerous on Pakistan in the long term. Musharraf 
assured him that “nothing is happening on the LOC.” Armitage told Coll that it was enough for him 
because he was interested primarily in stopping the conflict, and not necessarily finding a long-term 
solution. In New Delhi, Armitage met with Prime Minister Vajpayee. He told Indians that President 
Musharraf promised President Bush that he would crack down on jihadists in Kashmir. The Indian 
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra told the reporter Coll that India interpreted Armitage’s 
statement as a special message from Musharraf to India. Armitage told Indians that Pakistan needed 
India to also indicate that the crisis was ending. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes 
suggested that India might move its naval vessels away from Pakistan. After that, Powell called 
Musharraf to buttress the Indian message showing its willingness to ease the conflict.
429
 The 
Pakistani President Musharraf publicly endorsed that it would hinder trans-border terrorism and 
fight against terrorist groups.   
           These US initiatives contributed to mitigating the crisis, which was more urgently needed 
than in the 1999 Kargil crisis. In the Kargil Crisis, direct communication between Indian and 
Pakistani decision makers had continued, even if it was through informal channels. In the 2001 
crisis, there was no direct communication channel between India and Pakistan.  
          One would expect that the US should have sided with Pakistan because Pakistan was playing 
a key role in supporting US operations in Afghanistan. Nuclear deterrence theory also would not 
expect that the US would intervene because it is assumed that direct deterrence between India and 
Pakistan would prevent nuclear conflict anyways. Therefore, it was not necessary to risk offending 
an ally in the vital stage of the US campaign in Afghanistan. However, US attempts to control 
Pakistan’s actions demonstrated that the US did not support Pakistan’s actions simply because it 
was an ally. This US policy marks a shift in policy direction from the Cold War period when the US 
firmly supported Pakistan as an ally. One can attribute this difference to the nuclear dimension of 
the crisis. The nuclear dimension compelled the US to pursue policies easing the crisis instead of 
triggering it.  
         One can also attribute the balanced US policy to the US desire to build an equilibrium 
between its policies towards India and Pakistan. The US – India relations were, however, not strong 
in 2001, became stronger only after the signing of the US – India Civil Nuclear agreement in 
2005.
430
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2.2.6.3 Russian Mediation of the Crisis 
 In the 2001 crisis, Russia showed greater understanding of the Indian position. 
Nevertheless, it advocated for direct dialogue between India and Pakistan and argued that direct 
dialogue was the best option to solve the crisis. Right after the negotiations with the then Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Vladimir Putin stated that: 
     “…We paid much attention to the situation in Southern Asia. Russia would like the emerging political dialogue 
between India and Pakistan to turn into a permanent constructive process…We welcome a direct dialogue between 
India and Pakistan and we very much hope that it will lead to positive results.”431   
          A pro-Indian statement came from the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov. BBC 
news reported that Klebanov visited India to arrange trade issues. In New Delhi, he stated that 
 “It is time for Pakistan to show it is serious about fighting terrorism…It is not enough to say words. 
Pakistan has to do something on the ground…”432  
 He also underlined the unequivocal support of Russia for India. In the meantime, he 
emphasized that military assertiveness was not a good option.
433
 These statements demonstrate 
Russia’s support for India. At a meeting of foreign ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov underlined the seriousness of the crisis in South Asia and 
added that India and Pakistan should try to solve their problems calmly. He stated that: 
 “At our meeting in Beijing we together expressed concern over the continuing tensions between India and 
Pakistan…It is vital for India and Pakistan to show restraint and use their best efforts to solve existing problems 
peacefully.”434  
 On 17
 
May 2002, in answering the question raised by the Russian News Agency, the official 
spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation Alexander Yakovenko highlighted 
Russia’s concern about a possible conflict between India and Pakistan. He stated that: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005 [online] Available at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html [Accessed 28.03.2017]. 
431 President of Russia. Statement for the Press and Answers to Questions Following Negotiations with Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 6 November 2001 [online] Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21390 
[Accessed 28.03.2017]. 
432 BBC News. (2002). Russia Backs India Over Kashmir. 7 February 2002 [online] Available at: 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1807238.stm [Accessed 27.03.2017].  
433 Ibid.  
434 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 06 May 2002, Speech by Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov at an Enlarged Meeting of Foreign Ministers of States-Participants in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
[online] Available at:  
http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/sanhajskaa-organizacia-sotrudnicestva-sos-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/557702 
[Accessed 31.03.2017].  
109 
 
 “On May 14 a large-scale terrorist act was committed in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir which 
resulted in over fifty people killed and wounded from the Indian army military, their families and innocent residents…In 
Moscow we proceed from the assumption that in the current situation in the South Asian region, an open armed conflict 
is extremely undesirable, would have dire consequences for security and stability, going beyond the confines of that 
region. An extremely balanced approach to actions is required of both sides in this situation. At the same time, in terms 
of our own sad experience, we are well aware what terrorism is. We also understand the extreme concern of the Indian 
side over the continued terrorist activity by the extreme forces, apparently connected to some extent with the 
consequences of the anti-terrorist operation conducted in Afghanistan. We regard as just and absolutely legitimate the 
desire of the Indian side to put an end to the brazen activities of terrorists. We are prepared to assist this to the extent 
this is possible. We express solidarity with the legitimate demands of our Indian friends.”435 
 Whereas Yakovenko in his statement declared the Russia’s solidarity with India, he still 
emphasized that a possible conflict between India and Pakistan would have consequences beyond 
the region. This statement is an indicative of the fact that Russia’s support has limits and cannot be 
as great as it was in the Cold War because of the devastating effects of the nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, Russia’s first aim was to ease the crisis. 
 In this period, Russia generally supported the idea of preserving the LOC, as did the US. As 
Malek pointed out most Russian security experts were in favor of declaring the LOC as a formal 
international border.
436
 Putin attempted to surmount the crisis. In Almaty, President Putin met with 
the presidents of India and Pakistan, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf, respectively to 
ease the crisis.
437
 Musharraf took this move more positively. Musharraf stated that:  
 “Russia, with its long relations with India and now improving relations with Pakistan is most well-placed to 
play a key role in the resolution of disputes and improving relations between India and Pakistan.”438 
On 12
 
June 2002, a statement released by the Russian Foreign Ministry welcomed positive 
statements from India and urged Pakistan to also take positive steps such as reducing transboundary 
terrorism and preventing the infiltration of militants through the LOC.
439
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Russia also contacted the US in order to help resolve the crisis. For example, the Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and the US Secretary of State Colin Powell met to discuss 
international and regional problems. Afterwards, the Russian Foreign Ministry made an 
announcement stating that both Russia and the US discussed the ways to reduce the tension between 
India and Pakistan as early as possible.
440
 They both prioritized mitigating the crisis and later 
reconsidering their differences.  
  Increasing Russian distrust of Pakistan concerning the terrorist groups can be seen in an 
interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov conducted by Vremya Novostei 
(Newstime). Trubnikov stated that it is largely believed in Russia that some Islamic fighters in 
Kashmir have been trained by the Taliban, which Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence also 
supported.
441
 
 In another article written by the then Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Russia 
articulated its understanding of Indian sensitivities and declared that India and Russia shared the 
same problems. Igor Ivanov wrote in his article that: 
  “Cross-border terrorism is an acute problem for many countries. An essential precondition for the effective 
struggle against this threat is the close cooperation of neighboring states. In particular, for the security of Russia a 
grave threat is posed by the presence of Chechen terrorists and foreign mercenaries in the Pankisi Gorge on the 
territory of Georgia. In this connection we give special emphasis to the speediest possible implementation of the 
agreements of the Russian and Georgian presidents on reinforcing security in the Russian-Georgian border area, 
reached in the course of their recent meeting in Chisinau at the CIS summit. For the same reasons Russia treats with 
understanding the concern of India over the penetration of groups of militants through the Line of Control into the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. It shares the opinion about the need for the fulfillment by Pakistan of the obligations assumed 
to liquidate the terrorist infrastructure on the territory under its control.”442 
 On 3
 
December 2002 came a statement from, Alexander Kadakin, the Russian 
Ambassador to India. In his statement, he condemned terrorism and named the groups in Kashmir 
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as terrorist groups. He also urged Pakistan to fulfill its obligations regarding the terrorist networks 
in its country.  
 “Our countries share a common vision of the issue of preserving peace and stability in South Asia. The pre-
crisis state of Indian-Pakistani relations this past summer showed only too clearly that terrorism could be detrimental 
to inter-state relations and global stability, if someone was tempted to portray international banditry as some kind of a 
“liberation struggle” or to use such banditry for attaining foreign policy goals. Precisely this threat emanates from 
extremist groups, which are entrenched on Pakistani-controlled territories. We hope that Pakistan will fully and 
unconditionally fulfill its commitments, thereby thwarting trans-border terrorism and destroying the terrorist 
infrastructure on its own territory.”443  
 The above statements released by Russian politicians and experts reveal Russia’s support 
for India during the 2001-2 crisis. India was very satisfied with this level of Russian confidence. 
The Indian Prime Minister at that time, Atal Vajpayee, even hoped that Russia would play an active 
role in pressuring Pakistan to curb the activities of the terrorist groups within Pakistan.
444
 However, 
this level of support was still very low in comparison to the Soviet Union’s support of India during 
the crises before 1980s. Russia’s support on 2001 crisis was consistent with the US and China. It 
blamed Pakistan, and did not use blaming language against the US and China.  
 Here, one should note that Russia was also suffering from Islamic terrorist groups and had 
the same interest as India in preventing these groups. It was therefore expected that Russia should 
have more aggressively supported India, instead of just giving rhetorical support. Russia instead 
chose to act in accord with the US. It was because an overt Russian support for India would have 
threatened Pakistan. This would have put the US in a difficult position because then it would have 
to be more supportive of Pakistan as an ally in a global war against terrorism. In other words, a firm 
Russian stance with India would have compelled the US to firmly stand with Pakistan. It would 
have therefore weakened the efficiency of US mediation efforts to deescalate this conflict with a 
nuclear dimension. Russia did not follow this path and collaborated with the US. This collaborative 
Russian mediation could possibly be attributed to the Russian support of the US campaign against 
global terror in general, especially at the initial stages of the campaign. However, the US campaign 
brought the US near regions where Russia traditionally viewed as its own sphere of influence. It 
was clear that Russia would not have contented with increasing US influence in both Central Asia 
and South Asia in the long term. Therefore, Russia could have used the India-Pakistan crisis in 2001 
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as an opportunity to show its influence in the region. This in turn would have deteriorated the crisis 
between India and Pakistan. Because of the nuclear dimension, Russia chose not to compete with 
US and weaken US mediation of the 2001 India – Pakistan crisis. 
 An evaluation of Russian mediation during the post-Cold War era, however, requires 
considering the changing foreign policy of Russia throughout the 1990s. During the first years of 
the Yeltsin
445
 presidency, Russian foreign policy was enthusiastic about the West. For example, in 
his address to the United Nations Security Council on 31 January 1992, Yeltsin stated that: 
 “I think the time has come to consider creating a global defence system for the world community. It could be 
based on a reorientation of the United States Strategic Defense Initiative, to make use of high technologies developed in 
Russia’s defense complex. We are ready to participate actively in building and putting in place a pan-European 
collective security system…Russia regarded the United States and the West not as mere partners but rather as 
allies…”446  
 Rising inflation, job insecurity, and poverty, however, caused an immense socioeconomic 
crisis in Russia and soon led to disenchantment by the majority of the Russian population with 
Russia’s reformist course and with the West in general.447 Disappointment with the West gradually 
contributed to Russia’s foreign policy change from favoring full integration with western 
institutions to a more assertive one.
448
 The early signs of this change in foreign policy had already 
manifested itself by 1993. For example, in February 1993, Yeltsin referred to Russia’s special rights 
in the regions of the former Soviet Union. Yeltsin pointed out that international organizations, 
including the UN, should have given Russia special powers to assure peace and stability in the 
former Soviet Union because the cessation of armed conflicts in former Soviet regions was also 
crucial for Russian interests.
449
 Moreover, Russia argued that it was responsible for protecting 
ethnic Russians living abroad in the former Soviet Union. This claim gave Russia a valuable foreign 
policy instrument with which it could assert its strategic objectives.
450
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In November 1993, the changing Russian attitude against the West had become more 
evident through a study conducted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which described 
NATO as the “biggest military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive 
potential.” This report also blamed NATO for being laden with stereotypes of bloc thinking.451  
In the second half of the 1990s, socioeconomic problems heightened. As a result, Yeltsin 
fired the foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was one of the predominant architectures of pro-
Western foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yevgeny Primakov, more a hardliner 
than Kozyrev, became foreign minister in 1996.
452
 After the financial crisis in 1998, Primakov became 
the Prime Minister. He held the position until Vladimir Putin took power. These changes 
demonstrated the transition of Russian policy from a pro-western stance to a more hardline position. 
All of these developments culminated in the release of a new national security concept on 10 
January 2000. This new report highly criticized the structure of international relations based on the 
domination exerted by certain developed Western states. The US was blamed for acting unilaterally 
and for using military force without applying the fundamentals of international law. This national 
security concept emphasized that Russia’s interests required “strengthening its positions as a great 
power and as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world.”453  
This new concept first found its practical application in Russia’s relations with its traditional 
partners. During his visit in India on 3 October 2000, for example, Russian president Putin talked 
about the need to create a democratic world order and discussed the need to reform the UN.
454
   
One can briefly argue that, starting in the early 1990s and through the end of 1990s, Russian 
foreign policy moved from being enthusiastic with Western principles to a search for finding a new 
role for Russia in global politics. This changing foreign policy throughout the 1990s is important 
for my argument because one may attribute the reason for Russian apathy to the 1990 Kashmir 
crisis to shrinking Soviet power and the approaching end of the Cold War. This, however, does not 
explain Russian collaboration with the US in the Kargil crisis in 1999 and in the 2001-2002 military 
standoff, although Russian foreign policy had already become more assertive. This strengthens my 
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argument that it was the nuclear dimension which compelled the US and Russia to collaborate in the 
crises between India and Pakistan. 
2.2.6.4 Chinese Mediation of the Crisis 
 China was more actively engaged in this crisis than the crises of 1990 and 1999. On 31
 
July 2002, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with his Indian counterpart Yashwant 
Sing at the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum. In this meeting, 
Tang Jiaxuan highlighted the positive steps taken by Pakistan and its role in the campaign against 
terrorism. Tang Jiaxuan said that: 
   “China, which has kept a close eye on the situation in South Asia, has no selfish interests in the India-
Pakistan dispute. China's policy on the issue is to make peace and facilitate talks…We note that Pakistan voiced 
objection to acts of terror in all forms and manifestations. The Pakistani government's stance on fighting terrorism is 
explicit and firm. We hope that India and Pakistan will ease tensions and make peace between them through 
dialogue, which is in the interest of both countries and is also a desire of the international community.”455  
One can interpret the above statement as a small amount of support for Pakistan. However, 
China was still not in the position to support Pakistan to a larger degree as it had during the Cold 
War era. Tang also demonstrated China’s willingness to cooperate with other actors in easing the 
crisis between India and Pakistan. He said to US Secretary of State Colin Powell over the phone 
that: 
“China is very concerned about the development of the India-Pakistan situation, and will spare no effort to 
promote reconciliation, so that the tension between India and Pakistan can be eased.”456 
     The Chinese President Jiang Zemin also met with his counterpart Pervez Musharraf. He 
told him that: 
        “China hopes that Pakistan and India will settle their dispute peacefully through dialogue. China supports  
all efforts to alleviate the tension between Pakistan and India and to safeguard peace and stability in south Asia.”457 
  
From these statements made by Chinese officials, one can detect a tone that China was not 
as passive as it was in the 1990 and 1999 crises. In the 2001 crisis, China not only advocated for 
India and Pakistan to solve their problems with each other, but also actively engaged in easing the 
crisis through meetings with Indian and Pakistani officials and politicians. This Chinese 
engagement was not in competition with the US, but was more collaborative. Even if China stated 
its support on Pakistani position in some occasions (such as in ASEAN conference), it also 
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highlighted that only a direct dialogue can solve the crisis between India and Pakistan. China was 
therefore not overtly pro-Pakistani as in the crisis before 1980s.    
Both the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001 crisis demonstrated that non-state actors and 
terrorist groups add an additional complexity to the deterrence mechanism between states. The 
attacks initiated by non-state actors led to frequent crises between nuclear states, posing extra 
challenges to the stability reached at the nuclear level. The 1999 Kargil crisis occurred because of 
the trespassing of the non-state actors in the LOC, and the 2001 crisis occurred because of the 
terrorist attacks on Indian Parliament. In the 2001 crisis when the conflict started to subside, the 
Kaluchak terrorist attack increased tensions again, and caused India to consider enlarging the scope 
of the offensive, which could have escalated to a nuclear level without international mediation. 
Increasing the number of crises initiated by terrorist attacks in our contemporary world requires 
thinking in terms of the relationship between international mediation and nuclear deterrence. 
International mediation plays an important role in reducing the conflict dynamic between nuclear 
dyads, preventing overreaction by facilitating communication. It can therefore hinder a crisis from 
escalating to a nuclear level. 
 V.P. Malik, Indian Army Chief during the 2002 conflict, also underlined the escalation risk 
inherent in the India-Pakistan crisis. V.P. Malik stated in an interview by Chindu Sreedharan and 
Josy Joseph that there is a threshold between India and Pakistan, which makes conventional war 
possible, despite the nuclear capabilities by both states.
458
  
Another important phenomenon in terms of the nexus between international mediation and 
nuclear deterrence is the friction between civil and military leaders and how they perceive threat 
and success. It is also visible in the India-Pakistan conflict. The analysis of the 2001-2002 crisis 
revealed that the views of civilian leaders and military concerning the success of India was highly 
differentiated. Civilian leaders commented that India was successful, whereas the military leaders 
were dissatisfied with the results. Indian national security expert K. Subrahmanyam argued that:  
“If deployment of troops on the border was meant to serve as an exercise in coercive diplomacy and to compel 
the US to apply pressure on Pakistan to promise a visible and permanent end to cross-border terrorism, then it would 
be fair to say that the purpose has been achieved.”459  
In contrast, retired Indian Major General Afsir Karim stated that  
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“The deployment of our armed forces in battle stations for over 10 months, with a view to coercing Pakistan 
into stopping cross-border terrorism, has failed to achieve its stated purpose…”460 
The dissatisfaction articulated by Indian military leaders also showed that nuclear stability 
could be fragile without international mediation. For example, retired Brigade General Vijai K. Nair 
said:  
“…The fact that you deployed the entire military and did not take punitive action against terrorists 
demonstrated to all that New Delhi does not have the political will to use the means it has deliberately created to secure 
India when the chips are down.”461  
Retired Lieutenant General V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, predominant author in defense 
issues, also argued in their book that: 
“Facing tremendous pressure, the Indian leadership lacked the stomach to take a war inside Pakistan.”462  
Discussion of this friction between military and civilian leaders is important because it 
indicates that in the absence of international mediation, unsatisfied military leaders could have 
easily taken steps deteriorating the crisis. 
The problem of studies analyzing the crises between India and Pakistan was that they only 
focused on direct deterrence. They mainly neglected the mediation of other actors as a 
complementary factor in easing the crisis. On the other hand, studies that have incorporated 
mediation in analysis have only focused on the US. The fragile escalation dynamic in South Asia, 
however, requires an analysis of the interaction of US mediation with other major powers in the 
region. The cases showed that the collaborative behavior of Russia and China with the US helped 
the US to mediate successfully. If, for example, the alignment requests of Pakistani Prime Minister 
Shariff were not rejected by both Russia and China in the 1999 Kargil war, US mediation efforts 
might have lost its effectiveness. We can of course never definitely measure the impact of the fear 
of isolation, as we cannot travel back in time to analyze the incidents in a world where Russia and 
China did not support US mediation. We can interpret this only by comparing the 1999 and 2001 
cases with the 1965 and 1971 cases. In the 1965 and 71 crises, the different alignment options of 
Pakistan, between the US and China, allowed Pakistan to prolong the conflict and reduce the 
effectiveness of US mediation. The behavior of other major powers, whether competitive or 
collaborative, is therefore an important factor in increasing or decreasing the escalation dynamic of 
conflict between India and Pakistan.  
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Pivotal deterrence that only analyzes the mediation of the US, which neglects the interaction of 
Russia and China with US mediation does not explain the dynamics of mediation that deescalated the 
2001 crisis. This sub-case also demonstrated that the mediation was based on Russia and China’s 
loosely agreed understanding of the US mediation, which reflects the collaborative mediation. It was not 
a highly institutionalized cooperation based on legally binding rules as collective actor deterrence theory 
asserts. 
2.2.7 Mumbai Terrorists Attacks in November 2008 
2.2.7.1 Overview
 Mumbai attacks were a series of coordinated attacks organized by the terrorist 
organization Lashkar-e-Taiba from 26
 
to 29
 
November 2008
463
.
 
On 26 November 2008, a group of 
ten well-organized men targeted renowned touristic places in Mumbai. 
 The first attack took place at the restaurant, Cafe Leopold. The attackers opened fire on 
the restaurant and then joined the attack taking place at the Taj Mahal Hotel, which started around 
9.20 PM on Wednesday 26 November. Cafe Leopold is popular with foreign tourists and close to 
the Taj Mahal Palace hotel. The Taj Mahal Palace hotel is a popular tourist hotel where some 
international politicians, bankers, and bureaucrats also stay. Around the same time, other group of 
attackers stormed the Oberoi – Trident Hotel, which is located in the main business district. It is a 
popular place among business travelers. Meanwhile, two gunmen armed with heavy weapons 
stormed into the crowded Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus station (formerly Victoria Terminus). 
Afterwards, attackers went to the Cama & Albless Hospital and opened fire inside and outside the 
hospital. Other gunmen took control of the Nariman House business and residential complex. The 
complex was housing the Jewish Lubavitch outreach center. After the gunfight, six people were 
dead including a rabbi and his wife.
464
 There were also two separate explosions, one in the 
Mazagaon
465
 and one in a taxi.
466
 They was also gunfight in the Metro Cinema.
467
 The gunfight 
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continued for three days and the crisis was over on Saturday morning on 29 December 2008. By the 
end of the crisis, 166 people were dead.
468
 
 The magnitude of the attack dramatically increased the tension between India and 
Pakistan. India blamed the Inter-Services-Intelligence, the Pakistani intelligence agency, in 
designing the attack.
469
 Pakistan, however, denied the allegations. Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan’s 
High Commissioner to Britain, declared that Pakistan was not involved in the planning of Mumbai 
attacks.
470
 India was not convinced, and the tension further increased. There were also some military 
deployments. In late December, the New York Times reported that Pakistan had relocated some of 
its troops from Afghanistan border in the west to the Indian border in the east.
471
 Based on the 
statements of two intelligence officers, Dawn reported that some 20,000 Pakistani soldiers were on 
the move to the Indian border. Moreover, both India and Pakistan cancelled leave for military 
personnel.
472
 Despite the disconcerting developments, a positive development also occurred. The 
Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Satyabrata Pal, met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary 
Salman Bashir in Islamabad. The Indian side assured that India was not deploying military units 
along the border, and India had no plans for military action.
473
 These developments slightly helped 
reduce the tension between India and Pakistan. On 5 January 2009, another level of cooperation 
occurred. India had issued a file, which explains the links between elements in Pakistan and the 
Mumbai attacks.
474
 Indian Minister of External Affairs Shri Pranab Mukherjee also stated that India 
insisted on the extradition of the Mumbai perpetrators to India, who were behind the Mumbai 
attacks. However, he added that if it was not possible for some reason, the attackers could also have 
been tried in Pakistan. However, Mukherjee stated that his comments should not have been 
understood as India forgave its demands for extradition of those, who were responsible for Mumbai 
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attacks.
475
 Pakistan also positively responded to the Indian initiatives. Pakistani Advisor to the 
Prime Minister for Interior Rehman Malik stated that Pakistan had arrested 124 individuals, who 
were believed to be connected with Lashkar-e-Taiba. Malik also added that the trials would be 
transparent and highlighted the need for cooperation between Pakistani and Indian investigators.
476
 
These mutual gestures helped prevent high tension and immediate crisis. However, a certain level of 
tension continued. Even in the February 2009 session held in Lok Sabha, for example, Indian 
Minister of External Affairs Mukherjee stated that: 
 “Firstly, that the terrorist attack on Mumbai again underlines the grave threat that terrorism poses to peace 
and stability and therefore has to be seen in the context of the global challenge of terrorism. Terrorism emanating from 
Pakistan is of course a direct threat to India, but it is equally a regional and a global threat. Secondly, from our 
investigations the evidence was conclusive that the attack was planned, executed and launched from Pakistan territory, 
by Pakistanis and by elements based in Pakistan.”477  
 Through these statements, Mukherjee not only blamed Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks, 
but also indicated that the threats coming from Pakistan posed a danger to the entire world. India’s 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also addressed both Houses of Parliament, and in his speech, he 
also highlighted how the danger coming from Pakistan threatens the entire world.  
 “There is greater appreciation in the international community of the threat that exists to the region and the 
world from the terrorism emanating from Pakistan.”478 
             The 2008 Mumbai attacks did not target the decision-makers of India as it did in the 2001 
Indian Parliament Attack; however, it targeted highly touristic places in the city of Mumbai. This 
received international attention. Below is the reaction of major powers to the crisis.   
2.2.7.2 US Mediation of the 2008 Mumbai Crisis       
 The US stayed neutral to the 2008 Mumbai crisis. The US President George W. Bush 
called both Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, and 
urged both countries to cooperate with each other in the investigation.
479
 Bush told Singh that American 
agencies would support India’s investigation into the Mumbai terror attacks and take on a “shared 
commitment” to combat terrorism. Bush added that the US would work together with the international 
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community to go after extremists.
480
 Additionally, the US sent a special investigation team of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to Mumbai to help with the investigations.
481
  
 The most notable US mediation came when US President George W. Bush sent the US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the region. On 3 December 2008, Rice first stopped by in 
India to meet Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. She stated that Pakistan had a responsibility 
to cooperate with India and help prevent attacks. In the meantime, Rice warned India that impulsive 
moves could bring unintended consequences.
482
  
 On 4 December 2008, Rice visited Pakistan as well, and met with Pakistani President Asif 
Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and 
army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Rice said that there was irrefutable evidence that some 
groups within Pakistan were involved in the Mumbai attacks. She warned that Pakistan would need 
to bring the perpetrators to justice, otherwise the US would act.
483
 
 The US mediation of 2008 attacks was not comprehensive. The US condemned the attack, 
urged India and Pakistan to work together, but refrained from blaming Pakistan. 
2.2.7.3 Russian Mediation of the 2008 Mumbai Crisis 
 The first reaction to the Mumbai attacks came from the Russian President Dimitry 
Medvedev. He condemned the attacks and supported the actions of India to suppress terrorist 
acts.
484
 After tensions had increased, Russia clearly articulated its concerns about the nuclear 
component of the crisis. On the official webpage of the Russian Foreign Ministry, it was stated that: 
 “Moscow has received with extreme concern news of a massive buildup of troops and military equipment on 
both sides of the India-Pakistan border. The tension in this region has reached a dangerous level. There are worrying 
reports that New Delhi and Islamabad are not ruling out the use of military force against each other. The Russian 
Federation resolutely urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and not allow the situation on the border 
to develop into a military-based scenario…Whereas any confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad would only 
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benefit their common enemy, international terrorism, whose aim is to pit India and Pakistan against each other and 
thus destabilize the situation in South Asia. That prospect looks especially threatening as these states possess nuclear 
weapons de facto. We hope that the governments of India and Pakistan, aware of their high responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the region, will do everything in their power to defuse current tension in their 
bilateral relations by politico-diplomatic means. To this end the Russian Federation stands ready to provide all 
necessary assistance to New Delhi and Islamabad.”485 
In this statement above, Russia’s concern of the nuclear component of the crisis can be 
easily detected. It was also announced that Russia was ready to give assistance to both actors of the 
conflict in order to ease the crisis.  
2.2.7.4 The Chinese Mediation of 2008 Mumbai Crisis 
 Chinese engagement in this crisis followed the same pattern as in the 2001-02 crisis. 
High-level officials communicated with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts. They urged them to 
stay calm. For example, the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi called the Indian and Pakistani 
foreign ministers, Pranab Mukherjee and Shah Mahmood Qureshi, respectively. He told them that 
problematic issues between the two countries could only be resolved through dialogue. He urged 
both foreign ministers to improve their relations. He also said that improved relations between India 
and Pakistan are in the interests of the entire world. More importantly, Yang Jiechi declared his 
country’s readiness to collaborate with India, Pakistan and with the rest of the world to cope with 
the terrorism.
486
 
 Another statement came from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao. 
He stated that: 
 “China firmly opposed terrorism. It accorded with the fundamental interest of India and Pakistan to 
strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation. It is also in line with the requirements for regional peace and stability 
and the common expectation of the international community.”487  
 Furthermore, China also sent a delegation to the crisis region. It was headed by the then 
Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei. Their mission was to transmit the message to the Indian and 
Pakistani leadership that China was interested in only a peaceful conduct of relationships in South 
Asia.
488
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 Here, it is evident that China was not as passive as it had been during the 1990 and 1999 
crisis. Since the 2001 crisis, it has become more active, but has not pursued competitive policies as 
it did during the Cold War. 
 Briefly one can say that the international response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks was not 
strong, compared with the other incidents between India and Pakistan. It may be because although 
both India and Pakistan deployed its military units near the border, the threat of a major war was not 
high. For example, India’s Defense Minister A.K. Antony stated that:  
 “We are not planning any military action. At the same time, unless Pakistan take actions against those 
terrorists who are operating in their soil against India, and also against all those who are behind this Mumbai terrorist 
attack, things will not be normal.”
489
  
 The conflict had a low beginning point, leaving enough room for escalation. These 
features of the conflict might not have caused a major international concern. If the war had continued, 
mediation might have become necessary. It is, however, under these conditions, not possible to 
analyze whether the pattern of international mediation in the 2008 crisis fits to Expectations that I 
laid down. The only inference one can make is that Russia, China and the US did not blame each 
other for the conflict, and they did not use defamatory language against each other. They also did 
not support one particular side of the conflict. They also refrained from blaming one party of the 
conflict. However, I refrain from interpreting these attitudes as fitting to Expectation 4 and 
Expectation 5 because there is no evidence to suggest an explicit intention of mediation existed on 
the part of any of the major powers. This could also be observed by the following border 
skirmishes, which occurred in 2011, 2013, and 2016. These did not have the magnitude of those in 
the 1990, 1999, and 2001 crises and did not trigger international attention. It also did not cause large 
military deployments in the LOC, which in turn had an impact on the formation of international 
mediation, apart from being characterized by whether mediation was competitive or collaborative. 
 Another issue was that during the 2008 crisis, both Indian and Pakistani politicians did not 
issue threats of mass destruction. These changed attitudes of Indian and Pakistani politicians 
combined with the limitation of military moves might have had helped induced an environment 
where international mediation did not need to strongly emerged. This underscores the fact that in 
my study I argue that international mediation played a complementary role. My intention is never to 
argue that international mediation exclusively halted the crises between India and Pakistan. My thesis 
rather proposes and seeks to establish that, apart from the direct deterrence between parties of the 
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conflict, international mediation is an important complementary factor easing crises with nuclear 
dimension. The role of international mediation becomes particularly crucial, if the crisis started on a 
high level of escalation.  
2.3 Complementary / Discussion Cases 
2.3.1 The Crises between India and China 
In this section, I analyze the crises between India and China as a complementary case to my 
main case. One can divide the India-Chinese relations into four phases. The first phase can be 
described as limited relations and limited conflict in the 1950s. The second phase started in 1960s 
and witnessed conflicts with high intensity, with which the 1962 Sino-Indian War reached its 
climax. The third phase is the skirmishes in the 1980s, and the deployment of military units to the 
Line of Actual Control.
490
 The fourth level began in the 1990s without serious conflicts, and only 
some verbal exchanges from high-level politicians.  
To provide greater detail, in the first phase, India - China relations started with the China’s 
declaration of Tibet as its internal region. A treaty signed by Tibet and the United Kingdom in 1914 
demarcated the border between India and China in the Himalayan region, which is referred to as the 
McMahon Line. China declared that the agreement was invalid because Tibet had no authority to 
sign a treaty with Britain.
491
 With Tibet becoming a part of China, the McMahon Line between 
India and China became unclear, causing tensions between India and China. The relationship 
between India and China deteriorated when India gave asylum to Dalai Lama and his followers, 
who wanted to settle in India’s Northeast region.492 Despite the tumultuous relationships, China and 
India did not escalate to war during the 1950s. 
The second phase of the India - China relations had started in 1960s, with which the India – 
China War of 1962 reached its lowest phase. India’s implementation of the Forward Policy served 
as a major provocation to China in September 1962. Through Forward Policy, India sent troops into 
disputed places around the McMahon Line. The first major clashes occurred in Dhola post, 
established by Indians. The military clashes continued during September 1962, causing a full-
fledged war between India and China on 20 October 1962. The US showed its support for India in 
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this conflict. In a communique issued on 21 October 1962, the US Department of State expressed 
that the US was “shocked at the violent and aggressive action of the Chinese communists against 
India”. It furthered stated that “any Indian requests would be considered sympathetically.”493 The 
US also started to recognize the Indian position on the McMahon Line. On 27 October, Ambassador 
Galbraith stated that “the McMahon Line is an accepted international border and is sanctioned by 
modern usage. Accordingly, we regard it as the northern border of the North-East Frontier 
Agency
494
 (NEFA) area.”495 US President John F. Kennedy considered India a useful player in the 
region to win the political and economic race against China. M. Schlesinger recalls Kennedy’s 
famous remark: 
 “We want India to win the race with China… If China succeeds and India fails, the economic development, 
balance of power will shift against us.”496  
 The US offered its help to India. Kennedy sent a letter to Nehru stating that the US 
sympathy was with India and if India wants, the US could offer some practical assistance beyond 
sympathy.
497
 Subsequently, Nehru made a formal request for US military assistance.
498
 By 9 November 
1962, the US had already air shipped about 3.5 million dollars worth of equipment and ammunition, 
adding up to 800 tons.
499
 
 The Indian position dramatically deteriorated in the battleground, and lost posts along the 
McMahon Line. These losses caused Nehru to send two letters to Kennedy. In the letters, Nehru 
requested greater US assistance, and protection by US jet fighters to protect Indian cities from air 
attacks by the Chinese.
500
 Discussions at the US Department of State reveals that the non-aligned 
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position of India made it problematic for the US to release the amount of assistance Nehru 
requested.
501
 In order to provide such assistance, the US needed guarantees that India would pursue 
more pro-West policies. On 21 November 1962, China declared a unilateral ceasefire, leaving no 
time for US negotiations with India to influence Indian foreign policy.  
 The US – India rapprochement during the 1962 war upset the Soviets. Khrushchev stated 
that China was responsible for the US – Indian rapprochement, and declared that Chinese 
withdrawal was a wise decision to prevent further US – India rapprochement. Khrushchev stated 
that:  
 “Some are already saying that China, if you please, ceased hostilities apparently because India began to 
receive support from the American and British imperialists, who are providing that country with arms. Consequently, 
say such people, the Chinese People’s Republic felt that if the conflict were to develop further it might grow into a 
major war that would require even greater sacrifices. Yes, evidently the Chinese friends took account of the 
situation…”502 
 This statement showed that the US overtly allied with India against China and supports 
Expectation 2 that mediator states align with one conflictive side against the other one. The Soviet 
Union had good relations with India, but they could not overtly align against a communist China. 
Almost one year after the conflict, however, the Soviet and Chinese discrepancies regarding the 
border conflict emerged. Pravda released articles criticizing the Chinese position in the 1962 
conflict. These articles declared that the Chinese attitude toward India was not about ideology. It was 
nationalistic. Pravda also stated that China’s position was to destroy India-Soviet relations.503  
 China rejected Soviet accusations, and blamed the Soviet Union that: 
“The leadership of the C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) has become increasingly anxious to 
collude with the Indian reactionaries and has been bent on forming a reactionary alliance with Nehru against socialist 
China. The leadership of the C.P.S.U. and its press openly sided with Indian reaction, condemned China for its just 
stand on the Sino-Indian border conflict and defended the Nehru government. Two-thirds of Soviet economic aid to 
India have been given since the Indian reactionaries provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict. Even after large-scale 
armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border began in the autumn of 1962, the leadership of the C.P.S.U. has continued to 
extend military aid to the Indian reactionaries.”504 
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 In the fall of 1967, the border between India and China in the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, 
which was then an Indian protectorate, witnessed two military clashes: Nathu La Incident and Chola 
incident. On 11 September 1967, Chinese troops attacked Indian troops stationed across the Nathu La 
on the Sikkim border. On 15 September 1967 the hostilities stopped. On 1 October 1967, Chinese 
forces again infiltrated Sikkim, but this time to Cho La, in the north of Nathu La.
505
 On 10 October 
1967, the Indian Army repelled them. The end of the battle saw the Chinese Army forced to leave 
Sikkim after being defeated by Indian troops. Sikkim became an Indian state in 1975.
506
 
The relations between India and China positively started in the beginning of 1980s. In 1981, 
the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India, paving the way for vice-ministerial level 
talks between the two countries. The border issues were discussed in these formal talks, and eight 
rounds of talks were annually held from 1981 to 1987.
507
 Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986, 
however, overshadowed bilateral talks held in 1986. The Sumdorong Chu is a rivulet flowing from 
north-south in the Tawang District of Arunachal Pradesh, which is located on the eastern side of 
Bhutan. It is also known as Wandung. There were heavy clashes in this region during the India - 
China war of 1962.
508
 In the summer of 1984, however, India erected an observation post on the 
bank of Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, where it sent its troops every summer, and withdrew 
every winter. When India returned to Sumdorong Cho in July 1986, it encountered Chinese 
intrusions in the area. Chinese troops had demolished the structures built by India in Sumdorong 
Cho, and built their own structures.
509
. This further increased the tension. In October 1986, the US 
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger visited China. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told 
Weinberger that if New Delhi continued nibbling across the border, China would have to “teach 
India a lesson”510 On October 1986, Indian Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji launched 
Operation Falcon as a response to China.  In Operation Falcon, General Sundarji air-lifted an 
infantry brigade to Zimithang, a helipad near the Sumdorong Chu.
511
 These developments caused 
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increasing predictions of war.
512
 In December 1986, India heightened tensions by declaring Arunachal 
Pradesh as a full-fledged state of the Indian Union. It was a risky move because some parts of 
Arunachal Pradesh was also claimed by China.
513
 In March 1987, the US Secretary of State George 
Schultz visited China and Deng Xiaoping repeated the message that Indian actions could carry 
grave consequences. China backed the seriousness of its threats with military action. China placed 
20,000 troops from the 53
rd
 Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13
th
 Army in Lanzhou in the region by 
early 1987 along with heavy artillery and helicopters.
514
 As a counter move, the Indian Army 
started Operation Checker Board, under which India sent three divisions to positions around 
Wandung in Arunachal Pradesh and supplied 21,000 tons of equipment through airlifts.
515
 On June 
1987, the crisis ceded by the visit of Indian External Affairs Minister N.D. Tiwari to China.
516
 In 
1988, Rajiv Gandhi also visited China. During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, a joint group was established to 
discuss the border issues. The group was first composed of the Indian Foreign Secretary and the 
Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister. Later, senior representatives of the armies and ministries of defense 
also participated in the meetings.
517
 
The most visible mediation on the part of external powers came from the US by means of 
the visits of US Secretary of Defense and US Secretary of State to the region. They brought a 
message sent by China to India. The Soviet Union played a limited role. As the Soviet - China 
relations were improving, the Soviet Union was caught in a dilemma. The crisis broke out just two 
weeks before the anniversary of the India – Soviet Union friendship agreement. It was therefore a 
test for Soviet-Indian relations. Despite this fact, in a state visit of Gorbachov to India, Gorbachov 
refrained from offering explicit Soviet support in a possible war with China. During the Press 
Conference, he refused to take sides.
518
  
The relations between India and China have steadily improved during the 1990s. In 
September 1993, India and China signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and 
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Tranquility, agreeing to reduce their military units along the Line of Actual Control.
519
 During the 
2000s, only some low level tensions have been noted. In July 2006, the relations between India and 
China reached its peak when India and China reopened the Nathu La pass for trading, which 
connects the Indian state of Sikkim with China’s Tibet Autonomous region. The Nathu La pass was 
closed after the 1962 India – China war.520 In April 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and Chinese President Hu Jintao met in Sanja. They agreed to restore full defense co-operation by 
exchanging high-level military delegations.
521
 It was a major breakthrough which facilitated 
arrangements the high-level military issues. However, a certain level of friction also continued. For 
example, a low level military standoff took place in the western sector of the border between India 
and Pakistan. India claimed that Chinese soldiers intruded into India through the western rim of the 
Himalayas. However, the crisis did not escalate and both India and China restored the border that 
existed before 15 April 2013.
522
  
 As described above, the relations between India and China were highly conflictive during 
the 1960s. It witnessed one great war, and several skirmishes. The relationship between the US and 
the Soviet Union did not fulfill Expectation 1. They hardly competed with each other because the 
Soviet Union faced a dilemma. The competition between the Soviet Union and China increased at 
that time. However, the Soviet Union could not have overtly acted against a communist state. The 
Soviet Union also had good relations with India. In contrast, the US sided with India during the 
1962 war. This suits the assumptions of Expectation 2 because in a nonnuclear platform, the 
mediator state does not hesitate to support one party of the conflict. The US supported India and 
protected India against a disproportional use of force by China. The reason could also partly be that 
a greater Chinese influence or communist influence would work against US interests in the region. 
The US therefore allied with India. One can see here that in a conflict where the parties of the 
conflict do not have nuclear weapons, the mediators could promote their own strategic interests. 
They had the luxury of pursuing policies, which maximize their own interest. Once the conflict 
gained a nuclear dimension, however, the US pursued a very limited approach and did not overtly 
support either side of the conflict. We see that in the crisis during the 1980s, especially in Operation 
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Checkerboard, India tried to win US and Soviet support, but failed.
523
 This also fits the criteria of 
Expectation 4 and Expectation 5 in that during the conflicts which have a nuclear dimension, the 
mediators first try to end the crisis, and do not prioritize their own interests. They also reject the 
alignment demands of the parties of the conflict. 
2.3.2 The Relations between the US, Russia, and China in the Post-Cold War Era 
Relations between the US, Russia, and China present elements of collaboration and 
competition. This section seeks to demonstrate that in certain parts of the world, competition 
continues to characterize these relations in the post-Cold World Era. These examples are provided 
from the Kosovo war in 1999, the competition in Central Asia, the competing actions of the US and 
China in the South Asia Sea and competing trade agreements and projects attempted by the US and 
China in different parts of the world. The end of the Cold War had raised much hope, but it did not 
end the competition between major powers. The Kosovo war was the first crisis which tested the 
relations between the US, Russia, and China.  
2.3.2.1 The Competition in Balkans 
Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Kosovo was granted autonomy 
in 1974. In 1989, the then head of the Serbian Communist party Slobodan Milosevic annulled the 
autonomy in Kosovo.
524
 After the dissolution of the SFRY in 1992, Kosovo stayed under the rule of 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which then consisted of the Republics of Montenegro and 
Serbia. The level of violence in the conflict between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians living in 
Kosovo gradually increased.  In 1998, the situation deteriorated beyond repair with the intensification 
of clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian security forces. This led to a 
Serbian offensive in the Kosovo region and ended with the dislocation of the Kosovo population.
525
 
In March 1999, NATO launched an air campaign, justifying its actions as a humanitarian 
intervention. The problem with the NATO air campaign was that it was launched without a UN 
Security Council resolution, causing great resentment on the part of Russia.  
Russia called the UN Security Council, and drafted a resolution with Belarus and India, 
calling for the cessation of use of force against FRY by NATO. Russia’s representative said before 
voting that:  
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“Attempts to justify the military action under the pretext of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe bordered on 
blackmail, and those who would vote against the text would place themselves in a situation of lawlessness. Indeed, the 
aggressive military action unleashed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against a sovereign State was 
a real threat to international peace and security, and grossly violated the key provisions of the United Nations 
Charter.”526 
On 26 March 1999, the draft resolution was rejected. The NATO air campaign continued 
until Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo in June 1999. In February 2008, 
Kosovo declared independence. The US and European major powers recognized the independence 
of Kosovo, against the will of Serbia and Russia, causing great tensions between Russia and the US 
even to present day.
527
  
One of the crucial incidents during NATO’s air campaign was the bombing of China’s 
embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999. After the bombing, the US immediately stated that the attack 
was unintended. US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and CIA Director George J. Tenet 
made a joint statement that: 
“We deeply regret the loss of life and injuries from the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade last night. 
The bombing was an error. Those involved in targeting mistakenly believed that the Federal Directorate of Supply and 
Procurement was at the location that was hit. That military supply facility was the intended target, certainly not the 
Chinese Embassy.”528 
US President Bill Clinton also publicly apologized for the attack.529  
While the US admitted and explained the attack as an accident, the Chinese reaction 
remained harsh. The Chinese Representative to the UN Security Council Qin Huasun stated that: 
“The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, flagrantly attacked the Embassy of 
China with three missiles from different angles and caused serious damage. Two people had died, two were missing and 
many were injured. Flagrant bombing by NATO, led by the United States, had already caused enormous casualties and 
now it had gone so far as to bomb the Chinese Embassy. That was a violation of the sovereignty of China, and of the 
basic norms of international relations. China expressed the utmost indignation and severe condemnation of this 
barbaric activity. It made the strongest protest. NATO, headed by the Unite States, must assume the responsibility. 
China reserved the right to take further measures…The indiscriminate attack constituted a serious breach of 
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international conventions. It was a crime of war and should be punished.”530  
An article released in The Guardian claims, based on three anonymous NATO officers, that 
the US bombing of the Chinese embassy was a deliberate act. The article claimed that the US 
realized that the Chinese embassy was helping the Yugoslavian army’s communications by acting as 
a rebroadcast station. 531 The Guardian article further claims, again based on senior anonymous 
military and intelligence sources in Europe and the US, that the Chinese embassy was “removed 
from a prohibited targets list after NATO electronic intelligence (Elint) detected it sending army 
signals to Milosevic’s forces.” 532 
These developments prevented collaborative behavior between the US, Russia, and China, 
where the US ultimately acted unilaterally in the Kosovo crisis.  
2.3.2.2 The Competition in Central Asia 
Central Asia is another region of contention between the US, Russia and China. The 
competition in Central Asia has many dimensions. For example, the rivalry between the US and 
Russia in Central Asia began right after the end of the Cold War, where the US started to engage 
Central Asia in the 1990s. The main incentive was to integrate Central Asian states with western 
institutions and guarantee US access to energy resources in the region.
533
 The US intensified its 
activities in the region when the military operations started in Afghanistan in 2001. Colin Powell 
told the House International Relations Committee in February 2002 that the US “will have a 
continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of 
before.”534 The US then acquired Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan and Manas Air Base in 
Kyrgyzstan.
535
 This was the peak of US influence in the region. 
 Russia initially approved US presence in Central Asia under the framework of the global 
war against terrorism, and shared the same concern with the US regarding radical Islamic 
organizations in the region. However, Russia later became concerned that the US would stay in 
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Central Asia permanently.
536
 The authoritarian leaders of Central Asia also became increasingly 
suspicious about US intentions. They felt threatened, especially after the Color Revolutions in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. This diminished US influence in the region, and Uzbekistan 
urged the US to leave the military base in 2005.
537
 In 2013, the Kyrgyzstan Parliament gave a one-
year deadline to the US to leave the base. In 2014, the US vacated the military base.
538
  
Recent trade agreements proposed by China also created a sphere of competition between 
major powers. China had initiated the project of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21
st
 Century 
Maritime Silk Road, jointly named One Belt, One Road (OBOR).  The Silk Road Economic Belt 
aims to connect the countries of the ancient Silk Road, to which China historically exported goods. 
It links China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and the Indian 
Ocean. The 21
st
 Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from two routes. One is from 
China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The other route is from 
China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific.539 China’s President Xi Jinping 
first announced the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative during a speech at Nazarbayev University in 
Kazakhstan.
540
 He announced the 21
st
 Century Maritime in a speech to the Indonesian Parliament.
541
 
An article in the Economist argues that these Chinese projects connect Asia and Europe, and 
contradict the following US trade agreements: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). These US trade agreements respectively establish 
Europe and Asia as the main trading partners in trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific trading blocs. The 
US therefore positions itself at the center of two trading blocs. In contrast, China considers Europe 
and Asia as one entity, positioning itself at the central point.
542
 Central Asia plays an important role 
in these Chinese projects as a transit region. Although US President Trump declared to withdraw 
from TTP, it is not known yet whether these Chinese projects will trigger US responses in the 
future. 
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The competition between Russia and China in Central Asia creates another dimension to the 
conflict. Russia and China actually collaborated in certain fields under the framework of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, they viewed each other as competitors in Central 
Asia. Although Russia offered to combine the Chinese One Belt, One Road project with the Russian 
project of the Eurasian Economic Union
543
, it was not clear whether this would eliminate 
competition between the two powers. The Chinese project led to a closer relationship between 
China and Central Asia, this in turn, strengthened China’s influence in the region. China was 
additionally interested in Central Asia because of its rich natural resources and proximity to China. 
This provided China with reliable energy resources, which it desperately needed. One can, however, 
describe Central Asia as a hinterland of Russia. The old pipeline networks built in the Soviet era 
gives Russia control over energy exports from Central Asia. Direct energy deals between Central 
Asia and China would jeopardize Russian dominance in the energy market, which is the backbone 
of the Russian economy.
544
 
2.3.2.3 The Competition in the South China Sea 
The South China Sea is another theater in which China and the US compete. One can divide 
the problems in the South China Sea into two main groups: Exploitation rights and navigation 
rights. The problem with exploitation rights involves the coastal states in the South China Sea: 
Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam. Article 57 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that:  
“The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”545 
It gives coastal states the right to engage in economic activities within the range of 200 
nautical miles, which is their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This causes a problem because the 
EEZs of the coastal states overlap in the South China Sea.
546
 Additionally, there are three groups of 
archipelago in the South China Sea, of which the ownerships are disputed. This causes additional 
problems in terms of maritime rights. The first group of the archipelago is Scarborough Shoal 
(Huangyan Dao in Chinese), and is claimed by both Philippines and China. The second group of 
islands is Paracel Islands (Xisha). They are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The third 
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group of Islands is Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao). China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Vietnam each claim some features over Spratly Islands.
547
  
China claims that most of the archipelagos in the South China Sea are part of its territory. 
China also asserted this belief by sending two notifications to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon, the first one on 7 May 2009
548
 and the second one on 14 April 2011. In the second 
notification, China emphasized that: 
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and 
enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil therefor. China’s 
sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal 
evidence.”549 
The Philippines challenged China’s claim and brought the issue to Arbitral Tribunal on 22 
January 2013. On 12 July 2016, Arbitral Tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines and concluded 
that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights on the South China Sea.
550
 China 
immediately called the decision of the tribunal void and not binding. On 13 July 2016, China’s 
State Council Information Office (SCIO) held a press conference related to a white paper released 
by the Chinese government regarding the dispute between China and the Philippines. During the 
press conference, the spokesperson of the SCIO, Guo Weimin, expressed that the most important 
part of the white paper was that it emphasized Chinese sovereignty on Nanhai Zhudao (the islands 
in the South China Sea). He further explained that Nanhai Zhudao belongs to China and can be 
proven through historical records. 
Weimin further said that:  
“…the Chinese people have been conducting activities in the South China Sea for over 2,000 years. The 
Chinese people say that the South China Sea has been left to us by our ancestors. The arbitration case unilaterally 
initiated by the Philippines and the illegal arbitration by the ad hoc tribunal is a political farce carefully orchestrated 
under the legal pretext. The so-called award is illegal, null and void, and cannot change the fact that Nanhai Zhudao 
are China's inherent territory and can not deny China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the 
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South China Sea. This farce will not cause waves in the South China Sea, a sea that has been passed down to us by our 
ancestors. China's resolve and will to uphold our sovereignty and maritime rights and interests is as firm as ever.”551 
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhemin also emphasized at the same conference that:  
“Nanhai Zhudao are China's inherent territory. The activities of the Chinese people in the South China Sea 
date back to over 2,000 years ago. China is the first to have discovered and named, and explored and exploited Nanhai 
Zhudao and the South China Sea, and the first to have continuously, peacefully and effectively exercised sovereignty 
and jurisdiction over Nanhai Zhudao. China's sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao and the relevant rights and interests in 
the South China Sea have been established in the long course of history.”552 
These statements demonstrate China’s determination of not compromising its position 
regarding the South China Sea, which can also cause problems with the US in the region. Even 
before the Tribunal’s decision was declared, China made its position clear. On 9 June 2016, the 
Chinese Ambassador to Britain Liu Xiaoming gave an interview to western journalists.
553
 Xiaoming 
blamed the US for China’s problematical relationships with its neighbors, and stated that the US 
provoked them. Xiaoming stated :  
 “I think before America's so-called 'rebalancing in Asia Pacific', the South China Sea was very quiet, very 
peaceful. China was talking to the neighboring countries. We had a Declaration of Conduct. And the Philippines was 
talking to us. Once the Americans came in, so-called "rebalancing", things changed dramatically. The Vietnamese 
changed their position with regard to talking to China. The Philippines changed their position. I think the American 
move in the Asia Pacific emboldened those countries to change the traditional channel of negotiation with China. And 
they probably believe that they have the Americans behind them, and they can get a better deal with China. So I'm very 
suspicious of American motives.”554 
Ambassador Liu furthermore stated: 
“Yet Americans now send more reconnaissance planes and warships. What they are doing is not for 
safeguarding free navigation. They are there to challenge China's sovereignty over the islands and reefs. And they make 
a dangerous provocation. China has a legitimate right to check what they are doing. The South China Sea is very wide. 
There is a lot of space and area for American warships and planes to go through. Yet they are not interested in the open 
sea. They are more interested in areas close to China's islands and reefs. What are their intentions? If they do not try to 
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provoke, I think the area and the region will be very peaceful, very stable. So there is no reason for foreign fleet to go to 
the South China Sea to patrol, to protect the free flights, the freedom of navigation.”555 
These statements also allude to problems concerning navigation rights. China claims legal 
rights over the control of sea traffic passing through the islands in the South China Sea. The US, 
however, defends the right of freedom of navigation in international seas and claims that the area is 
open to international sea traffic. Because of this position, the US sent patrols near the artificial 
islands built by China in the South China Sea.
556
 According to an article released by the Wall Street 
Journal, some US officials said that several ally countries in the region approached the US and 
insisted that the US should stand against China’s territorial claims in the region. If they did not, 
China may make additional territorial demands in the region. According to the same report, other 
US allies warned that greater US involvement in the region may have the opposite effect, and 
exacerbate the crisis.
557
  
These developments show that although the US, China and Russia did not compete with 
each other in terms of strategy, concerning the India and Pakistan crises since the 1980s, they 
competed in other parts of the globe. The international structure changed at the end of the Cold 
War, but it did not end the struggles between the US, Russia, and China. It is especially important 
to note that although the relations between China and the US were strained after the Embassy attack 
in Belgrade, China did not change its policy against the US concerning the crisis between India and 
Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil crisis.  
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3 CONCLUSION 
In the conclusion part, I summarized the findings of the dissertation. I first compared the 
outcome of the nonnuclear and nuclear phases of the India – Pakistan crises, and discussed 
whether the results met my assumptions, which I laid out as Expectations. Second, I evaluated 
the results in the nuclear phase in order to expose whether one can observe the second part of 
my hypothesis.  
The first finding is that international mediation was present in the conflict between 
India and Pakistan, even before the conflict gained a nuclear dimension. In the nonnuclear 
phase, however, international mediation was characterized by competition, in which the 
mediator states were prioritizing their own interests. The 1965 and 1971 wars met the 
Expectations mostly concerning the nonnuclear phase. The US, the Soviet Union, and China 
competed with each other as mediator states during this phase. The US was overtly pro-
Pakistan during the crises of 1965 and 1971. It prioritized its relationships with Pakistan and 
considered the impact of its actions on the ally structure. During the 1965 War, in particular, 
the divide between the Soviet Union and China resurfaced. China discredited the Tashkent 
Agreement sponsored by the Soviet Union, and claimed that the agreement was a 
collaboration between imperialists and social imperialists. In most of the statements, China 
used a defamatory language against the US and the Soviet Union in the nonnuclear phase. The 
Soviet Union was pro-Indian and completely antagonistic to the mediation efforts of the US 
and China. In other words, the mediator states supported one party of the conflict, even if it 
increased the tension between India and Pakistan and reduced the effectiveness of mediation. 
These attitudes of mediator states fulfill Expectation 1: competition and Expectation 2: 
mediator states support one party of the conflict.  
 In the nonnuclear phase, India and Pakistan sought maximum support from mediator 
states. When they were not supported, they threatened to change their foreign policy stance. 
This also fits Expectation 3: The sides of the conflict have more maneuver capability to 
choose different foreign policy (alignment) options. Ayub Khan’s threats to approach China in 
the 1965 crisis and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s complaints regarding the lack of US support are 
among the examples of maneuvering capability during the nonnuclear phase. 
In the nonnuclear phase, the 1947 War is a subcase, which met least the Expectations. 
The US and the Soviet Union were struggling with the other problems after the Second World 
War. China was affected by civil war. The interests of the mediator states in 1947 war were 
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therefore very low.  At the end of the 1947 War, tension between India and Pakistan did not 
dissipate. Quite contrary, tensions gradually increased in the 1950s. A further analysis of the 
relations between the US, the Soviet Union, and China in the 1950s reflected the 
Expectations. 
In the nuclear phase, which started with the nuclear tests of India in 1974, data 
illustrated that mediator states refrained from provoking the conflict. The Kahuta crisis in 
1984 and the Brasstacks crisis in 1987 demonstrated that the US and the Soviet Union did not 
compete with each other in order to influence the conflict, although these two conflicts 
occurred during the Cold War. In the Brasstacks crisis, American and Soviet ambassadors 
even worked together to ease the crisis.  
The pattern of collaboration between mediator states is most evident in the 1990 and 
1999 Kargil crises. The US, the Soviet Union, and China did not blame each other for the 
initiation of the conflict during the 1990 crisis. China and the Soviet Union supported the 
Gates Mission initiated by the US. None of the mediator states aligned with one party of the 
conflict, making the mediation solid. Mediator states collaborated in the 1999 crisis as well. 
Neither China nor Russia attempted to discredit the US President Bill Clinton’s mediation 
attempt. In the Kargil crisis, Pakistan tried to align itself with China and the US. These 
Pakistani attempts were rejected by both countries, making the international mediation 
effective. These actions of the mediator states in the 1990 Kashmir and the 1999 Kargil Crisis 
met Expectation 4: collaboration and Expectation 5: collaborative mediation places pressure 
on the sides of the conflict effective.  
 The comparison of the nuclear and nonnuclear phases revealed that once the India – 
Pakistan conflict gained a nuclear dimension, the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, and China 
collaborated to ease the crises between the two countries. This finding supports the first part 
of the hypothesis, and answers my first and second research questions. Crises with nuclear 
dimension influence the relationships between major nuclear states and can cause changes in 
their mediation patterns. 
 The analysis of the crises in the nuclear phase demonstrated that collaboration 
between the US, Russia, and China reduced the alignment options for India and Pakistan. This 
was most obvious in the case of the 1990 Kashmir Crisis and the 1999 Kargil Crisis. In the 
1999 Kargil Crises, Pakistani president Sharif’s attempts to seek assistance from both China 
and the US failed. The US instead made Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Line of Control as a 
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prerequisite for US mediation. This attitude of mediator states put pressure on Sharif because 
of the lack of alignment options. Sharif also used US mediation and strong international 
collaboration as an excuse to back down from the conflict without losing face. Mediation was 
important for Sharif because his position was not strong vis-à-vis the military. The military 
could use an unsuccessful outcome as justification to topple him.
558
 The behavior of mediator 
states therefore played an additional role in reducing the tensions between India and Pakistan, 
apart from the deterrence they posed to each other. The analysis of the Kashmir Crisis in 1990 
and the Kargil crisis in 1999 verified the second part of my hypothesis, and answered my third 
and fourth research questions. This change in behavior of mediator states created a second, 
complementary deterrence, apart from the direct deterrence between parties of the conflict, 
and helped reduced the conflict dynamic. 
Russia, China, and the US collaborated with each other and did not blame each other 
for the conflict in both sub-cases of the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai 
crisis. The extent of the 2001 and 2008 crisis, however, was not as large as the 1990 Kashmir 
and the 1999 Kargil Crises. The international attention was therefore not great concerning 
these crises.  
The examination of the relations between the US, Russia, and China in the post-Cold 
War era revealed ongoing competition from all sides. The end of the Cold War did not 
automatically bring cooperation between them. The nuclear dimension of the crisis was 
therefore the critical factor in facilitating the collaboration between mediator states, not the 
end of the Cold War. 
The analysis of the crises between India and China revealed almost the same pattern as 
the India – Pakistan dyadic conflicts. For example, the US overtly supported India in the Sino-
Indian War in 1962.  The Soviet Union also supported India, though not overtly as the US, 
because China was a communist country. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union released articles in 
Pravda criticizing the Chinese position. After China acquired nuclear capabilities in 1964, the 
US and the Soviet Union did not support one party of the conflict in the 1967 crisis and in the 
crises of 1980s.  
To conclude, I would like to emphasize that after analyzing the many crises one can 
still ask whether direct deterrence between India and Pakistan or the collaborative mediation 
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 The General Musharraf anyways toppled Sharif only couple of months after the Kargil war in 12 October 
1999.  
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of major powers prevented the wars from escalating. It is hardly possible to concretely ascertain 
that collaborative mediation alone prevented wars. For this reason, I viewed collaborative 
mediation as a complementary measure to help direct deterrence, but not as a distinct factor. 
Therefore, I do not argue that collaborative mediation alone hindered the escalation. Here, one 
should remember Schelling’s analogy about the curved slope. Schelling argued that direct 
deterrence is not a sharp cliff, but it is a curved slope. In this respect, even if one is confident 
that stability at the nuclear level is robust, increasing periods of the friction, high pressure, a 
shared territory that decreases the reaction time, all present in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, may 
cause adversaries to slip on the curved slope with each incremental step. This risk exists even 
if the adversaries do not intend to fall down. Collaborative mediation among major powers 
helps to set back these incremental steps because when major powers collaborate, they decline 
the aligning attempts of the parties of the conflict, thus strengthening the probability of 
mediation success. It also provides an opportunity to the parties of the conflict to retreat 
without losing face. These characteristics of collaborative mediation are stronger than the 
mediation of a single strong state, or the mediation of competing major powers. The ad hoc 
nature of collaborative mediation — one that is not highly institutionalized — also facilitates 
mediator states to easily participate in mediation efforts without having to make strong 
commitments, which is different from collective actor deterrence which requires strong 
commitments and consensus between members based on highly institutionalized 
arrangements. 
As a final remark, this study contributes to the international relations discipline in 
identifying nuclear deterrence dynamics between new proliferator states and in 
comprehending the deterrence relationships between new proliferator states and established 
nuclear states. Most deterrence studies analyze the direct deterrence between the US and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, or the deterrence between the US, Russia, and China in 
the post-Cold War era. In other words, they analyze the nuclear deterrence between 
established nuclear states, which already have well-developed communication networks as 
well as standardized operational procedures in times of crisis.  However, these conditions 
hardly exist in the context of relations between new proliferator states. The main challenges in 
the context of new proliferator states are the existence of opaque nuclear capabilities, 
asymmetric proliferation, and the ensuing danger of preemptive and preventive attack by one 
party of the conflict, which already possess nuclear capabilities. The unstable relations and 
limited communication between new proliferator states also aggravate these problems and 
make the situation more dangerous. Under these conditions, the findings of the dissertation 
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are relevant and important in understanding the conflict dynamic and deterrence relations 
between new proliferator states, and the complementary role of collaborative mediation in 
preventing nuclear wars. 
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